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INTRODUCTION 
In June, 1940 defeated France faced Hitler~s Germany. 
After the armistice, the Government took_ refuge in the non-
Occupied zone at Vichy, a city on the banks of the Allier 
River. This France governed from Vichy, represented the 
legal country from July, 1940 to 1944. 1 The northern part 
of the country (north of the Loire River) was occupied and 
administered by the German military government: it was the 
Occupied Zone. France had been cut into pieces and in the 
metropolitan territory, the French people were forbidden to 
enter certain zones (East and Atlantic Coast); or zones 
annexed from France such as Alsace-Lorraine, Savoie and the 
Department of the Nord. 
I 
The new Vichy leaders, such aa Petain and Laval, took 
the country in hand. From the end of Summer, 1940, the 
aryanization movement was legitimized. This movement made 
it possible for leaders to exclude opposing political 
factions (communists, trade unionists, free masons and Jews) 
from most of the jobs, professions, and education in partic-
ular. At this time, education was so important that the 
responsibility for the defeat of 1940 was attributed to its 
shortcomings. 
1 The fall of the Vichy regime occurred in Oct., 1944, 
although Vichy was occupied by German forces in 1942. 
1 
2 
If Napoleon had structured the French educational 
system, it was not until Jules Ferry that school instruction 
became part of the French society and a necessity for the 
Republicans.2 Until this time, education was for the 
elite and upper class--the Bourgeoisie and the clergy. 
Under the Third Republic, education in the primary school 
became compulsary, free and secular for all youths. 
During this time, teachers at all levels of education, 
including primary, secondary and university professors were 
accused of having introduced their students to pacifist 
ideas. Therefore, by modification of the educational system 
that Vichy leaders wished to lead the country in a "national 
revolution." They thought they could assure the future of 
France with Marshal Petain, Chief of the French State, as 
its head. Education was to be an immediate and powerful 
weapon of propaganda which would aid and justify legitimate 
new orientations of the country (patriotism, the family, 
education). 
/ 
Members of Petain#s cabinet, such as Pierre Laval, 
wanted to apply the German system of education to French 
education. Part of their desire was to placate the 
Germans. Education had to be rapidly aryanized in both 
2 Antoine Prost, Histoire de l#Ensejgnement en France 
1800-1967, (Paris, A. Colin, Coll. U., 1968), p. 193. 
3 
the public and private schools. In France, anti-Semitism 
was built in a "legislative program established by jurists 
and promulgated by an authority duly qualified."S 
The anti-Semitism of Vichy was therefore an anti-
Semitism of the state which was baaed on police regulations. 
The roots of these regulations were in the French legal 
system. The number of Jewish students in schools were 
recorded and limited, and Jewish professors were dismissed. 
From July, 1940 to November, 1942, the government of 
Vichy promoted the famous "National Revolution." The 
National Revolution was symbolized by this New Regime and by 
this new ideology. The country was no longer spoken of as 
I 
France, but as the French State. The motto of Petain, Chief 
of the new government of Vichy, was "Work, Family, Country." 
I 
When Petain took hold of the Vichy government, he wished to 
restore order--a reaction to what he saw as the social con-
dition of that era. / Petain proclaimed this new slogan, 
which was reactionary for the twentieth century. After 
sixty years of lay rule in France, the New Regime offered 
a cultural, social and political challenge to the French 
people. I Petain~s ideas were to defend the country, rebuild 
and lift France and maintain peace. For this, the French 
3 Robert 0. Paxton and Michael R. Marrus, Vichy et les 
Jujfs, (Paris: Calman-Levy, Coll. Diaspora, 1981), p. 138. 
4 
people were expected to be ready to serve the government. 
They were to be ready for discipline and collaboration with 
the National Revolution. In short, they were to be a New 
Order. 
Thia Vichy idea was found among Catholics who proposed 
dignity and happiness, order in work, and the return to the 
earth and its natural values. Individuals were expected to 
reject the perversity of cities. The Catholics equally 
preached a sense of discipline and the authority of a new 
Chief of the French State. It was necessary to restore the 
notion of family based on education. The ideology of the 
National Revolution was more than a collection of terms and 
languages taken from the Catholic Church--it was the 
language of moralists. I As Petain said on June 25, 1940, 
"the spirit of enjoyment has destroyed what the spirit of 
sacrifice has built." 
The Third Republic was criticized and often called the 
"Old Regime." The people of Vichy condemned and rejected 
,,. 
the faults of the defeat of the previous regime. For Petain 
the French Army had paid for the enormous mistakes of the 
previous regime: incapacity of the personnel of the Third 
Republic and the corruption which was so prevalent in 
Parliament. The role of education was of prime importance 
I 
for Petain. He wanted to be Minister of Public Education 
when he was appointed Minister of War of the Third Republic. 
5 
According to him, the school should be required to inculcate 
the sentiment of grandeur, the continuity of the country, 
and respect for moral and religious beliefs by the child (in 
particular, the ones professed by France). At school, books 
were to be well selected. Lectures were to be historical 
and moral so they were able to support the new ideology of 
I 
Petain. For him, moral values had to be taught in the 
schools. Directly tied to the education at the beginning of 
1940, certain theoretical measures hit teachers and Jewish 
pupils--that was the aryanization of education. This racism 
was not entirely the work of the legislation under Petain. 
The peak of racism occurred under the Third Republic. Play-
wright Jean Giraudoux in his book, Plein Pouyoir, exposed 
his republic anti-Semitism by saying, "[ ... ]wishes a 
ministry of race." 4 As early as 1930, Christian students 
asked for the departure of foreigners judged too numerous, 
too bright and therefore too dangerous. In 1938 in l~Action 
Franlaise, / Leon Daudet wrote an article stating: "A statute 
on the Jews in France should be established as early as 
possible." 
4 Jean Giraudoux, Plein Pouyoir, cited by Paxton and 
Marrus, Vichy et les Jujfs, p. 52-53. 
Concretely, however, the first racist laws appeared in 
France in July and August, 1940. It was under the powerful 
influence of Algeria that the origin of racist legislation 
started because in Algeria Muslims were hostile to Jews. 
(Of 1.2 million Europeans in Algeria, 110,000 were Jews--
about 10 percent; while in France, the percentage was less 
than 1 percent--350,000 Jews to over 42 million French.) 
I From the Dreyfus Affair to Leon Blum, France was ready 
for a new era and Marcel Peyrouton, (ex-governor of Algeria, 
appointed Minister of the Interior of Vichy in September, 
1940) was the head of these changes. On October 7, 1940, 
a law was passed which recognized the abrogation of the 
Cremieux Law, which dated from 1870 and gave French citi-
zenship to the Jews. 
In French education, one witnessed a collective resist-
ance which suddenly had taken root in the double shock of 
def eat and the indictment organized by the beginning Vichy 
Regime. The 15,000 primary teachers were surprised to find 
that they were considered responsible for the defeat of 
1940. Was it to fight against this vague accusation that 
some of them enlisted in the Resistance? Did they feel the 
Vichy menace, while others faithfully supported the politi-
cal changes of Summer, 1940 and were faithful to Marshal 
Petain--this public school director, layman and World War I 
veteran? Petain was impregnated by the civic spirit and was 
7 
following the great founders of the lay echool and Vichy 
moralism. Those people wanted the return to a "pure repub-
licanism."5 Other educators (conscious or not of the 
seriousness of their involvement) were completely manipu-
lated by the Office of Propaganda. This office sent ardent 
panegyric letters to the personnel of the Chief of the 
French State: "You carry like a cross, the enormous weight 
of our destiny ... you are a real king of France ... one of our 
greatest kings."s This style of literature disappeared 
little by little. However, the Office of Propaganda gradu-
ally stopped sending these letters because of the ineffi-
ciency of the new government. 
At the time of the Liberation, few educators were 
active in groups such as "Friends of the Marshal" and 
"Collaboration."7 For the most part, teachers were not 
anti-Semitic. They came from the working class and followed 
the social and political ideas of the times. By nature, 
they were nationalistic and republican with communistic 
tendencies. In contrast to the anti-Semitic movement at 
this time, Catholics grasped the opportunity for a religious 
revival, especially in the teaching field. 
0 Yves Durand, Vichy. 1940-44, (Paris: Bordas, 1972), 
pp. 89-90. 
6 L~Espoir Fran9ais, Nov., 1942. 
, 
7 Le Memorial Universitaire lists approximately 400 names 
of groups. Documented at the Institut d~Histoire du Temps 
Present in Paris. 
8 
On the other side of the political game, according to 
historian W. D. Halls, there were more than 2,000 communist 
primary teachers in 1940-41.s However, the great major-
ity of the professors were not politically involved until at 
least 1942. This does not signify that they had remained 
completely passive and indifferent to external events or the 
school politics of Vichy. But since Summer, 1940 they could 
not speak out. It was in this artificially provoked silence 
that they finally found refuge. Laval and Bennard tried to 
bring them back to give a second life to the dying National 
Revolution in the Spring of 1942. 
This study proposes to evaluate the educational policy 
of the Vichy government and its impact on French primary and 
secondary education, including the subject of aryanization. 
It will define and evaluate the diverse roles of the 
Ministers of National Education during the Vichy period. 
Certain influential members of their staff as well as the 
role of the General Commission of the Jewish Question (CGQJ) 
will also be discussed. This study is based on texts and 
legislation which determined the education of this contro-
versial period in modern French history. New programs, 
schoolbooks and instructions given to students and teachers 
of primary and secondary schools in the public and private 
sector will also be analyzed. 
a W. D. Halls, The Youth of Vichy France, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981). 
9 
Halls discusses the same period in his book, The Youth 
of Vichy France,e but in a much broader sense. Although 
this work was extremely helpful in the preparation of this 
study, Halls himself stated in the preface that he dealt 
only briefly with the principal educational changes. In 
Vichy et les Juifs,10 an interesting and influential work, 
Paxton and Marrus give a general overview of the same 
subject, however, research for this study was concentrated 
solely on the impact of VichyJs educational policy on French 
primary and secondary education during the German Occupation 
of France. 
e W. D. Halls, ibid. 
10 Robert 0. Paxton and Michael R. Marrus, ibid. 
CHAPTER I 
ANTI-SEMITISM 
Anti-Jewish Legislation Under Vichy 
In France, the hunt for the Jews started quickly under 
the Constitutional Act No. 7 of July 17, 1940. This act gave 
' full governmental power to Marshal Petain, which permitted 
him to summarily dismiss those judged "undesirable." 
In July, 1940, the Journal Officiel1 published a list 
of 1,328 teachers opposing the new Regime. The goal of this 
publication was to publicly dishonor these thousands of 
functionaries, republicans, communists, trade unionists, free 
masons and Jews. 
Among the intellectuals, anti-Semitism was fashionable, 
but they were not the only ones to hold this view; the man on 
the street was anti-Semitic as well. Thus the adoption of 
the anti-Jewish legislation by Vichy, which will be discussed 
later, was not the result of true German pressure. On the 
contrary, anti-Semitism dated back to the thirties when 
France saw an increase of xenophobia coming from the Right 
.l. Journal Officiel, July 18, 1940. 
10 
11 
(Catholic and nationalist groups). This was reinforced by 
a Leftist group which was anarchist, anti-capitalist and at 
times attracted Jews like Leon Blum. The pre-war press. 
witnessed the virulence and the exacerbation of this French 
anti-Semitism. 2 
In the first issue of the newspaper, Journal Anti-Juif, 
published June 3, 1937, Darquier exposed his objectives: 
" ... a quota for Jews in higher education ... "s Four years 
later his wishes became reality thanks to the new law. In 
I 1938, an article signed by Leon Daudet in L~Action Fran~aise 
affirmed: "A special statute for Jews in France is impera-
tive .. " In this atmosphere, 1939 marked the height of 
anti-Semitism in France. 
Just before the war, France was indeed the center of an 
intense anti-Semitism. The University students in Paris were 
the most clamorous and unanimous group of anti-Semites. 
These pressures, which had already existed for three years, 
influenced the government of Vichy and resulted in the first 
2 Ralph Schor, "Xenophobia and the Extreme Right: The 
Example of the People~s Friends (1928-1937)", Revue of Modern 
and Contemporary History, Jan./Mar. 1976, pp. 116-144. 
3 Journal Anti-Juif, June 3, 1937. 
12 
racist laws of July and August, 1940. As stated by the well 
known historians, Paxton and Marrus, none of these laws con-
cerning Jews had been imposed by the Occupying Authorities: 
It is certain that Vichy has inaugurated its own anti-
semitic politics before the publication of the first 
German text, and without having received the direct order 
of the Germans.4 
Vichy held all the authority to take these measures and used 
German law as a model for the new French laws. This French 
anti-Jewish legislation on teaching appeared at first to be 
very surprising to the Germans, but they soon wished this 
legislation to become more and more restrictive. The role of 
the Germans was, in fact, limited to making these laws a 
model for all of France.6 Early on, the Occupation 
Authorities were very interested in publishing pro-German 
propaganda. As early as September, 1940 the first famous 
OTTO list was printed in Paris.s It banned certain 
4 Paxton and Marrus, p. 130. 
6 A.N. A.J. 38119, Dossier 5 S/C 28. Concerning the state 
of German pressures Apr. 4, 1942. German authorities asked 
for a modification of the French law of July 21, 1941 (asking 
that immatriculation be assimilated in France the same way as 
in Algeria, with registration in the faculties). They wished 
to see fines and imprisonment added to the law in cases of 
false declarations at the time of registration. 
6 Named for Otto Abetz, German Ambassador to France and 
Head of the Propaganda Office in Paris. The OTTO List at the 
International Library of Contemporary Documentation (BDIC) 
contained in Appendix I. 
13 
authors such as, Henri Michel, Louis Aragon, Andr~ Maurois, 
I / 
Charles Maurras, Charles de Gaulle, Leon Blum, Leon Daudet, 
and surprisingly, Adolf Hitler. (No explanation was given 
regarding Hitler~s works.) Also in 1940, French authorities 
expressed their desire7 to go ahead with an annual revision 
of schoolbooks. In his circular of December 7, 1940, Pierre 
Chenevrier, President of the Commission of Revision, 
announced the overhaul of the school libraries. 
The textbooks of Jules Isaac, a famous editor of French 
educational books, had been blacklisted since September, 1940 
(as would be mentioned two years later by the French Minister 
of Education in an interview). "It is unacceptable that the 
history of France is taught to young French by an Isaac."s 
The interdiction of Isaac~s manuals did not immediately elim-
inate all the copies in circulation, but they rapidly became 
limited because bookshelves were inspected by the police. 
Hachette, the publishing house, had outdated history books 
removed from circulation since the defeat of France in 
1940.e In addition to some books and authors being 
7 Decree of Aug. 21, 1940. Journal Officiel, Aug. 23, 
1940. 
8 A. Bonnard, Nov. 13, 1942 in Grinioire. A.N. A.J. 3870, 
Dossier M 797. "We should not have France represented by a 
Jew, especially to teach our language." Letter of Boutmy, 
at the CGQJ, sent to Miss Maurel of the State Secretary of 
Education. 
9 Paxton and Marrua, p. 273, note 51. Jules Isaac, as 
were others, was retired Dec. 20, 1940 in application of 
the statute of Oct. 3, 1940. 
14 
forbidden under the Occupation, schoolbooks were also revised 
/ 
and corrected in the interest of Petain"s ''National Revolu-
tion." The Occupation Authorities became demanding vis~a-vis 
the teachers and Jewish children. 10 These pressures were 
geared toward French children to improve the image of Germany 
in relation to the outcome of World War I. 
The Occupation Authorities first announced their project 
of education for the Jews in October, 1941. Xavier Vallat, 
who was part of the CGQJ, told of his meeting on September 
19, 1941 with the German Dr. Storz.11 Both discussed 
future distributions of the UGIF. 
German authorities put pressure on national education in 
order to concentrate the Jews in private schools. Vallat had 
resisted this project and for this reason was replaced by 
Darquier on May 6, 1942. 
The Germans also assumed the role of supervision over 
French laws. To do so, they used the CGQJ, which was created 
by Vichy at the suggestion of the Germans. With the arrival 
of Darquier at the CGQJ, the Germans thought "the time had 
come to put pressure on the government in order to obtain 
exclusion of Jewish teachers from private schools."12 
10 J. Carcopino. Souvenirs de Sept Ans. 1937-44, (Paris, 
Flammarion, ed., 1953), p. 371. 
11 Xavier Vallat, Ecrits dans La Prison de Fresnes. 
(n.p., Hoover Institute, Nov., 1947), p. 668. 
12 Cited by Carcopino in Souvenirs, p. 371. 
15 
The Germans also deplored the fact that numerous Jewish 
professors taught in the private schools. Particularly 
shameful for them was the situation at the Berlitz school in 
Paris, where Jews taught German! 
Concerning the education of Jewish children, there was 
equally strong pressure from the authorities, at least in 
four cases. In the archives, a file of the military admini-
stration of May 18, 1942 noted, "that the moment has come to 
pressure the government in order to obtain a) separation of 
Jewish pupils and b) a quota in secondary education ... "13 
This pressure was not successful. The Germans tried again 
on February 16, 1943: 
They tell me that the Isaac pupils of the Jules Ferry 
Lycee in Paris are regularly taken to gymnastic lessons 
at the same time as the Aryan pupils. It appears to be 
the same for pupils of the Lycee Racine. I ask you to 
control these actions, stop this disastrous situation of 
things, and report to me about measures taken by you.14 
The procedure was clever because the Germans directed 
themselves to the CGQJ instead of obtaining restrictive 
legislation from the government of Vichy. Focusing on the 
i lycees in particular, the Germans hoped to impose their will 
in the schools, but here they met with another failure due to 
the firmness of the schools~ directors. It seemed that no 
order was given in metropolitan France to exclude the Jews 
13 Letter signed by S.S. Officer Ahnert (Untersturmfuhrer), 
CX II-34. Translated and kept in the Archives, XLI-34. 
14 ibid. 
16 
from teaching in higher education where the number of Jewish 
professors was minimal. These professors were badly needed 
at the university level. This does not signify that the 
pressure of the Occupation Authorities was ineffective in 
primary and secondary education, where the number of attacks 
on teachers were more frequent and aimed at more diverse 
groups (communists, free masons and Jews as well). 
Nevertheless, as a consequence of multiple administra-
tive requests by Vichy and German pressure on this subject, 
the CGQJ gave orders to compile a census of pupils and Jewish 
students. This census started in February, 1943; first in 
Paris, then in the provinces during the last weeks of 1944. 
The possibility of a complete separation of students was not 
excluded. Most likely, if the course of the war had not 
changed, Jewish children would have been separated from their 
non-Jewish companions in kindergarten, primary and secondary 
schools just as they were in Algeria. 
This role, which the Occupation Authorities expected 
to play in the aryanization of education, was verified in 
a specific study by the National Conservatory of Music and 
Dramatic Art of Paris (CNMAD) during the Occupation.1e 
Furthermore, under the influence of Otto Abetz, the 
German authorities gave direct instruction to Henri Robard, 
a member of the Institute and Director of the Conservatory. 
1 5 A.N. A.J. 38-119 and 38-65, CNMAD, Doc. CX-4. 
17 
TheY found out that Miss Dehelly, who was half-Jewish, had 
been awarded First Prize in acting in a competitive examina-
tion. They deplored this and insisted that prizes should not 
be distributed to Jewish students and asked that they be 
excluded from competitions. 
These exigencies were not supported by any French law. 
Therefore, the Director of the Conservatory referred this 
incident to his superiors. Georges Ripert, who was Minister 
of Education at the time, was informed. Following this 
incident, Ripert wrote to Fernand de Brinon, Delegate of the 
French Government to German Administration in France, in 
order to expose the fact that the Director of the Conserva-
tory had to admit students to competitive examinations with-
out segregation by race. Refusal to allow students to test 
and thus deny them the benefit of rewards uniquely on the 
basis of their origin constituted a case of cancellation of 
the competitive examination. 
The MinisterJs tone was firm, but Fernand de Brinon was 
an ultra-collaborationist and had more of a tendency to 
represent Germany in France than France in Germany. As a 
journalist, he had the privilege to interview the Fuhrer 
Adolf Hitler as early as November 16, 1933.16 The news 
reels showed him all over France as Ambassador under the 
Occupation. However, being very ambitious, he denounced 
his own colleagues to the Germans. 
16 Le Matin, Nov. 19, 1933. 
18 
Ripert also wrote to Louis Hautecoeur,17 the General 
Secretary in charge of the Arts. He advised diplomacy in 
regard to the Occupation Authorities: " ... in the actual 
circumstances it is advisable to avoid putting Jewish and 
half-Jewish students on public display."18 The directives 
of Minister Ripert were transmitted to Albert Rivaud: 
"Although in principle Jewish students are accountable under 
French law, they are obliged to take into account the German 
administration in occupied France." In answer, Rivaud com-
plained to Hautecoeur that the Occupation Authorities were 
more and more intransigent, and he had to inform the con-
cerned students that they could not take part in examinations 
and competitions at the end of the year. As a consequence, 
the students found themselves on leave for one year. This 
year, of course, was not taken into account as one of their 
years of study. The maximum number of years for study was 
established by regulations. On March 28, 1941, Hautecoeur 
inquired about this question again and suggested to de Brinon 
the establishment of a system of non-matriculated students 
just as it was done in universities. Fernand de Brinon was 
against this idea and was in favor of a more conservative 
approach. 
17 Ex-Curator of the Museum of Luxembourg, who was named 
High Commissioner of Fine Arts in Aug., 1940. 
18 Letter from Ripert to Hautecoeur, Nov. 30, 1940. 
19 
The new director of the CNMAD, Claude Delvincourt, 
again submitted a request to the Secretary of the Arts on 
MaY 14, 1941 that measures against half-Jews "contrarily to 
the law" be rescinded. The complaint of a parent, who was 
the father of a harp student, (half-Jewish because of two 
grandparents who were Jewish) to Hautecoeur on May 19, 1941 
was successful; 19 and five days later, the CGQJ informed 
the National Education that half-Jewish students could again 
present themselves to the competitive examination of the 
Conservatory.20 What was the meaning of this relaxation 
of the rules when only one month before the Germans had 
attempted to impose their will? 
Perhaps things became more complicated with the French 
law of June 21, 1941 which established a quota for the 
Jewish students. The Conservatory of Paris again became a 
kind of pilot school in France regarding the anti-Jewish 
measures. Were those the result of new pressures from the 
Germans? 
19 "I was received this morning by the Underfuhrers Prisig 
and Bauman, who formally declared to me that they are in 
agreement with this interpretation." (The French statute of 
Oct. 3, 1940 did not include the half-Jews.) 
2o Letter of CGQJ, Vichy, Mar. 16, 1943 to the Regional 
Directors of the CGQJ of Lyon/Toulouse. CX CII-75 and 
XVIIa-41 (198). 
20 
A conference on October 31, 1941 had determined 
specific regulations for Jewish students at the School of 
Music and Dramatic Arts in Paris. What was very strange 
was that this same document stipulated that "no similar 
regulation has been considered for the conservatories of 
the provinces to which access is, therefore, free for Jew-
ish students."21 This was not the end of the matter. 
On April 2, 1942, the new French Minister, Carcopino decided 
that the National Conservatory of Music and Dramatic Arts of 
Paris was not part of higher education. Therefore, this 
school was not required to apply the regulatory requirement 
of 3 percent quota of Jews. A le~t~r written on May 18, 
1942 informed the Dean that the Director of the National 
Conservatory of Music and Dramatic Arts Projects was to have 
the Jewish students compete in the year-end examination in 
closed-door sessions, but without giving them rewards or 
diplomas. Another letter of June 3, 1942 revealed how the 
Director of the CNMAD had lamented the lack of directives 
from the Ministry of Education: "Even though I have asked 
repeatedly for more than one year for precise instructions, 
I cannot get them." 
21 Letter of CGQJ to Vichy, Mar. 16, 1943. 
21 
This started a press campaign by Le Petit Parisien and 
other newspapers. All the laws relating to education were 
brought back into question. Because of Carcopino~s 
indecision, the new Minister of Education, Abel Bennard for--
bade participation of Jewish students in competitions and 
examinations. Three months later, (September 21) Bennard 
ordered Delvincourt to take radical and effective measures. 
He replied: 
I have notified all Jewish students of the Conservatory 
that I was under obligation to dismiss them, effective 
October 1, 1942; and in addition, I request from new 
applicants who come for admission a -declaration of 
aryanity supported by presentation of the identity card 
for candidates of 15 years of age ... 22 
On March 4, 1943, measures were put into effect. The 
CGQJ informed the Ministry of Education that by virtue of 
the law of June 6, 1942, Jews were banned from artistic 
professions: 
No Jew can be accepted or allowed to continue in the 
Conservatory. It would be more than strange to see 
Jewish students wearing the yellow star in the 
Occupied Zone participating in public examinations 
and competitions.23 
2 2 Letter of Delvincourt to Bennard, Oct. 7, 1942. 
23 For the CNMAD, Doc. CXC III-87, 12; A.N. A.J. 38 119, 
Dossier 5 S/C 6 and 14. A.J. 3865, Dossier 797, Beaux Arts. 
22 
Special permits could be issued, however, if Jews had 
the proper contacts. A letter of July 7, 194424 (a few 
weeks before the liberation of Paris) was sent by the CGQJ 
to the Conservatory with information that an inquiry on the 
~racial quality~ of 12 students at the school had occurred. 
The Occupation Authorities attempted to impose their 
will on schools by multiple pressures. They attacked not 
only the CNMAD, but the School of Commerce as well.26 
One wonders if the German Authorities wanted to make those 
schools a model for their ideology. As we have seen, many 
of the numerous projects for the aryanization of education 
did not succeed. The true aryanization of education was the 
result of French laws. The Germans had French extremists 
under their control who were ready to do anything. The 
Germans did not hesitate to distribute funds generously to 
individuals and anti-Semitic groups. For the Germans, the 
virulence of these collaborators constituted an effective 
means to implement Vichy politics in reference to the Jewish 
question. Politically speaking, the choice was right. 
24 ibid. 
26 Rothke, a member of the SS, learned by the newspaper, 
Jeunesse, on May 3, 1942 that 15 percent of the pupils at 
the School of Commerce on the Avenue de la Republique, were 
Jewish (letter of July 11, 1942); on Feb. 1, 1943, Ahnert, 
another member of the SS, deplored the too-high number of 
Jewish pupils in the School of Commerce. 
23 
After July 22, 1940, the law permitted the revision of 
naturalization. This changed the status of thousands of 
people. Among those, 6,307 Jews who were naturalized French 
citizens in the twenties and thirties, brutally became 
foreigners in France. Those laws of naturalization were 
promulgated at an accelerated rhythm and were aimed 
specifically at the Jewish educators.26 
The law of October 3, 194027·was the base of the 
I 
legal persecution signed by Petain, Laval (First Minister), 
and Alibert (Minister of Justice). This law forbade the 
Jews to hold public office.· In the Occupied Zone, the Ger-
man Ordinance attached merely a religious significance to 
the Jews; while the French law utilized the word "race." 
This law was much more restrictive and severe than the 
German ordinance and defined Jews as those with three 
grandparents of the "Jewish race." Article I is specific 
as to who would be classified as a Jew (having a spouse 
26 Aug. 13, 1940: Dissolution of secret societies. July 
30, 1940: The law permitted the "Frenchification" of the 
administration. Journal Officiel, Aug. 1, 1940. Already 
the law of Nov. 12, 1938 had opened the way to a revision 
of naturalization. 
27 The French law of Oct. 3, 1940 had resounding similar-
ities to the German Ordinance of Sept. 27, 1940, which had 
defined "Jew" for the Occupied Zone. Journal Officiel, 
Oct. 18, 1940. This law became effective on Dec. 26, 1940 
and was signed by the following ministers: Huntzinger, 
Darlan, Peyrouton, Bouthillier, Boudoin, Caziot and Belin. 
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considered Jewish), or a "half-Jew;" that is to say, someone 
with only two Jewish grandparents. Article 2 of the French 
law forbade the Jews access to and exercise of public 
functions. The fourth point of this article concerned edu-
cation in particular. It specified that Jews could no 
longer be "members of the teaching corps." Thus, Jewish 
teachers and professors were included by this law.2s 
In Article 8, contrary to German legislation, Vichy 
France considered exceptions based on ·"exceptional services 
rendered to the French State", such as veterans from World 
War I. This was subject to varying interpretations.20 
The Jewish educators, hoping to benefit from Article 8 
(which considered exceptions), understood very well the 
expression, "exceptional services rendered to the French 
State." This same law of October 3, 1940 granted an 
indemnity for licensed functionaries who could justify 
fifteen years seniority.30 
2e Exceptions consisted of the veterans of 1914-1918 or 
those of 1939-40 cited by military medals and those of the 
Legion of Honor--they could keep their teaching posts. 
(Article 3, Paragraphs a, b, c.) 
29 Article 8 defined that "by individual decree taken on 
the advice of the State and in the literary, scientific and 
artistic domains have rendered exceptional services to the 
French State" could be exempt from prior interdictions by · 
the persecutory law. 
I 30 Law signed Dec. 2, 1940 by Petain, Bouthillier and 
Baudin, published in Journal Officiel, Feb. 7, 1941. Special 
indemnity was in theory only. It was very difficult for the 
licensed Jewish teachers to reach the indemnity category or 
to retire. Even more difficult to apply was Law 1499 of Apr. 
3, 1941, which previewed indemnities for widows of function-
aries put into retirement by the law of Oct. 3, 1940. 
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Article 9 specified that this law addressed itself to 
all French territory, which included Algeria, the colonies, / 
countries under the protectorate, and territories under man-
date. These different articles projected a will of revenge 
of the French Republic detested by the new government of 
Vichy. With approval to apply racist politics, which 
created a General Commission of the Jewish Question, a 
purely French organization,31 thousands of Jewish teachers 
were condemned to forced unemployment by the Commission. 
This added a new attack against the Jewish teachers.s2 
Article 1 of the law of June 21, 1941 stipulated" ... 
3 percent of the Jewish students enrolled during the preced-
ing school year can be enrolled per year for one year" and 
therefore were not authorized to enroll themselves in the 
schools where 3 perpent of the students were Jewish. Excep-
tions were considered, but it was even more difficult for 
the students to benefit from these exceptions than for the 
teachers.33 Article 2 of this law showed a preferential 
31 Journal Offjciel, Mar. 31, 1941. With the law of Mar. 
29, 1941 a budget of more than 2 million francs was given to 
the GCQJ. The State Secretary was Xavier Vallat (appointed 
Apr. 4, 1941) and Darquier of Pellepoix, (who replaced him 
on May 6, 1942 because Vallat was judged too anti-German for 
the Occupying Authorities) as Commissioner General. 
3 2 Journal Officiel, June 24, 1941. Law 2570, dated .June 
21, 1941, signed by P~tain, Darlan and Carcopino is applic-
able before Oct. 31, 1941. 
sa Journal Officiel, Jan. 21, 1942. Law 5275 (Dec. 19, 
1941) required Jewish students to prove that five genera-
tions had lived in France, and that "exceptional services" 
had been rendered by the family. 
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order against admission of Jewish students and confirmed the 
policies of the Vichy government, which gave preference to 
"a good Frenchman"34 more than to a good student. 
The third Article of this law specified the procedure 
to follow in selecting Jewish students. A commission of 
five designated professors had to accede to the following 
demands before September 15: A list was to be completed 
before October 31 and posted in establishments of higher 
education. The students not admitted had one month to 
petition against this exclusion. A board, which consisted 
of the faculty of the school or the institute, would decide 
each case. In reality, this "Phase II Operation" was more 
theory than practice. It was not ignored, but received 
little attention. 
In liaison with the CGQJ and the national police, a 
separate force called the Police of the Jewish Question was 
created on October 19, 1941. It lasted until July 5, 1942, 
and Durieux served as its Director.35 A month later, 
these police were placed in the "Section of Problems and 
Controls" (SEC) which was attached to the CGQJ. These anti-
Jewish police were very efficient and zealous. They veri-
f ied the status and statements of Jewish professors and 
34 Orphans of the military (sons or daughters) dying for 
France (first category) had more of a chance to follow 
their studies than "particularly deserving students" 
(sixth category). 
I 
36 Rene Bousquet, Secretary General of Police for the 
Ministry of the Interior. Under his orders, the Director 
of Administration Fran9ois , and the General Police dir-
ected the Jewish Section to the prefecture from Oct., 1940. 
students. New stipulations in the Decree of November 19, 
194136 countersigned by Carcopino, Minister of National 
Education, substituted the very explicit expression of 
"having to cease their functions, or to occupy their jobs 
after December 20, 1940."37 Carcopino, relieved to have 
' 
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countersigned this stipulation, added cynically that he had 
not been "the most responsible for issuing the laws." 
The French law of November 29, 1941 created the General 
Union of the Israelites of France (UGIF)3S which united 
all the Jewish organizations. This new association, spon-
sored by Vichy, was directly controlled by the CGQJ and 
completely supervised by the Occupying Authorities. The 
role of this association was ambiguous. One month after the 
creation of the UGIF, the last law of 1941 concerning the 
Jews was signed on December 31.39 This law concerned 
the authorization of Jewish private education in Algeria 
36 Journal Officiel, Dec. 2, 1941, Decree 5062. 
37 Jerome Carcopino, Souvenirs de Sept Ans, 1937-44, 
(Paris: Flammarion, 1953), p. 368. 
3 a Maurice Rajfus. Les Juifs dans le Collaboration -
UGIF, 1941-44, (Paris: Maspero, 1980), p. 403. 
39 Journal Officiel, Jan., 1942. Law 5535 (Dec. 31, 1941) 
signeti by Pltain, Carcopino and Pucheu. The law of Oct. 19, 
1942 was made for Algeria, concerning the conditions for 
admissions for Jewish students in private establishments. 
The anti-Jewish laws were not abolished with the embarkment 
of the Allies in North Africa on Nov. 8, 1942. For example, 
in the primary schools, it would have been necessary to 
attend since Jan. 21, 1944 for the State to void the quota. 
to exclude all higher education. At any moment, Jewish 
educational establishments and schools could be closed by 
governmental directives. 
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A German ordinance in the Occupied Zone dated May 29, 
1942 required Jews over the age of six to wear a yellow star 
whenever they left their home. (The Vichy government 
refused to hear of this measure in the non-Occupied Zone.) 
This ordinance had many repercussions in the schools. Jew-
ish students were harassed by their classmates and teachers. 
On July 8, 1942 another ordinance was promulgated by the 
Germans which forbade Jews of the Occupied Zone to frequent 
public place_s. 
Different laws and decrees directly or indirectly 
concerned the aryanization of education. It is important 
to remember that some of these laws were drafted to conform 
with the pre-war French laws. Since 1938, French laws 
severely limited the number of foreigners in France. There-
fore, the Vichy government rejected republican tradition by 
designating those French judged unworthy of the title of 
"French citizen." This attempt was not innovative, but had 
gone further than republican tradition. It would be con-
venient to place the only responsibility for these laws on 
the Vichy government. But history has shown diverse 
pressures were faced by the Vichy government to which the 
Republic was not subjected: war, invasion, exodus, death, 
loss of territory, low morale, military collapse, and 
economic disorder. In fact, a number of documents dating 
from the Occupation clearly demonstrate that during the 
Vichy era the French attributed Vichy~s anti-Semitic 
attitude to the Occupying Nazi authorities. Few French 
were acquainted with the existence of the anti-Jewish 
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legislation, being concerned with activities of daily life. 
Even the victims thought that this legislation was a German 
dictate.4° How could one think that real anti-Semitic 
legislation could be uniquely French? In a letter to 
P~tain, the Grand Rabbi of France affirmed at the start of 
his message that he could not adhere to the principle of 
In November, 1940, Gustave Honed, Inspector of Educa-
tion at the Academy of Paris, wondered who had originated 
the anti-Jewish laws. Jules Isaac, a historian (and friend 
of Honed) was conscious of the entire Vichy responsibility 
in the legislation but affirmed again in July, 1941 that the 
status of the Jews was "not of French inspiration."42 
40 Tract dating Oct., 1940. BDIC. Statement made by 
French Jews: "Our country will not carry the shame of the 
measures whe~e our heart did not take part; we know he has 
done everything for us which was in his power ... " 
41 Letter of Grand Rabbi to Petain, Paris, Oct. 22, 1940. 
Document CDJC CCX III-4. Letter to Minister Carcopino from 
.Jewish students, Algeria, June 23, 1941. Doc. A.N. A.J. 
38-65, Dossier H 797. 
42 Letter dated July 12, 1941 from Isaac to his under-
secretary of Aix-en-Provence. Jules Isaac, Les Nouveaux 
Cahiers, "The Assimilation of Soldiers for Israel - 1940-63." 
No. 59, Winter, Sept. 7, 1980, p. 33-43. No. 68, Spring, 
1980, p. 30-40. 
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" ... If we reacted to German constraints, we (French) had 
(to take) part in common humiliation ; if we reacted to 
the contrary, to a French order, it would have been 
acceptable ... " 43 
This showed the ambiguity of the situation, but things 
became clear for the most lucid--and it was surprising to 
see that during the German Occupation the majority of the 
French (and even French Jews) would wrongly continue to 
attribute French anti-Semitic legislation to Nazi pressure. 
Nowadays, this legislation haunts the collective conscience 
of the French. It is certain that the French prefer to 
remain mute or to forget the true role of the men of the 
Vichy government. It is certainly more favorable to pre-
sent oneself a posteriori as a hostage more so than an 
executioner. 
In his memoirs, Carcopino did not hesitate to lie. He 
attributed all the laws passed under Vichy to the Germans, 
although in reality, he had signed them himself. If Vichy 
adopted them, it was always, (according to him) to "protect" 
the Jews: " ... The law dishonored only the Germans. Not an 
instant did I think of placing such a responsibility on 
I 
Petain." 4 4 Once again, he had been looking for the lesser 
43 Carcopino, Souvenirs, p. 248. 
44 ibid., p. 245. 
31 
of two evils. He spoke of "these brutal laws imposed to the 
Marshal by the Nazis ... " 46 As Minister of National Educa-
tion, Carcopino should have known that the quota in Algerian 
schools was not a German project, but in fact recommended by 
the Algerian government, which was, after all, French.46 
46 
Ibid., p. 358. 
Ibid., p. 371. 
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Internal Pressures 
Better Hitler Than Blum47 
At the end of May, 1942 a group of anti-Semitic 
collaborators from the Institute for the Study of the Jewish 
Question (IEQJ) had congratulated Captain Dannecker, who had 
introduced the yellow star in the Occupied Zone. This group 
of anti-Jewish writers and intellectuals took the position 
that the measures against Jews must be strictly enforced. 
, 
It included Brasillach, Deat and Rebatet, all of whom were 
in some measure influenced by L~Actjon Fran9aise and other 
anti-Semitic movements. The Germans were not the only ones 
to request completely separate education for the Jews. 
French collaborators and other groups of anti-Semites also 
passionately_ desired this segregation in education. These 
small groups were encouraged and sustained by the Germans. 
They also served to frighten the men of Vichy, whose weak-
nesses they daily denounced. For example, the IEJQ was not 
entirely satisfied because their claims and projects were 
not always as succesful as they wished. 
47 Expression which circulated from the beginning of the 
popular front and quoted by a journalist Jan. 1, 1937 in the 
newspaper, Vendredi. 
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... friends also expressed their desire that measures be 
complemented by total separation in primary and second-
ary schools between Jewish and non-Jewish children. 
The Lycee Condorcet (secondary school) which had always 
been a Jewish lycee, and the Lycee Jules Ferry, should 
be completely affected by these separations. 4 8 
At the forefront of the anti-Jewish battle in France 
were numerous and diverse associations of militant indivi-
duals who were very often rivals. The IEQJ, the UFDR 
(French Union for the Defense of the Race), a collaboration 
group, and the IEQJER, (Institute for the Study of the Jew-
ish and Ethno-Racial Question) probably contributed greatly 
to the aggravation of the Jews~ condition in France.49 
In addition, numerous accusations and denunciations 
rained on the CGQJ. The collaborators and retired teachers 
vied to give information which would help aryanization. As 
a practical matter, their lack of constraints (diplomatic, 
administrative and moral) gave them great influence. The 
Germans were extremely tolerant and never complained about 
these extremist outcries because it allowed them to put 
pressure on Vichy. 
48 IEQJ, May, 1942. 
49 The University Memorial (1940-44), Paris, Nov. 11, 1950, 
the Committee of History of the Second World War, contains 
200 names of professors who were members of collaborationist 
groups. A memorial was also made listing 150 names of those 
faithful to Petain. 
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At the time, the hunt for the Jews was taken up by 
several thousand amateurs. Letters of denunciation, not 
always anonymous, were sent daily by the dozens to German 
I 
and French authorities. Andre Fugier, who worked as Dir-
ector of the Cabinet of the Minister of Education, declared 
after the war that the Minister of National Education 
ordered him to throw "a very large file of denunciations 
against numerous university professors in the garbage." 
These were very often anonymous and not directed only at 
Jewish professors. If we believe Fugier, 
there was a flood of letters at that time, anonymous or 
not. Many people had judged that the time had come to 
get rid of the primary teacher who had bothered them, 
and it was a rain of denunciations.5o 
After being denounced, professors of Jewish origin 
were excluded from teaching, even though totally detached 
from the Judaic religion. Some letters of denunciation 
demanded new measures. They deplored not only gaps in 
legislation, but also the bad application of legislation. 
For example, on July 30, 1941, Paul Curie, who had 
been named, thanks to Vallat, Secretary of the National 
Center of General and Sport Education, Adjunct Secretary 
of the Academy of Paris, and Secretary of the Committees 
60 Testimony at trial of Chevalier, Mar., 1946 session, 
Vol. 1, p. 62, CHSGM. 
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for the Aid of Students at the University of Clermont, wrote 
a letter to his old friend Vallat at the CGQJ in which he 
complained that the laws of July 21, 1941 were: 
mute on what concerns the female students. Is it 
intentional? If so, should I conclude that if a female 
kike applies at a university, school or institute, we 
must accept her without other formality? ... 51 
Curie continued to request that the French law be more 
restrictive: 
because we close a door in the nose of Jews (oh, Drumont, 
how you would have laughed), is that sufficient? But we 
leave several other doors half open ... and you know very 
well that those specimens know how to enter by all the 
openings; they would find a bias very easily and infil-
trate themselves by another door which is open.52 
He finishes his letter wishing great courage for the 
"hard work which was started.53 
Another interesting letter was one written to Commis-
sioner Vallat by M. L. Giribone of Marseille sent on August 
21, 1941. Giribone suggested completely eliminating grants 
in secondary teaching for Jewish students. This idea would 
be restated by Vallat on September 2, 1941 in another letter 
sent to the Minister of National Education, Carcopino, who 
had responded negatively in his letter of September 5, 1941. 
51 A.N. A.J. 38 1144, Dossier 5, J.A. 20. 
52 A.N. A.J. 38 1144, Dossier 5, J.A. 20. 
53 A.N. A.J. 38 1144. 
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Another letter sent by an ex-professor of Literature at 
/ 
the Lycee of Salonique (1920-21) to the CGQJ denounced the 
Jewish professors of the Lycee of Salonique, which constitu-
ted "a focus of propaganda and recruitment. "54 The CGQ.J 
had known of this situation since August, 1941 because it 
communicated to the Minister of Education an extract of the 
.,, 
letter: "The French Lycee of the lay mission of Salonique 
is a Jewish lyc~e. We can say that it does Jewish recruit-
ment for France."55 
From Nice, M. F. Berthier complained to Darquier about 
the scandal which constituted the authorization for Jewish 
teachers to continue to teach in private schools: 
... in relation to the law on Jewish activity, I dare 
to mention what I think is a loophole of the greatest 
importance: the education of our youth by Jewish pro-
fessors ... I know here in Nice, Jews who do not hesitate 
to open private schools, in which daily, young men and 
women go to receive their education. One wonders if-it 
is in the national interest that this state of things 
continue?5S 
Robert Brasillach, the most active collaborator, was 
a convinced Germanohile who did not hesitate to write in 
Cahiers Franco-Allemands. As were many intellectuals of 
54 Letter of May 13, 1942 to CGJQ. 
55 A.N. A.J. 38 70, Dossier: "Foreign Jews." 
56 A.N. A.J. 38, 119. Dossier 5 S/C 2. "Private Teach-
ing." Letter of May 26, 1942 to the CGQJ of Vichy, in which 
the private teaching not included by law remains free for the 
Jews. A response which must have disappointed the inquirer. 
the time, he was influenced by LJAction Franqaise. A 
literary journalist at LJAction Franqaise from 1931-39, 
and editor-in-chief of the anti-Semitic Je Sujs Partout 
in 1938-39, he explicitly asked for a clear statute 
regarding the Jews as early as April 15, 1938, when he 
signed an article in Je Sujs Partout. ("It protects them 
as well as it protects us.") 
One of BrasillachJs most important activities, apart 
from writing and socializing, was the denunciation of the 
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Jews. For example, one month after his return from Germany, 
he signed a very explicit article in LJAppel on May 25, 
1941: " ... For us the Jewish problem is a world-wide 
problem. We are posed face to face with a race and not 
simply a religion ... " He was, under the Vichy regime, with 
all his style, the young, spiritual and intellectual father 
of Parisian anti-Semitism. He was executed after judgment 
on February 6, 1945 at the Fort of Montrouge. 
Another famous collaborator was Lucien Rebatet, alias 
Fran~ois Vinneuil, who also wrote in LJActjon Franqaise, 
Je Sujs Partout, and Cahjers Franco-Allemands. He also 
demanded a Jewish statute even before the French defeat and 
the German Occupation. Rebatet revealed in Je Suis Partout 
in February, 1939 his "reasonable" project of the statute of 
the Jews: "Our definition must be racial. .. " 
I Rebatet was a member of the Cercle Europeen and 
directed the press section for the publishing of the IEQJ 
side by side with Robert Denoel, a well-known journalist 
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at that time. He was also political director of the very 
anti-Semitic Petit Parisian until 1941, in which he never 
failed to denounce the JewsJ control over France. Rebatet 
spent his time denouncing Jews--in his books, articles, 
broadcasts and conferences. 
In Le Cri du Peuple, RebatetJs anti-Semitism was 
clearly expressed when having heard of the death of a famous 
Jewish philosopher, he wrote: "It would have been hetter 
that Bergson never had the right to write and teach 
French."57 In the same newspaper, he deplored the skills 
of the Jewish professors and all those who found themselves 
to be "indispensable to science and French culture ... "58 
RebatetJs professional conscience as a patent denuncia-
tor was such that he was pushed to continue "his work" 
during his travels or his vacations. For example, on August 
19, 1942, he wrote from Moral in Valloire to Couissin, Chief 
of the Cabinet in the National Education of Vichy, to ask 
him very simply to fire Drouot, Head of the Ecole des Cadres 
of Sorlin in Valloire.59 He accused Drouot of being 
hostile to Vichy, in favor of De Gaulle, Great Britain, 
Russia, and worse, (which was unforgivable) of being a 
57 Le Cri du Peuple, Jan. 7, 1941. 
58 Le Cri du Peuple, Dec. 6, 1941. 
59 Bennard Papers, CHSGM Library, Paris. 
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"passionate Judeophile." 60 Rebatet, as a member of the 
Institute for the Study of the Jewish Question (IEQJ), had 
great influence and responsibility regarding the hunt for 
the Jews. This French organization was private. The most 
important and most active of the numerous anti-Semitic 
groups during the Occupation, it numbered around 11,000 
"friends." The IEQJ developed anti-Jewish propaganda and 
between May, 1941 and June, 1942 had denounced hundreds of 
individuals. This Nazi center in France received money from 
a Nazi Officer, Captain Dannecker, in payment for its 
precious aid.61 This organization published "yellow 
notebooks," in which Pierre Antoine Cousteau, Henri Labroue, 
I 
Henri Coston, Jean Herold Paquis and numerous others signed 
virulent anti-Semitic articles. The staff of the IEQJ, was 
directed by Captain Sezille, an ex-companion of arms of 
Darquier, who liked quarrels and was completely uncultured. 
According to him, Laval was Jewish! 
Along with Sezille, Charles Laville, anthropologist 
and racial ethnologist, contributed to the organization and 
success of an exposition at the Palace Berlitz titled, "The 
6 0 Letter of Rebatet to Couissin, Aug. 19, 1942, CHSGM 
Library, Paris. File on Bennard. 
61 Billig, IEQJ, Ed. CDJC; the IEQJ was French, but the 
budget was German. The Gestapo allowed maintaining permanent 
contact between the IEQJ with the Anti-Jewish Institute of 
Rosenberg in Frankfort. 
Jew in France. '' In order to promote this exposition, the 
cinematographic newe showed some representative images on 
the screens of France. The exposition had received some 
·383,000 visitors in Paris.62 In sequences which rendered 
homage to Drumont, Laville explained with photographs how 
to differentiate a Jew from a French person: " ... the Jew 
is the result of a mixture of aryans, mongols and negroes 
· ... the Jew has a face, body, gestures and attitudes which 
are his own ... " 63 
40 
From 1941 to 1944, Laville wrote in the tenth edition 
of the articles in the ethnoracial Journal de Montandon. A 
racial ethnologist, Montandon was born in 1879 at Canton of 
Neufchatel in Switzerland. He was a great explorer 
(Ethiopia during 1909-11, then Russia and Japan). He was a 
bolshevik during the twenties and then established himself 
in France in 1925 and worked in the laboratories of anthro-
pology at the Museum of Natural History. He was appointed 
to the School of Anthropology in 1933, and just before the 
war became a militant anti-Semite. He wrote numerous 
articles to explain to the French "how to recognize 
Jews ... ,"64 including "France at Work," written in 
s2 Archives INA 41-498. Journal No. 62, Oct. 3, 1941. 
63 Brochure, NEF, Paris, 1940. Front page of Le Matin, 
Aug. 5, 1941. 
64 ibid. 
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July, 1940. He also directed the IEQJER (the IEQJ was 
inaugurated on February 23, 1943 by the CGQJ, since Darquier 
was liquidated by the Germans). 
In addition, Montandon delivered the indispensable 
"certificates of aryanity." In fact, he sold these "cer-
tificates of safety" to rich Jews. It was for him that 
Bennard, the Minister of Education, created a "Professorship 
of Racial Studies" at the Sorbonne.65 The professorship 
remained unfilled, probably due to the lack of success of 
Henri Labroue, named November 12, 1942 by the Minister to 
the professorship of "History of Contemporary Judaism." 
65 Journal Officiel, Decree of Nov. 6, 1942. 
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Reactions to the Laws 
Reactions on the subject of Jews in education were. 
found among the victims accompanied by the silence of 
non-Jews. " ... Always the same thing, nobody said 
anything ... "66 The religious Jews were the first to 
react, and as early as October 18, 1940, when the first 
French statute was published in the Journal Officiel. 
Some days later, the Grand Rabbi of France, Isaie Schwartz, 
addressed a declaration to the Chief of State in the name of 
the French Israelites. This interesting letter mentioned 
the official position of the Jewish institutions: it was, at 
the same time, significant because the terms, the style, and 
the approach used in the exposition of the arguments demon-
strated a certain Petainism. The protest of the Grand Rabbi 
was undeniable, but also solemn and dignified: "We affirm 
that we are neither a racial minority nor a political minor-
ity, but a religious community ... "67 
These Jews wished to be treated just like the other 
French. As they were French, very often from several gener-
ations back, they were "faithful servants of the country," 
and prayed for the "grandeur of France." This pleading, 
66 M. Dionnet, teacher quizzed in the documentary film, 
"The Sorrow and the Pity" by Marcel Ophuls. 
e 7 The text of the letter found in annex. Doc. CDJC, 
CC XIII-4. 
emanating from the highest Jewish religious authority in 
France, demonstrated a certain political naivete. It did 
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not even suggest the responsibility of the men of Vichy, who 
had created the laws, because the victims were as Petainist 
as the other French, in spite of the racist laws. They 
underlined "the new order, which having been proposed to the 
French by the Chief of State, must be based on work, family 
and country. No other proposal could be dearer to us."68 
The lay Jews also found the status heart-rending. In 
relation to the Jewish teachers, it seemed that they reacted 
differently than the religious Jews. That is to say, in a 
non-collective fashion. Also, it was not until April, 1941 
that some university professors sent a textse signed 
collectively to Petain in fear of new measures being taken 
against Jewish teachers. It was, therefore, the fear of a 
Jewish ghetto being created in France which impelled their 
move. 
It is noted that in their communication, the .Jewish 
professors seemed to believe that the Germans were respon-
sible for the new statute. The French government was con-
sidered innocent: "We appeal without hesitation to the 
68 Laws of July 27 and August 27, 1940 aimed at French 
Jews and foreign Jewish residents in France. 
se Doc. CDJC. CC XIX-104. 
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venerated Chief, in whom is incarnated today, the idea of 
country, one and indivisible, and with broken hearts, we ask 
him to intervene." These intellectuals did not hesitate to 
"confide" their anguish to Petain, their savior to whom they 
showed their "profound respect." They insisted all along in 
their pathetic letters that they were Israelites in 
' 
religion, but that they were all from very old French 
families; that they were French not by adoption but from 
"always"; that they were born French and would always remain 
French, and they formed neither a race nor a people, but an 
integral part of the nation. 
The reaction to the statutes was different according to 
each individual. Some reacted in a desperate fashion--
deprived of work and resources, wounded in their honor, they 
committed suicide. Jules Isaac noted with sadness in his 
journal the deaths of two of his teaching friends.70 
Other teachers, conscious of the impact of the statutes, 
were not surprised by their dismissal from national educa-
tion. They knew that the arrival of Petain to power would 
leave no illusions about the orientation of the New Regime. 
70 Lasare Landeau's study on Jules Isaac, from 
"L'Assimilation du Combat pour L'Israel, 1940-1943," in 
Les Nouyeaux Cahiers, No. 59, p. 37. R. Cohen and R. Loew 
were the professors mentioned. 
Note also another important difference between the 
people and the Jewish intellectuals. The latter group 
understood perfectly the responsibility of the men of 
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Vichy. Even so, they affirmed for Jews (religious or not) 
that the second statute was not by itself of French inspi-
,, 
ration. Jules Isaac referred to Petain as the "apostle of 
the lay school, having applied his principles with religious 
fervor", (work, family, country).71 The same ideas as the 
religious Jews held are found here. But on the other hand, 
/ 
Isaac reproached Petain from the beginning of 1940 for the 
anti-Jewish laws which were very useful to crystallize on 
the Jew, the eternal black sheep, the rancors provoked by 
the defeat. 
Among the non-Jewish teachers, the reactions were as 
discreet as they were rare; some had seen nothing, heard 
nothing. Others wanted to see nothing-~to hear nothing. In 
1955, Maurice Gait, General Secretary of Youth under Petain, 
did not hesitate to state that nothing at all happened in 
teaching during the Occupation: 
The seventeen French universities functioned normally. 
The 150,000 primary teachers, 30,000 secondary teachers, 
and 6,000 professors of higher education remained at 
their post; as well as the personnel of technical and 
vocational education created by the Vichy government.72 
7 1 Lasare Landeau, cited in Les Nouveaux Cahiers, No. 60, 
p. 33-34. Letter from Isaac dated Sept. 27, 1940. 
7 2 "The Life of the French Under the Occupation." (n.p.: 
Hoover Institute, Oct., 1955, T. 2, 1957), p. 873. 
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The truth was markedly different. Gustave Monod, a 
protestant, pacifist of the Left, and a friend of Isaac, 
became Inspector of the Academy of Paris in November, 1940. 
In his report of November 5, 194073, he made a point of 
mentioning the statute of the Jews and the problems produced 
by its application to education. Monod declared he was 
upset when confronted with the limitation of liberalism 
in education and courageously asked that the report be 
transmitted to Minister Ripert; but Ripert was neither 
sensitive to distress nor impressed by the timid protest; 
he asked only one question: "Is he Jewish?" 
It was with a new understanding of the nature of the 
New Regime, that Inspector Monod subsequently wrote to the 
new Dean, Carcopino.74 The statute itself was rarely 
criticized. The law was never questioned. No school went 
on strike when faced with the Occupying Authorities. 
Marcel Ophuls has interrogated, with a great finesse, 
two teachers on their behavior during the Occupation for his 
movie, "The Sorrow and The Pity." He questioned them on 
73 Report at the CHSGM (annex). 
74 Letter of Monod to Carcopino, Nov. 5, 1940, cited by 
Carcopino, Souvenirs, p. 248, and contained in Appendix J. 
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this law and the exclusions: 
" ... when you say: #What could you do# ... in fact, #What 
could you do# ... meant, what? Because at most, we can 
imagine a collective resignation of all the teachers at 
the Lycee of Clermont." Danton and Dionnet start to 
laugh. Dionnet: "Oh, no ... it was not a question of 
that ... you don#t understand the mentality ... (he laughs) 
... a collective resignation ... (both of them laugh)."75 
It was, therefore, evident that in general the French 
society was indifferent. In their ·great majority, the 
French teachers did not react. They behaved just like the 
rest of the population--tacit approbation of the measures 
geared, in their eyes, essentially to the foreigners. The 
reason for this seeming indifference was that most of the 
French, preoccupied with the problems as obsessional as 
daily life (to eat, to heat their homes, to write to the 
prisoners, and in a word--survival), were rendered 
completely insensitive to the suffering of others; they 
manifested a complete indifference. In the absence of a 
political party, 'public declarations of men politically 
engaged remained very rare until 1942. The socialists said 
nothing. / . In the Communist Party, hostility to Petain and 
his Regime was consistent--racist legislation constituted 
only one of the essential themes of clandestine editorials. 
On occasion, the Resistance also subscribed to the avowed 
75 Text from documentary film, "The Sorrow and the Pity," 
by Marcel Ophuls, 1972. 
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anti-Semitism of the men against whom they fought. On the 
Gaullist side, the silences were also eloquent. Not once 
did General De Gaulle publicly proclaim his disapproval of 
the racial legislation previously mentioned in this study. 
The first to rebel were the religious French (Catholic and 
Protestant). But not all of them, as in general their 
reaction would be late and limited. Paul Claudel, well-
known for his religious fervor, wrote on July 6, 1940, 
"After 60 years France is delivered from the weight of the 
radical and anti-Catholic party (professors, lawyers, Jews 
and free masons)."76 The following shows the interesting 
and quite significant reactions of Giraud on April 28, 1944 
in writing to one 0£ his emissaries in Spain: 
" ... At this time, the situation is clear, General 
De Gaulle is the dictator of tomorrow with a general 
staff of communists, socialists and Jews ... General 
Giraud is very sincerely republican, but with a republic 
based on clean people and without Jewry ... 77 
It is important to remember that the only law which 
produced frequent and spontaneous pro-Semitic reactions in 
the midst of the French population was not a French law. It. 
76 ~ J. P. Azema, De Munich a la Liberation; (Paris: Seuil, 
1979), p. 103. 
77 Jacques Soustelle, Envers et Centre Tout, (Paris: 
Laffont, ed., 1950), Vol. II, p. 384. 
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was the German ordinance of May 29, 1942 prescribing the 
wearing of the yellow star in the Occupied Zone as early as 
the beginning of June, 1942. 7 8 This is what was written 
by Abetz on July 2 and 7, 1942: 
If the French population is "in general ... absolutely in 
agreement with the introduction of the distinctive sign 
for the Jews," they revealed their resentment and venge-
fulness by observing foreign Jews dispensed by some 
German measures.79 
The wearing of the star made the French Jews martyrs of 
the war, and some teachers of the Occupied Zone advised 
their students to manifest their solidarity with their 
Jewish comrades by wearing an insignia. This was confirmed 
by a German report dated June 5, 1942: 
... According to the report of an informer, the teachers 
of the communal school of the 18th District have asked 
their students to come next Monday, June 8, 1942 wearing 
any insignia. We suppose that this is in relation to 
the introduction of the Jewish star and that it corre-
sponds to a manifestation of sympathy ... so 
This anti-Semitic measure demonstrated the lack of 
sympathy and solidarity of non-Jewish teachers. As for the 
victims, their shocked reactions to the measures revealed 
their political naivete and Petainism. 
J 78 Study of Leon Poliakov, "L~Etoile Jaune", (Paris: CDJC, 
1949) , 93 pages. 
79 Paxton and Marrus, p. 221, Note. 62. 
6 ° Cited by Philippe Bourdrel, Histoire des Juifs de 
Erance, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1974), p. 424. 
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This study has shown how the racial laws affected 
education. It is evident that the responsibility was 
entirely on the French, and that many men in power were 
responsible for the application of those laws. Among these 
were all of the successful Ministers of Education who had 
participated in the aryanization of education in different 
degrees with their application of the laws and their initia-
tives. The role of Carcopino as discussed later in this 
study, is without any doubt the most important because it 
shows his influence in the Ministry of Education. This 
racism, institutionalized by laws, seems to be the best 
prism through which to observe the behavior of the leaders 
and the men in education. This racism became the corner-
stone of the Vichy government. 
This study stated measures which were too harsh and 
which victimized Jewish teachers, professors, pupils and 
students. The study of these measures is very useful 
because it allows us to understand the environment in which 
the French population lived and worked. As a result of the 
laws, the rejected teachers had great difficulty in finding 
new employment. In addition, the children were marked for 
life by·the indifference of the remaining teachers, who, in 
general, did not dare to do anything for fear of reprisals. 
This is a fascinating and sad subject for historians and the 
French people as well. 
CHAPTER II 
THE MINISTERS OF EDUCATION 
Vichy had marked a turning point in the history of 
contemporary France, introducing in the different minis-
tries, technocraps, who would impose their reforms since 
no parliamentary opposition could impeach them. 
In the Ministry of Education, practically all of the 
successive ministers were professors or administrators. 
Except for Abel Bonnard, none of them could be labeled as a 
political Minister. Under the Third Republic, all Ministers 
had come from the ranks of politicians. The accomplishments 
of these men were not always negat£ve'for education as a 
whole. Technical education began to replace the vocational 
schools which had been created in 1939. Under the Occupa-
tion, many vocational schools opened, primarily for the 
young unemployed. In 1941, the first technical colleges 
were founded. Secondary education, still elitist, began 
losing ground when faced with mass education. The number 
of students grew very rapidly and significant changes 
occurred: a) Jewish teachers were.dismissed; b) Jewish 
students were admitted in limited numbers; and c) almost 
all Jewish school children in Algeria were excluded from 
the public schools. In all these matters, the different 
Ministers of Education often played a decisive role that 
will now be analyzed. 
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Albert Rivaud, First Secretary of Public Instruction 
I ' 
under Petain, only served from June 16 to July 12, 1940. He 
was unaware of the measures which had been adopted in regard 
to the quota system. At the liberation, this conservative 
professor of philosophy at the University of Strasbourg 
easily obtained a verdict of not guilty after his indict-
ment. He was even cited for the order of the Resistance. 
To better understand some of his ideas, one can refer to a 
book which he published in 1942, Education and Culture.1 
Emile Mireaux was appointed by Petain as State Secre-
tary for Public Instruction and Arts on J~ly 12, 1940. Also 
a professor, Mireaux was Senator of the Hautes Pyrenees and 
co-director of Temps, whose leading article of July 25, 1940 
was titled, "France to the French." He became the first 
, 
Minister of Education of the New Regime under Petain, "the 
French State" (July 12, 1940 - September 6, 1940). During 
his stewardship, some measures were adopted: 
a) The law of August 2, 1940, which ended recruitment 
by competitive examination for inspectors of primary 
schools and imposed Ministerial appointment. 
b) The re-establishment of religious education. 
c) The annual revision of schoolbooks (by a decree 
dated August 21, 1940). 
1 Albert Rivaud, Education et Culture, (Paris: Presse 
Universitaire Franqaise, 1942). 
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Furthermore, Mireaux did not hesitate to participate in 
an initial purge of educators. As early as August 16, 1940, 
this Minister warned deans of different university districts 
of the pernicious influence of political doctrines which, in 
his opinion, influenced "too many of the members" of the 
educational profession. The teachers were judged respon-
sible for the "misfortunes of the community." As early as 
July, 1940, dozens of teachers were excluded. Almost all 
were accused of being trade-unionists, Republican commun-
ists, free masons, Jews or foreigners. Mireaux~s departure 
from the Ministry (Quai de Grenelle) in September, 1940 
prevented him from participating further in the purges, 
but the guilty were already clearly designated. At the 
Liberation, the High Court of Justice gave him a verdict 
of not guilty. 
Georges Ripert 
Georges Ripert succeeded Mireaux as the Minister of 
Education from September 6 to December 13, 1940. The 
Ministry was then placed under the authority of the Min-
istry of Justice, of which Raphael Alibert was Minister. 
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Ripert was a member of the Institut de France, and Dean of 
the faculty of the Law School of the University of Paris. 
He continued to "purify" the French educational system. 
Jewish functionaries and foreigners were his first targets. 
On November 27, 1940, Ripert declared: "We want to remake 
the race, remake an education. This is not the work of a 
day and others will have to continue after us ... "2 
We can ask ourselves how such an eminent jurist could 
have accepted these discriminatory measures retroactively, 
without protest which violated the most elementary prin-
ciples of French law. The answer to this question can be 
found in part in a book published in 1943 on Nazi law. In 
it, Ripert pretended to study "objectively" all these ques-
tions. Specifically, he brutally affirmed his amorality: 
" ... the man of science has the right to be unconcerned by 
the political consequences of his studies ... "s 
2 A.N. A.J. 16 2895, Dossier ENS. Official declaration 
of the Minister. 
s Etudes de Droit Allemand, Balazard, Colliard, Vein, 
Doublet, Gaudemet, Hubert, Hamelin and Melanges. (Paris: 
OFLAG II, B, Preface of Ripert, 1943). A collection of five 
studies written by French jurists who were prisoners of war. 
All of the reforms undertaken by Ripert in national 
education expressed the reactionary direction of the New 
Regime. Ripert did not hesitate to sign: 
a) the decree of September 15, 1940, which suppressed 
the concept of free education in the lycees and colleges. 
b) the law of September 18, 1940, which caused the 
disappearance of the Eccles Normales, which existed 
specifically to train teachers. 
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c) the law of October 23, 1940, which allowed government 
funding of religious teaching in lay schools as well. 
d) the decree of November 21, 1940, which introduced the 
concept of God in the teaching of morals. 
On December 5 of the same year, Ripert went to the 
extreme of restoring "the duties toward God" in the schools. 
In addition, the elections of the deans of faculties and of 
the members of the councils of the university were temporar-
ily suspended. The aryanization of education, which was the 
first law to be applied, would specifically retain Ripert~s 
executive order of October 21, 1940. This order, counter-
signed by Dean Rousey, Superintendant of the Academy of 
Paris was directed to all superintendants and academic 
supervisors of the French academic establishments. 4 The 
law of October 3, published in the Journal Officiel on 
October 18, 1940 became effective on December 18, 1940. 
Thanks to the efficiency of Ripert, who sent his executive 
order on October 21, the law became effective at the Academy 
of Paris as early as mid-November, 1940. 
Text of circular is kept at the CDJC. CC XVI-13. 
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The order of Ripert was very precise. The census of 
the Jewish functionaries was to be methodical. Three files 
were to be constituted; then a general listing of function-
aries who were considered Jewish was to be established 
consisting of: " ... men and women, who from public notor-
iety or from your personal acquaintance must be regarded 
as Jewish."5 
The door was open to denunciation. Ripert interpreted 
the law of October 3, 1940 in a restrictive and severe 
manner. He believed that in order to obtain the members of 
the teaching corps it was necessary to add educators such as 
proctors, assistants, administrators, superintendants and 
heads of educational establishments. All Jews who, by their 
professional activity, were in contact with the pupils or 
students, were dismissed because Ripert was afraid of their 
influence on the children.a All Jewish teachers were 
required (except in exceptional cases) to stop their pro-
fessional activity "in application of Article 7 of the law" 
within two months.7 
5 Footnote on Ripert~s Executive Order taken from the 
text of circular CC XVI-13 at the CDJC. 
6 Article I, A (4th point, section on members of the 
teaching corps), law of October 3, 1940. 
7 Journal Officiel, Oct., 18, 1940. 
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The Jewish functionaries who asked to benefit from the 
exceptions previewed by the law (Articles 3 and 8) were 
obliged to follow the orders of Ripert and: 
supply an authentic document showing that they were 
war veterans, their family background (sometimes 
even for two generations), date of birth and date of 
their naturalization.a 
Ripert was only too happy to initiate the aryanization 
of the French teaching profession. His policies also scru-
tinized the status of the Jewish students. At the beginning 
of his career, Ripert revealed a moderate policy by opposing 
the Authorities at the end of November, 1940. He even wrote 
to de Brinone refusing to eliminate Jewish and half-
Jewish students of the School of the Conservatoire. He 
believed the German directives concerning elimination of 
Jewish students of the Conservatoire constituted an 
infringement of French sovereignty. In his opinion, the 
French statute of October 3, 1940 did not prohibit higher 
education for Jews.io 
8 Law of Oct. 3, 1940, Article 3, Article 8. 
8 CX-4. Letter of Nov. 30, 1940 signed by Ripert, to 
Fernand de Brinon, delegate of the French government, and 
friendly with the German administration in France. 
io Ripert·s opinion diametrically opposed that of the 
future Minister Carcopino. At this time, Carcopino was 
Director of i·Ecole Normale Superieure and had the views 
of his Minister. 
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Ripert "estimates that the pupils of the Israelite schools 
not being members of the teaching corps are not targeted by 
the instructions of October 21, 1940."11 
Ripert although moderate in relation to the question of 
Jewish students, was by no means unaware of it. On October 
28, 1940, an explicit note was sent from Vichy to the Super-
visors of the Academy. Thie note, sent by Adolphe Terracher 
(who was Director of Secondary Education under Ripert) was 
to be transmitted to directors in order to underline the 
will of the Ministry to mark the difference; schoolchildren 
and Jewish students were to be regarded as foreigners, 
designated from this date as second class citizens. The 
terms of this note signed by Terracher left no doubts: 
In the absence of all regulations forbidding access to 
lycees, colleges and secondary schools to foreigners and 
Israelites, I beg you to take care that their admission 
has not, as a consequence, kept away the French pupils 
and non-Israelites from our establishments, who would 
have satisfied entrance examinations and/or passage into 
the different courses of these establishments.12 
The ministry of Ripert lasted only fifteen weeks. On 
December 13, 1940 Ripert and Laval were the only ministers 
to leave the government. From January 23, 1941, Ripert 
11 Letter of Nov. 24, 1940 signed for Ripert by the 
Director of Superior Education, State Counsel, Roussy. This 
letter was a response to questions formulated by the Dean of 
the Academy of Paris (Carcopino) Nov. 7 and 11, 1940. A.N. 
A.J. 16 2895, Dossier ENS. 
12 Letter of Adolphe Terracher, Oct. 28, 1940. 
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occupied a new important post as Member of the National 
council and returned to his position ae Dean of the School 
of Law in Paris, from which he was dismissed at the 
Liberation. Arrested and accused of national disgrace by 
the High Court of Justice for having collaborated with the 
government of Vichy, he was accorded provisional liberty on 
February 15, 1945 and then acquitted.13 
1s Le Monde, Feb. 16, 1945. 
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Jacques Chevalier14 
On September 11, 1940, Jacques Chevalier was officially 
named Secretary General of Public Instruction. He kept his 
post until the departure of Ripert, then was named Secretary 
of Public Instruction, Arts and Youth under the authority of 
the Minister of Justice. It was during the Flandin inter-
lude (December 13, 1940 to February, 1941), a three-month 
period of educational reform, that Chevalier directed the 
Ministry of Education. 
I 
As a godson of Petain, he also believed in private 
school education. Having become Secretary of Public 
Instruction, he clearly showed his desire to favor private 
education (providing subsidies and grants) even if public 
education had to suffer cutbacks in funding. 
In his philosophy, Chevalier was influenced by the Jew-
ish philosopher, Henri Bergson. Bergson received the Nobel 
Prize in 1927, which bothered certain individuals, such as 
Rebatet, who was indignant to see a Jew claiming to repre-
sent French thought. The sudden death of Bergson, who died 
a Christian, at the beginning of 1941 ended the polemics. 
14 Jacques Chevalier was born in 1882 in the department of 
Allier at Cerilly to a family of landowners and soldiers. 
His father served under the command of Petain as an officer. 
It was in this way that Petain became his godfather. 
Chevalier was really saddened by the loss of his 
mentor, but could not openly oppose this racist ideology 
of the Vichy Regime. That is why he sent Louis Lavelle, 
another Bergsonian philosopher, who was director of the 
Rivaud Cabinet and member of the Cabinet of Mireaux, to 
the funeral. Although a philosopher, Chevalier was,not a 
humanist. 
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When we speak of a man who had the respect of the human 
people and who implicitly, in the depth of his heart, 
should have refused to accept the racial law, I see this 
man consenting to enter into a government which is 
already engaging Nazism, makes a policy of division 
between the citizens, which marks a red cross on those 
who belong to one race or another, one cannot say that 
this man is a humanist in every sense of the word. 1 6 
His moral responsibilities were clear at the time of 
his trial, when his "benevolence" toward the Jewish teachers 
was stressed even under German pressure. In fact, a dozen 
Jewish teachers were, by individual decree, (in application 
of the law of October 3, 1940, Article 8) to have "rendered 
exceptional services to the French State, and are freed from 
interdictions foreseen by the present law."16 
16 Sitting of March 11, 1946 at the time of his trial. 
Fasc. 2, p. 12, preserved at the CHSGM. 
16 At the time of his trial (March 11, 1946) before the 
High Court of Justice, Chevalier cited the names of Marcel 
Bloch and Gustave Cohen, who were leaving for the United 
States, as well as Rivet, who went to Columbia. 
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Chevalier, however, forgot to say the law was French 
and that during his brief position at the Ministry of 
National Education, some Jewish teachers were dismissed. 
Although he did not sign the statute of October 3, he had it 
applied. On the day of his installation, December 13, 1940, 
Chevalier signed a decree which mandated the dismissal of 
numerous professors and functionaries of the Schools of 
Medicine, Law, Science, and Literature. Hundreds of 
teachers, who were allegedly free masons, union leaders, 
communists and others opposed to the government, were dis-
missed from the primary schools. Chevalier, however, was 
not an extremist as he was not influenced by letters of 
denunciation. 
On December 20, 1940 he refused to create a "Chair of 
Racist Doctrines" for Vacher de Lapouge, Jr.17 at the 
College of France. He did, however, apply French laws and 
began carefully to examine textbooks used in the schools. 
Some books were forbidden to be used in the schools or to be 
placed in libraries.16 A circular of February 10,194119 
confirmed that the doors of the Eccles Normales and doctoral 
studies were closed to Jewish students. 
17 Trial of Chevalier, High Court of Justice, CHSGM, 
Fasc. 2, p. 62. 
16 Decree of Ministry of Education, Feb. 3, 1941. 
19 Ministry of Education Circular, Feb. 10, 1941. 
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ChevalierJs interpretation of the law of October 3, 
1940 was more severe than that of his predecessor, Ripert. 
As for ChevalierJs successor, Carcopino, he would review 
the interpretation of this statute, and judge it to be 
too narrow. 
Chevalier left his post on February 23, 1941. Several 
months later he returned to his Chair of Philosophy and his 
position as Dean at the University of Grenoble. In this 
position he was less intransigent and in 1943 permitted cer-
tain Jewish students to enroll in the university in spite of 
the legal quota of 3 percent. It appeared that Chevalier 
was neither anti-Semitic nor racist, but more of an anglo-
phile and germanophobe, which was evidenced by his respect 
for his master, Bergson, as well as his love for English 
literature. He does not appear to have been fervent or even 
adept at collaborating with the Germans. Everything in his 
behavior, however, indicated a fervent anti-communism and 
I 
adhesion to the Regime of Petain. In 1943 at Grenoble, he 
defended some Jewish students while he denounced communists 
and Gaullists. At the end of 1943, he wrote to P~tain to 
propose the creation of an anti-Bolshevik and counter-Maquis 
idea.20 He would retain his opinion until 1944.21 
20 The Maquis was the geographical area in southwest 
France where the French Resistance fought the Germans. 
21 Letter dated June 12, 1944 reiterates his position, 
CHSGM, Fasc. 2, Chevalier Trial Dossier, p. 62. 
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On June 25, 1944, Chevalier was arrested at Cerilly and 
imprisoned for fourteen months. Chevalier was the first 
person indicted by the High Court of Justice in March, ·1946, 
' which was presided over by Henri Nogueres. Chevalier was 
condemned to twenty years of hard labor, to national indig-
nitY for life, and to the confiscation of half his property. 
His condemnation was due more to his action against the 
Maquis during his short time as Minister of Education than 
to his dismissal of Jewish teachers. He later benefited 
from a presidential pardon in 1945. 
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J~rome Carcopino 
I A Jerome Carcopino succeeded Jacques Chevalier in 
Petain 1 s government. He served as Secretary of National 
Education and Youth from February 23, 1941 to April 18, 
1942.22 His ministry was under the Secretary of War, 
Huntziger. Carcopino was a professor of ancient history at 
the Sorbonne and distinguished member of the Institut. In 
1937 he became Director of the French school in Rome, a 
position he would keep until 1940. He is chiefly noted 
today as the author of Daily Life in Ancient Rome. 
As early as 1938, Carcopino witnessed the ravages 
caused by the first anti-Jewish measures in the education 
system in Fascist Italy. Two hundred Jewish teachers were 
dismissed; the majority were teachers from higher education. 
That same year, foreign Jews and Jewish students were 
totally excluded from public teaching. Later, Jewish-
Italian school children would also be excluded .. In his 
writings, Carcopino maintained a falsely compassionate tone 
and said he deplored massive exclusions of school children 
22 J. Carcopino. Souvenirs de Sept Ans. 1937-44, and Coll. 
"The Present Time," (Paris: Flammarion, ed., 1953), 702 pp. 
The memoires of the Minister constituted a precious source 
and exclusive document. The article of Henri Clavet also 
contained pertinent information. CHSGM, No. 15-16, 
July-Sept., 1956, pp. 181-83. 
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in Italy and also regretted that none of the prestigious 
Jewish-Italian professors benefited from a derogation as in 
Vichy France; hence they were forced to emigrate.23 
Back in France, Carcopino did not hide his political 
opinions which were very favorable to the Regime installed 
by Petain. In July, 1940, he congratulated Mireaux, Minis-
ter of Education and transferred his entire devotion to 
Petain and his entire loyalty to the New Order.24 This 
step assured him a rapid rise in the Vichy government. 
Mireaux entrusted him with the direction of the Ecole 
, 
Normale Superieure (Rue d~Ulm), from July, 1940, a post 
which he would officially receive in September under Ripert. 
Carcopino was appointed Dean of the Paris Academy on 
November 13, 1940 by Ripert. In his memoirs, Carcopino 
congratulated himself in having been able to protect the 
university from the German menace. He added that he would 
have also defended the university against attacks by politi-
cians or the French military, whom he held responsible for 
the defeat.25 
23 This was not the case for France. 
24 ibid., pp. 74-154. 
26 ibid., p. 154. This is very subjective. He stressed 
that he would have been more firm than Roussy and would 
have evaded the troubles. 
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Nevertheless, the statute concerning Jewish teachers 
was promulgated October 18, 1940: they could not teach in 
Paris. Similar to Chevalier, to whom no one can attribute 
public anti-Semitic declarations, Carcopino spoke of his 
Jewish friends: " ... Among the Israelite menaces, I counted 
numerous friends. I was grieved and appalled by the ini-
quity which swooped down upon them .. "26 
Without ever putting in doubt the French racist legis-
lation, Carcopino, as the Dean, seemed to manifest particu-
lar care for certain colleagues.27 In spite of his per-
sonal feelings, Carcopino never forgot his responsibility. 
In the University of Paris, the most important in the 
country, he had to apply the French law of October 3, 1940. 
He centralized the declarations and asked for the rehabili-
tation of Jewish teachers. Those who were not fortunate 
enough to be famous or who were not one of his friends·, did 
not benefit from his support. Carcopino explained that if 
2s Carcopino, p. 244. In his memoirs, Carcopino commented 
on this law. "I have suffered in 1940 over the laws which 
suppressed the right of teaching to my students, colleagues, 
or other doctors because they were Jews ... I have never been 
anti-Semitic and was not to become one under the Schlague" 
(whip). 
27 He interests himself in Marc Bloch, Levy Provencal, 
Levy-Valensi, Lisbonne and Professor Guastalla. Testimony of 
M. Clarac, professor at the time at the Lycee Louis le Grand, 
preserved in the archives of CHSGM. Carcopino had written a 
very flattering letter to Guastalla offering to keep him in 
his position--an exception; however, the latter refused. 
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he stayed in "his place" it was to have the power "to shift 
the blows or weaken them."2S It seems that this was not 
his only interest because Carcopino was an ambitious man, 
and for him "to shift the blows" was also to accuse the 
Germans to be the originators of the racist legislation.29 
He wrote: "the law dishonored no one but the Germans ... not 
for an instant did I dream to throw back on the Marshal the 
blame ... "30 Once more he had looked for the least evil. 
For Carcopino, the Marshal "was not acquainted with the 
actions which were plotted against the Jews."31 The 
historian tried to give a positive image of hia government. 
He showed political diplomacy in his writing: 
the truth is that in its entirety, the government of 
which I was part looked to swerve the brutal application 
of laws that the Nazis had imposed on the Marshal.32 
Carcopino contradicted himself when he wrote: 
PetainJs law had not ceased under the cover of his anath-
emas, to protect life, civil liberty, and even the social 
condition of the Jews in France.33 
2a Carcopino, ibid., p. 248. 
29 Mr. Beslais at the lycee. Rollin was summoned by 
Carcopino because of a letter of protestation against three 
Jewish professors of the lycee. Testimony received Dec. 6, 
1961 by M. Calmetter preserved at the CHSGM. 
30 Carcopino, ibid. p. 245. 
31 ibid. p. 254. 
32 ibid. p. 358. 
33 ibid. p. 246. 
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In an interview Carcopino had with P~tain in Vichy-on 
November 24, 1940, the racial law was mentioned.s~ But 
nothing was changed since Carcopino, Dean at the time, .sent 
as early as December 5, to all the establishments placed 
under his orders, a note confirming to the directors of 
these institutes that the law of October 3, 1940 was 
applicable to the Jewish teachers who were prisoners in 
Germany. Carcopino specified: 
You do not have to fire from their classes professors who 
have already left because of war; therefore, in my opin-
ion, the application of the law of October 18 can only be 
suspended in regard to the prisoners of whom nobody in 
their absence would know how to establish by presumption, 
their personal status.as 
Carcopino, Dean, as successor of Ripert at the 
Chevalier Ministry, accepted this deferred condemnation. He 
would act in the same fashion regarding the law of April 11, 
1941, which complemented the one of October 3, 1940 (Article 
7), and specified that "functionaries who are prisoners of 
war or who serve abroad will cease to exercise their 
functions two months after the date of their arrival in 
non-Occupied France." 
34 A.N. A.J. 16 2895. In the archives, letters from 
heads of high schools evidenced the government~s indiffer-
ence about this question. 
35 Carcopino, p. 257-258. 
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On November 7, 1940, Carcopino wrote to Dean Roussy 
concerning the Jewish students: 
I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your minister-
ial instructions concerning the foreigners and your own 
instructions concerning the Jews. Regarding the latter, 
it is easy for me to· apply them; none of the civil ser-
vants of the School Administration is Jewish; the profes-
sors are those of the faculty of literature and sciences 
of the University of Paris, of which the statute and 
their destiny will be determined by their respective 
deans. In relation to the students, it comes from your 
circular, that not being members of the teaching corps, 
they do not have to be taken into account. I have, 
therefore, nothing to do ... 36 
His remarks revealed his moderation on the Jewish ques-
tion. He exhibited a certain joy in this domain; "to have 
nothing to do with it." At the Ecole Normale Supe'rieure, i~ 
a letter dated November 11, 1940, Roussy requested instruc-
tions from his Minister, Ripert. This last letter confirms 
that he "thinks that the pupils of the school, not yet being 
members of the teaching corps, are not targeted by the 
instructions of October 21, 1940."37 
Meanwhile, Carcopino replaced Roussy as Dean and 
remained moderate toward his Jewish students. However, the 
circular from Minister Chevalier of February 10~ 1941 placed 
everything in question as it forbade the Jewish students to 
36 A.N. A.J. 16 2895. Letter to Dean Roussy, Nov. 7, 1940. 
37 A.N. A.J. 16 2895. Letter to Ripert, Nov. 27, 1940. 
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frequent the Ecole Normale or present themselves for the 
doctorate. Carcopino, becoming Minister "in his place" 
would forget his own reticence. 
J~rome Carcopino would confirm the circular of his 
predecessor by a decree, which he signed July 11, 1941 with 
Marshal Petain and by the circular transmitted in July, 1941 
by his Director of Superior Education, Galletier. It is 
important to note the rapid rise of Carcopino. He affirmed 
at the Liberation that he neither plotted nor even asked to 
obtain favors or positions. However, the members of his 
Cabinet, such as Plante, spoke evasively of "the innocence" 
of Carcopino. This adjunct director of the office of the 
MinisterJs Cabinet emphasized public support of the Regime, 
CarcopinoJs visits to Vichy, his repeated conversations with 
Petain, and his declarations and articles published periodi-
cally in University Information, even before February, 1941. 
Carcopino was not the candid image of the man he attempted 
to project in his memoirs, but was that of an ambitious man 
--his Cabinet considered itself "apolitical" as he did. If 
we believe him,38 the men who formed it "wanted only to 
serve France."39 As Minister of Education, Carcopino did 
not hesitate to contact the Occupation Authorities in order 
38 Carcopino, p. 275. 
39 Noting some names: Gilbert Gidel, Dean of the Law 
School became Dean in Paris, a position he would keep in 
the following ministry of Bennard. He was arrested on Sept. 
10, 1941. Maurice Roy was officially named General Inspector 
to the Ministry of Relations with the Occupation Authorities. 
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to· negotiate with them. After the events of November 11, 
1940, he conversed with General Best at the Hotel Majestic. 
He even congratulated himself on the results of this inter-
view. " ... As of now the elite of our students is saved ... the 
best blood of the French students has not run, as the Czech-
oslovakian students in Prague."40 
Carcopino judged the reforms of his predecessors as too 
extremist. He chiefly tried to avoid any tension and had 
declared himself "defender of neutralism at school." It 
was therefore natural that the Minister tried to suppress 
certain dispositions of Chevalier and attempted to impose 
his own reforms. Religious education disappeared from the 
public schools. If Carcopino did not suppress the very 
large subsidy accorded by the State to public education,41 
he nevertheless reinforced the former position of separation 
between lay and religious schools. He followed the politics 
of his predecessors. On March 13 and April 22, 1941 he 
signed the decrees which forbade certain books in the 
schools. Under his ministry, for example, the Malet-Isaac 
manual had been replaced; meanwhile, other history books 
written by non-Jews continued to be used in the schools.42 
I 
40 Carcopino, p. 215-220. Minister of Petain and Darlan, 
he established good personal rapport. 
41 Carcopino, p. 327, and the law of Nov. 11, 1941. The 
annual subsidy accorded to private schools was raised to 
400,500 million francs per year. 
42 For the historic period 1848-1914, the manual of 
A. Bossuat and E. Bruley was chosen. 
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Less than two months after the installation of 
carcopino at the Ministry of Education, Vallat was named 
head of the newly formed CGQJ. The two men would officially 
cease their functions in April, 1942 with the return of 
Laval to the affairs of State. There had been numerous 
letters exchanged between the two men,43 as their func-
tions were complementary. Speaking of the law of June 21, 
1941, which instituted the quota for the Jewish students, 
Vallat specified that it had been conceived in "accord with 
the Minister of National Education and the Secretary of 
Health."44 Carcopino, however, wishing to separate him-
self from the CGQJ in order to preserve his authority and 
independence, sent this circular to the Deans: 
It has been brought to my attention that you have 
received directly, whether from the Commissar, the CGQJ, 
or from the regional directors of the economic service of 
aryanization, requests for information and even instruc-
tions relative to application of the law of June, 1941 
regulating the conditions of admission of the Israelite 
students in the institutions of higher education. I have 
the honor to advise you that in no case must you corres~ 
pond directly with the central or regional services of 
the CGQJ. As a consequence, all responses to requests 
for prescribed information must reach their destination 
by my intermediary. In relation to the instructions you 
have already received or which you will come to receive, 
I beg you to transmit them to me immediately. I would be 
very obliged if you would follow the strict application 
of these dispositions.45 
43 Doc. CXCIII-55, CXCIII-48. 
44 Doc. CX-42, Letter of Vallat to General Weygand, 
May 24, 1941. 
•e Carcopino, p. 358 (spoke of the law imposed by Nazis), 
and p. 368 (dissimulation of the government of Vichy). 
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This circular must not make Carcopino appear to be the 
protector of the Jewa. He cited it with complacency in his 
memoirs to confirm his moderating role when faced with ·the 
"fury" of the CGQJ. He desired to show his independence and 
his prerogatives. Never did he put French racist laws in 
question; he even countersigned certain laws, and on occa-
sion took the initiative in signing them. For example, in 
August, 1941 he demanded that the CGQJ extend professional 
interdiction to Jewish members of the lycee committees. In 
the same manner, Carcopino opposed the reintegration of 
certain Jewish teachers at a meeting on July 23, 1941 in 
Vichy. Concerning the special aryanization of teaching, the 
behavior of Carcopino was revealed chronologically by the 
exclusion of Jewish professors. As Director of the Ecole 
Normale, he claimed to have helped, with Dean Roussy, to 
pass through "the intentional loopholes of the law (of 
October 3, 1940) ... in official fraudulent fashion, the 
highest number of Israelite functionaries."-46 Carcopino 
claimed to have acted in the same fashion when he was Minis-
ter. Modestly he recalled hie fight against anti-Jewish 
laws: " ... I fought as much as I could to deflect the 
blows ... "47 He was never opposed, however, to the firing 
of Jewish teachers; even knowing the total numbers of them, 
-48 Carcopino, p. 246. 
-47 ibid., p. 368. 
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because he was the one who had them transferred to the CGQJ 
in May, 1941.48 Under Vichy, 3500 Jewish civil servants 
were dismissed in France, of which 1100 were part of 
National Education. The largest number of exclusions 
occurred during this ministry even though Jews represented 
a small minority (5 percent).49 The statute of June 2, 
1941 applied by Carcopino increased slightly the number 
of firings. He continued the work of his precedessors in 
applying racist laws. 
In his memoirs, the Minister claimed to have taken 
great care during the reclassifications. The reintegration 
purely and simply remained exceptiona1.eo Still he agreed 
to specify that the decision to rehire eleven dismissed Jew-
ish teachers had already been approved by Chevalier. The 
selection was difficult; Carcopino as Dean centralized the 
first requests.51 He wondered if he should give a favor-
able opinion on each dossier. He refused to transmit the 
demands of those who could not support their positions 
before the State Council. In his memoirs, Carcopino spoke 
48 A.N. A.J. 3865. Dossier M. 797. Letter of May 12, 
1941 to the CGQJ. 
49 The 1100 Jewish teachers were fired from the National 
Education as follows: higher education - 12-13%; primary 
education - 61-63%; secondary education - 20-22%; technical 
education - 2-3%; in the Occupied Zone - 38%; Non-Occupied 
Zone (including Algeria) - 62%. 
5° Carcopino, p. 363. "Well understood, I had been 
incapable of reinstating the teachers." 
51 Carcopino, p. 249. 
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almost entirely of higher education. He cheerfully claimed 
to have refused only two requests52 for higher education. 
However, his support was far from being as widespread as he 
claims.53 Still, we should specify to whom he gave his 
support. Carcopino was more interested in his colleagues at 
the university level than in primary or secondary teachers. 
He approved only about one demand out of four.54 
Soon, it was 1942, 1943 and the times had changed--men 
became more hardened. Carcopino perfectly tailored his Min-
istry to the team in power, which defended wealth more than 
individuals. The Minister was not a simple executor as he 
would have one believe. He did more than merely apply cer-
tain laws of exception. He also did more than to simply 
obey and execute--he fully participated in the creation of 
certain laws. In his capacity as Minister of National 
Education, he did not need to countersign the French law of 
52 Carcopino, p. 249. One of the professors of law with 
"foreign" origins and that of Raymond Weill, a professor of 
the School of Literature who had reached retirement age in 
1941. Among reinstated Jews, note that Robert Debre of the 
School of Medicine benefited from Article 8 (service ren-
dered to the State) after agreement of the State Attorney. 
53 ibid., p. 250. 
54 A.N. A.J. 3865, M 797. On July 5, 1941 a dossier was 
transmitted to the Ministry which contained the demands of 
reinstatement of 21 Jewish professors of the Secondaire. 
After agreement of Vallat (July 16, 1941), Carcopino 
favored all but five professors on July 22; two of the 
five benefiting from Article 8. 
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June 2, 1941 as he had signed the decree of November 5, 1941 
and the circular of August 28, 1941,55 which constituted 
the same thing. Also, it was Carcopino who communicated to 
the CGQJ information concerning the Jewish professors, and 
not the reverse. The CGQJ only verified and supervised the 
whole and stimulated his zeal. It was collaboration--
sometimes not without certain reticence--but collaboration 
even so. Carcopino added to the decree of December 26, 1940 
, 
(Journal Officiel, July 2, 1941) signed by Petain, a new 
lawes which forced the retirement of Jewish professors. 
This law changed only a few things. For dismissed Jewish 
professors who could not prove having at least fifteen years 
~f ~eniority, it was still difficult to receive at least 
retirement pay or indemnity. Things were not easy for 
others either. It was true that for the Minister, questions 
of the men#s resources were not as important as saving 
collections of books, archives or documents. Carcopino 
exerted immense energy to protect libraries menaced by 
German greed. He also suggested that interested persons 
such as Louis Halphen, Marc Bloch and Jacques Ancel donate 
their libraries to the State (l#Universit/' de l#Ecole de 
55 This circular concerned the secret societies ... an 
interdiction was made to all the dignitaries of these 
societies to hold public functions: Article 2 of the law 
of June 2, 1941. 
ee Law of April 3, 1941, No. 1499, Journal Officiel, 
May 5, 1941. 
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Literature in Paris). He assured them that their books 
would remain in France. In his memoirs, Carcopino congratu-
lated himself on this action since the collections remained 
intact and were returned to the families after the 
Liberation. 57 
In May, 1941, the Cabinet of the Minister of Education 
raised another administrative problem to the CGQJ. A law of 
December 27, 1927, (Article 91) accorded to children, grand-
children or heirs of functionaries of public education, 
retired or deceased, the exemption of the cost of day school 
in the secondary schools and colleges (university benefit). 
" ... Should we continue to provide Israeli professors with 
the benefits of accessory rights as the previously mentioned 
university benefits? ... " 5S The direction of education 
does not question the negative response of the CGQJ, 
evidencing the submission or indifference of the Ministry 
of Education directed by Carcopino. 
As we have already observed, Carcopino did not always 
tell the truth in his memoirs. His principal omission con-
cerned his role and true responsibility for the creation of 
the French law of June 21, ·1941, which limited the number of 
Jewish students at the university to 3 percent. 
67 Carcopino, p. 364-365. 
58 Letter of SEEN from Vichy, May 24, 1941. CX-41. 
Response of CGQJ, May 28, 1941. CX-46. 
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In addition, the initiative of the inter-ministerial 
commission in preparing the university quota was due to the 
pugnacity of Carcopino. He had not been imposed by anyone. 
It was Carcopino himself who, after knowing about the first 
incidents at the University of Algiers,5e which hurriedly 
proposed their adoption. As early as May 19, 1941, Ourliec 
signed a letter for the Minister addressed to Vallat at the 
CGQJ, which said: "The attention of the Minister has been 
drawn to the urgency to institute a quota for Jewish stu-
dents in the universities ... "so In their study, Vichy 
and the Jews,s1 Paxton and Marrus qualified Carcopino as 
a "liberal." They underlined his liberalism, his aid to 
Jewish professors of the Occupied Zone, his support of 
Bergson, his refusal to make the Deans cooperate in the 
persecutions in the Non-Occupied Zone.s2 They also 
wondered who had initiated the inter-ministerial 
commission 1 s preparation of the university quota.as 
59 Letter of Weygand, May 15, 1941. CX-37. 
60 A.N. A.J. 3865. Dossier M 797, May 19, 1941. 
61 Robert 0. Paxton and Michael R. Marrus, Vichy et les 
Juifs, (Paris: Calman-Levy, Coll. Diaspora, 1981). 
62 ibid., p. 195. 
63 ibid., p. 121. 
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On May 24, 1941 Carcopino wrote to the CGQJ from Paris 
to propose the application of a quota: 
1. It is desirable that the quota be applied as soon as 
possible, at least in the Schools of Medicine. 
2. The number of Jewish students admitted to take 
courses could only be 3 percent.64 
However, certain Jewish students (sons of war veterans) 
could go in front of a jury of five professors to benefit 
from the exemptions. On May 29, 1941, Terracher, General 
Secretary of the Institution, sent a letter to the CGQJ. He 
emphasized a necessity to "appease certain concerns regard-
ing the high number of Jewish students."65 But some days 
after, Darlan and Carcopino presented to Marshal Petain 
their project of quota; they tried to demonstrate the 
rationality of this measure.66 In his memoirs, the 
Minister made no allusions to this letter. He limited 
himself to repeating only that the quota was implicity 
contained in the Jewish statute (Article 4), in which 
Jewish access to liberal professions was limited.67 
64 A.N. A.J. 38 1144, Letter of May 24, 1941. Paxton and 
Marrus, p. 121. The letter of Carcopino states that in his 
Cabinet, Larnaud is the specialist for Algeria. 
65 ibid., p. 121. 
66 A.N. A.J. 38 119. S/C I, June, 1941. 
67 Carcopino, p. 369. A.N. A.J. 38 1144. Letter from 
Carcopino to Vallat Sept. 5, 1941 confirmed his ideas that 
a quota in higher education is "a correlary necessary" for 
the limitation of future Israelite professors, physicians 
or lawyers. 
81 
Ripert did not interpret the statute in the same way. 
Carcopino congratulated himself in having been able to admit 
to the Occupation Authorities "the extreme severity of" our 
calculation." He described the patience of the Inspector 
General of Germany, Maurice Roy, in approving the law men-
tioned in the Journal Officiel as early as June 24 without 
German censorship. His opinion of this law and the texts 
was that: " ... they were necessary to spare the Jews of the 
Occupied Zone from more rigorous measures."es In his 
memoirs, he cited a letter from Marc Bloch in which Bloch 
mocks himself about "his lame quota."69 He even pretended 
that he dismissed Jewish students. This interpretation was 
very broad; it was the law for all universities, grandee 
ecoles and technical schools.70 In addition, Vallat com-
plained to the Minister of Education about the poor applica-
tion of the law and about the laxity of his colleagues. In 
his mail to Vallat, Carcopino revealed a certain irritabil-
ity: "I took care of the strict application to the law of 
June 21, 1941; but I can only be surprised that this law 
relates only to the schools of my Ministry."71 
68 Carcopino, p. 690-91. 
69 ibid., p. 369-370. . .. we did not risk too much to 
exclude in practice these that, theoretically, we were 
eliminating." 
70 A.N. A.J. 3865, Dossier: Education Nationale, Doc. CDJC 
CXCIII-40. Since the beginning of 1941, a number of Jewish 
students were excluded from schools of the grandee ecoles. 
7 1 Carcopino to Vallat, Oct. 24, 1941, CXCIII-55. 
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Carcopino~s responsibility for the application of this 
law was undeniable and his circular of October 7, 1941 con-
firms it: "It is essential in all cases that at any time 
the number of Jewish students in the same university not 
exceed the total of 3 percent of non-Jewish students."72 
According to him, his circulars had been re-enacted only to 
pacify the Germans who were worried. 7 3 The first circular 
dated October 7, 1941 addressed to the Deans was more moder-
ate. The Minister was precise in it, however, and stated 
clearly that only enrollment was limited by the quota and 
that Jewish students could not participate in the examina-
tions. These students could, however, attend "courses of 
another university than where they are regularly enrolled." 
This double enrollment was an efficient way for Jewish stu-
dents to escape the rigors of the law. Referring to the 
directives of the CGQJ, a note of the Minister recalls at 
the bottom of the circular, that foreign Jewish students 
could not enroll themselves except in the "case where the 
number of Jewish French students had not filled the propor-
tion set by law."74 Carcopino stated he quickly received 
a complaint from the Occupying Authorities concerning the 
72 CVIII-21. Letter reproduced in "University Informa-
tion" of Oct. 26, 1941. Collection of CHSGM. 
7 3 Carcopino, p. 372. 
7 4 Dated Oct. 1, 1941 and reproduced in "University 
Information" on Oct. 8, 1941. Collection of CHSGM. 
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multiple enrollments of Jewish students--therefore, it 
became forbidden to enroll in two universities.75 Only 
in two schools of the same university did double enrollment 
remain possible because the Minister proposed that certain 
students in the Occupied Zone take refuge in the Non-Occu-
pied Zone where the quota was not 3 percent.76 On March 
14, 1942, however, Carcopino was forced by Vallat to sign 
another circular categorically forbidding multiple enroll-
ments. He, therefore, had to obey the orders of the CGQJ 
and the Occupying Authorities.77 Carcopino was able to 
demonstrate an inflexible resistance to the introduction of 
any quota in the secondary schools, however. In his 
memoirs, he submitted that that was what the Germans wanted 
--to institute the quota in the lycees and colleges.7a 
Carcopino also mentioned the ability of Maurice Roy, 
who sent false statistics to the Occupying Authorities and 
convinced his interlocuteurs that it would be absurd as well 
, 
as useless to adopt a quota in the lycees because this would 
provoke a certain agitation. It is known that there were 
never any limitations on Jewish students in primary or 
secondary education. 
75 Carcopino, p. 372-73. 
76 A.N. A.J. 38 1144. Dossier 5 JA 24. 
77 Documents CXCIII-55, CXCV-1700 and CCXXXVIII-44, 
showed repeated pressures exerted on the Ministry. 
7e Carcopino, p. 371. 
Carcopino resisted. This resistance was efficacious 
but the proportion of Jewish pupils in the schools and 
lycees was only 1 or 2 percent.79 If a quota was applied 
in 1941 in the schools and lycees, this measure would not 
rest on any other official legislation. Carcopino was 
always opposed to it.00 His successor, Abel Bennard, 
signed the law applicable to Algeria on October 19, 1942. 
In summary, if Carcopino had wished to hold a firmer 
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attitude towards the CGQJ and the Occupying Authorities, he 
probably would have avoided this segregation in education. 
But, did he sincerely want to resist? We recall that he 
signed a decree on July 11, 1941 forbidding Jewish students 
to compete in the examination for the doctorate or to enter 
I 
the Ecole Normale Superieure. Equally, in 1942, he approved 
the decision of the CGQJ to forbid Jews access to the com-
petitive examination for the Prix de Rome.01 In his 
memoirs, Carcopino omitted all these points because he was 
trying to appear innocent. He wished both to justify his 
actions and minimize his responsibilities. Due to his 
79 Carcopino, p. 371. 
so A.N. A.J. 38 11445 JA 6, Document of the CGQJ, CCCLXXI-
44, June 3, 1942 confirmed the opposition of Carcopino: 
"the general government of Algeria had, two months ago, pre-
pared a project of law intending to establish a quota for 
Jews entering institutes of primary and secondary education. 
This project confronted hostility in the Ministry of Educa-
tion under Carcopino." 
" 61 Carcopino was Director of the Ecole Normale Superieure 
and the Ecole Fran~aise of Rome. 
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longevity in the government, however, his reponsibilities 
were obvious and his influence was lasting. He was Dean 
for four months, Minister for 14 months and Director of 
the Ecole Normale Superieure until 1944. In addition, his 
ministerial functions corresponded to the most important 
phase of the Vichy government. During the spring and summer 
of 1941 was when the Jewish question was examined with the 
greatest interest; but Carcopino~s ambition triumphed over 
his moderation and kept him in the reactionary government 
of Vichy. He appears to have been less extremist and dis-
agreeable than his predecessor (Chevalier) or his successor 
(Bennard). 
Arrested at the Liberation, he was accused of national 
indignity by the High Court of Justice for having been the 
Minister of Petain. As early as February 15, 1945s2, he 
was provisionally given liberty. Later he was acquitted and 
restored to his position of professor. The court decided 
I that he had protected the pupils of the Ecole Normale Super-
ieure from leaving France for the STO (Service of Obligatory 
Work), and because he "stood in opposition to racist propa-
ganda" in the universities.83 In 1951, he was named 
honorary director of the Ecole Franqaise of Rome, where he 
pursued his career and did research on ancient Rome. Later, 
he became historical advisor to Fellini and died in 1970. 
s2 Le Mende, Feb. 16, 1945. 
8 3 Robert Aron, Histoire de l~Epuration. (Paris: Fayard, 
T. 2), pp. 628, 644. 
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Abel Bennard 
With a brilliant education, having graduated from the 
Lyc~e Henri IV and l~Ecole du Louvre, Abel BonnardB4 was 
appointed Secretary of National Education at the age of 60 
by Laval, who was in power April 18, 1942 to August 24, 
1944. Unlike other Ministers, Bennard was not a university 
man, but rather a writer of Maurrasian literature. He was 
anti-German, anti-communist, and a monarchist. From the 
twenties onward he was part of the Parisian literary milieu, 
where he was known as a poet who often wrote of love. 
In 1924, in his book, En Chine, he exalted the colonial 
realization of Great Britain, which according to him, pre-
served the white race: "The ·races have to recognize them-
selves; not mix themselves."Bf5 In 1925, he collaborated 
with the daily Fascist newspaper of Georges Valois, Nouveau 
s. ~ iecle. At that time, he participated in banquets which 
assembled teachers and well-known men, such as Albert Rivaud 
and General Weygand, to promote Maurrasian ideas among 
intellectuals and students. 
84 Bennard was born in Poitiera on Dec. 19, 1883 and died 
in Madrid May 31, 1968. RHSGM, Oct., 1977, No. 108, p. 1-
22. Article of J. Mievre, "The Political Evolution of Abel 
Bennard." The CHSGM conserved the papers of Bennard and the 
minutes of his trial in the High Court of Justice (Audience 
May 22, 1960 ) . 
85 A. Bennard, En Cbine, (Paris: Fayard, 1924), p. 254-56. 
In 1936, Bennard revealed his anti-Semitism in the 
pages of his pamphlet, Les Moderes.86 The year 1937 
marked a change in attitude in Bennard. His Maurrasian 
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hostility toward Germany disappeared when in that same year 
he met Hitler and Otto Abetz, future Ambassador of Occupied 
Paris. Shortly before the declaration of war, Bennard sym-
' 
pathized with L~Action FraDfaise and Xavier Vallat. During 
the Occupation his influence grew. He was part of Parisian 
literary elite and published in various collaborationist 
newspapers and magazines. He also expressed himself on the 
radio, and as early as September, 1940 Bennard stated his 
new motto: Family, Race, Nation. He was very concerned 
about students. According to him, they should be immedi-
ately "taken back under control" in order to "discipline 
them. "87 
In January, 1941 Flandin named Bennard to the Council 
of State.as Bennard was ready because he desired the 
position of Minister in the Ministry of Education to replace 
Chevalier as early as February 22, 1941. Unhappily, the 
Marshal~s opposition seemed to originate with the arrival 
of Carcopino at the Ministry. 
86 A. Bennard, Les Moderes, (Paris: Grasset, 1936). 
87 ibid. 
88 State Council, instituted by Flandin Jan. 22, 1941, 
established itself in the absence of all parliamentary 
representation, as representative of the nation. 
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Friends of Bennard (e.g. Rebatet and Brasillach) and their 
newspapers, such as Le Petit Parisien, multiplied-their 
attacks by alleging that Carcopino was too timid. In May of 
1941, Bennard exposed his complete loyalty to the New Regime 
in his writings, including his firm resolve to collaborate 
with Hitler 1 s Germany and his anti-Semitism. The Jews were, 
according to him, "foreign intruders who naturalize them-
selves most conveniently in order to plunder France." 
Further, he affirmed again that in the thirties, a "Jewish 
spirit destroyed ours ... "ae 
Bennard appeared different from other Parisian collab-
orationists such as Rebatet, and Brasillach, or from other 
writers such as Celine, who did not hesitate to laugh at the 
I 
Petain Regime. Bennard did not attack the New Regime. He 
also did not hesitate to present himself as the defender of 
a rural and traditional France. If Bennard had broken with 
his old Maurrasian friends, he did not yet declare himself 
Fascist. In the world of Occupied Paris, he occupied a very 
specific place: between the Maurrasians and the Fascists. 
On April 18, 1942, he succeeded Carcopino, whom he had known 
and admired since 1905. Bennard kept his position at the 
Ministry of Education until the end of the German Occupa-
tion. An avowed anti-Semite, he was more reactionary and 
extremist than his predecessors. 
ee A. Bennard. Pens6e dans 1 1 Action, (Paris: Grasset, 
May, 1941). 
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Bonnard was the Minister who remained in this position 
the longest and managed to pursue his paraministerial activ-
ities undisturbed. Adoring the social life, Bennard felt a 
limitless fascination for Hitler, the new man that the Third 
Reich sought to exalt. 
In addition to his other functions as Minister, 
Bennard, who detested Bolshevism, was part of an anti-
communist committee. He was also president of a group named 
Collaboration, and was active since 1940 in its literary 
section. He gave his support to the Institute of Anthropo-
sociology of Vacher de la Pouge. This institute had an 
ephemeral existence, but its ideas and racist theories of 
sociology are still alive and spread by the new Right. The 
article of Duguet in Le Matin showed the orientations of the 
Institute: 
The Institute of Anthroposociology, guardian of racial 
purity, will be inaugurated at 4:30 p.m. under the Presi-
dency of Monsieur Abel Bonnard and Darquier de Pellepoix. 
The goal is to study, determine and protect the 
scientific basis of racial selection ... eo 
The Minister#s relative ignorance concerning university 
questions conferred great importance on the men of his 
entourage. It is the reason that his nearest assistants91 
00 Le Matin, Dec. 22, 1942. 
01 See Appendix D. 
are mentioned here--they were practically all university 
professors and often the same men who had served in pre-
ceding administrations. Thus, one cannot really speak· of 
political rupture. 
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In the direction of secondary teaching, there were no 
changes. Cheneviere2 kept his post of Director; Doldier 
remained his Adjunct and Mr. Mas remained Secretary for 
Administration. There were no changes in primary education 
either. The General Inspector of Vichy, Jolly, remained 
Director of Primary Education, and Lafitte, his Adjunct, was 
seconded by the Inspector of the Academy of Paris, Hepp. 
Among others who kept their positions (in addition to 
Inspector Roy), was Miss Blanche Maurel. She was the 
person who took care of the "Jewish question;" and she 
therefore corresponded frequently with the CGQJ.93 After 
the Ministers and the members of the government (January 27, 
1941), it was the turn of magistrates, the military and high 
functionaries to swear fidelity to the Marshal and his 
Regime. Most of the functionaries of education (directors, 
deans, inspectors, and delegates) also had to swear allegi-
ance on November 3, 1942. All these men promised to be 
92 On Dec. 7, 1940, Chenevier signed the circular which 
prescribed the revision of school libraries. He became, 
with Roy, Couissin and some others, a member of a Commis-
sion for the revision of schoolbooks. 
93 CDJC, XXIII-35, 36. 
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faithful to the Regime while pronouncing the fateful little 
phrase: "I swear fidelity to the Chief of the State and 
engage myself to exercise my functions for the good of the 
State according to the laws of honor and integrity."94 
Not all the men who swore allegiance were completely 
and vigorously in favor of the legislation, but anti-Semites 
were the most active.e6 Although generalizations remain 
overly simple and even dangerous, we can affirm that the 
arrival of Bennard, who did not come from within the univer-
sity, to the Ministry accelerated the resistance of the aca-
demics. He had very few relations with French academics. 
The personality of Bennard had two specific characteristics 
which differentiated him from other Parisian collaboration-
ists: he never negated his adhesion to the Regime, and he 
never attacked it. If Bennard broke away from his old 
Maurrasian friends, he did not pose himself as a Fascist. 
Politically, he occupied a very unique place. 
Opposition appeared even in the midst of his Cabinet. 
The indifference of a Minister faced with the fate of a Jew-
ish professor was apparent--at times it was even replaced 
94 University Memorial 1940-44. Paris, Nov. 11, 1950. 
CHSGM, Dossier on General Education Measures. 
95 A.N. A.J. 38 III, Dossier 5 S/C 2. Letter addressed to 
the CGQJ by the SEEN, Nov. 16, 1942. See Appendix E. 
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with mild sympathy. It seemed that the racist measure was 
brought into question. We arrive in this way to a quite 
paradoxical situation: Bennard, Minister of Education,. 
the most extremist and antf-Semitic member of the Vichy 
Regime,es had, due to the resistance of some members of 
the Ministry and a part of the teachers, a very secondary 
role in the aryanization of education. Although he had 
control of education for twenty-eight months, he merely 
followed the pattern of his predecessors--no new initiative 
was taken. As it was common, Bennard began to question the 
reform of his predecessors. He was determined to continue 
and deepen the epuration in the university domain. On the 
Jewish question, he does not compound it. 
The Chief of his Cabinet, Louis Plante', wrote: "A 
letter of denunciation alarms him. If it is from the CGQJ, 
he is intimidated ... "e7 Therefore, Bennard continued to 
exclude Jewish functionarie~ from education. He benefited 
from this work of purification, which was an advantage as 
well as a handicap. His friendship, which tied him to his 
96 In the Hoover Institute, Laval writes, remarking of 
Bennard, "He is sometimes more German than the Germans." 
He recalled the opposition of the Marshal to his nomination 
in Oct., 1943. He would have even expressed the wish to get 
rid of a man judged too pro-German. It is clearly opposition 
from the Occupying Authorities (according to Laval) which 
permitted Bennard to keep his control until the liberation. 
I ' 97 Louis Plante, Au 110 rue de Grenelle. Memoires. (1920-
~' (Paris, Raymond Clavreuil, ed., 1967), pp. 322 and 341. 
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companion of struggle, Darquier, constituted an evident 
advantage as well as the good rapport which he tried to 
establish with the CGQJ. Darquier would help him in this 
task. His handicap came because his rapport was too good. 
The resistance of certain members of ·his Ministry 
appeared to grow with time; so much so that the CGQJ, 
informed of the non-dismissal of some Jewish teachers, came 
to Bennard to ask the sanction, not against those teachers, 
but against the personnel of his Ministry: 
... in conformity with the disposition of this law, 
(June 2, 1941) I have the honor to pray that you proceed 
with their immediate dismissal. Considering the time 
passed since the promulgation of the law, it appears that 
disciplinary sanction against the director of personnel, 
responsible for the maintenance and function of the Jews, 
B. and M. would be justly deserved ... ee 
Bennard continued the work of his precedessors, 
Carcopino and Chevalier. He succeeded in excluding only a 
few Jewish teachers forgotten by his precedessors. Those 
were dismissed immediately. It is certain that this process 
was accompanied by a great vigilance on the part of the CGQJ 
--itself being constantly alerted by the Occupying Authori-
ties. The Minister of Education was implicitly accused of 
98 Letter from the CGQJ to SEEN, where the director of 
personnel at the Ministry of Education was accused, 
Sept. 15, 1942. XIII-33. 
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laxity in his mail with the Occupying Authorities: " ... the 
pro-Jewish of certain Ministries still allows Jews to exer-
cise important professions ... "99 Bennard did not question 
the derogations accorded by his predecessors. He did not 
disapprove of advice formulated by his predecessors, and 
did not appear to be touched by numerous demands of rectifi-
cation of dismissals which were sent to him at the end of 
1942 and the beginning of 1943.100 The reclassification 
of Jewish professors became more and more difficult with 
time. The increasing severity of the Ministry of Education 
became sensitively apparent. The Ministry, however, 
remained most often, even with Bennard at its. head, behind 
the feeble desires and vague intentions of the CGQJ and the 
Occupation Authorities. During Bonnard~s tenure at the 
ministry, a Chair on Judaism was created at the Sorbonne for 
the purpose of diffusing racist theories within the 
university.101 
For the purge of the Jewish teachers, Bennard was too 
late, but it was not the same for the question of the Jewish 
pupils and students. His extremist and primary anti-Semitic 
99 Letter of Raethke to the CGQJ of Paris, Mar. 8, 1943. 
10° CDJC, CXVIII-20 and 29; the case of Mrs. Simone Levy, 
educator of children; favorable notice. 
101 Henri Labroue, a university graduate who was a special-
ist on racism and known for his book, Voltaire. Anti-Semite, 
was given the Chair of Jewish Studies. Discussion of the 
subject took place at the time of the trial of Bennard 
in 1960. A.N. A. J. 38 119, Dossier 6 S/C 29 and 40. 
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character appeared, and thanks to him the aryanization made 
clear progress. Very early, Bennard asked the deans and the 
men of his Ministry to establish direct contact in a narrow 
relationship with the CGQJ and the Inspector of the SEc.102 
It was not always the case between Vallat and the previous 
Minister, Carcopino. Under Bennard, the SEEN and the CGQJ 
tried to eliminate Jews from the university, but French 
tradition was difficult to violate. 
The result of the narrow collaboration had some reper-
cussions in 1943: a) the quasi-disappearance of the Jewish 
students from schools; and b) the heavy sanctions which 
menaced Jewish students if they were discovered in the 
schools. Upon the arrival of Bennard to the Ministry in 
April, 1942 the Occupying Authorities re-exposed their 
intention to modify the law of June 21, 1941.1os The two 
essential points of this project were geared toward: 
a) the assimilation of immatriculation to enrollment in 
school, which limited the enrolled to a total of 3 percent; 
b) the installation of precise sanctions in case of 
false declarations of Jewish students (such as a fine from 
500 to 50,000 francs and one month to one year in prison). 
When we refer uniquely to the political ethics of 
Bennard, his absence of scruples, the excellent rapport with 
the CGQJ and the Occupying Authorities, one could think that 
102 A.N. A.J. 38 224, Dossier on National Education. 
10s A.N. A.J. 38 119, Dossier 5 S/C 12. 
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his role in the aryanization of education was important. 
But this was not the case--his predecessors having enacted 
and supervised the work before him--as the moderate role of 
these men surrounding Bonnard at the Ministry is noted. 
Without them, the action of the Ministry would have been 
worse. 
At the Liberation, Bennard escaped to Germany and took 
refuge in Spain in 1945. On July 4, 1945 the High Court of 
Justice condemned him to death in absentia. He was the only 
Minister of Education to have been sentenced to death. In 
1960, he returned to France and the High Court of Justice, 
presided over by Jean de Broglie, granted him temporary 
freedom. He died in 1968. 
CHAPTER III 
VICHY 
A Religious Policyi 
Caution is necessary when one considers the behavior 
and the evolution of the French Roman Catholic world. The 
Catholics thought they could gain control of public educa-
I I 
tion when Leon Berard, Minister of Public Instruction of the 
Bloc National, had succeeded in establishing the notion of 
"duties toward God" in the school program in June, 1923. 
This offensive by the clergy had been facilitated thanks to 
the opposition to the Minister and his Director of Primary 
Education, Paul Lapie, an intransigent layman who had tried 
to suppress the provisions of the 1881 Ferry laws on 
February 23, 1923. This intent to review the status of the 
schools in a manner favorable to Catholics was later can-
celled in the twenties by Raphael Alibert, Minister of 
Public Instruction of the Cartel of the Left. 
Since the passage of the Ferry laws in the 1880s, 
Catholic public opinion and members of the French clergy 
vigorously attacked the laic public school, which in their 
1 This chapter owes a lot to W. D. Halls. 
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view, "deceived the intelligence of children, perverted 
their will, and derailed their conscience."2 Ten years 
later at the time when political conflicts ended in vio~ 
lence, the clergy showed a willingness to appease and 
ignored the old claim of the proportional school quota, 
which allowed the private confessional schools to receive 
98 
funds in proportion to the number of children registered. 
The clergy also initiated a dialogue with those in political 
power by engaging in negotiations with the Daladier govern-
ment in 1933 concerning subsidies for Catholic schools. 
All these efforts illustrated a notable evolution of 
French Catholicism expressed in the desire to reintegrate 
with the national community as external danger increased. 
If Catholics participated in the "drole de guerre," of 
1939-40, it was reluctantly: they had not obtained satis-
faction over the thorny school question, which remained an 
issue between 1938 and 1940. The evolution of the Catholic 
world was based on the influence of the encyclical Rerum 
Noyarum of 1892, on the condemnation of L#Action Fran~ajse 
in 1926, and on the will of appeasement expressed by its 
non-Catholic adversaries. This criticism was stronger in 
the forties than in the twenties. I In 1937, Leon Blum mul-
tiplied appeals for a dialogue to negotiate subsidies for 
private education.3 In addition, the Catholic world was 
2 Prost, L'Enseiinment en France. p. 473. 
I 3 R. Remond. Les Catholiques. Le Communisme et Les 
Crises (1929-39), (Paris: Kiosque), 1960. 
not united in thought. There were regional disparities 
wherein many Catholics lagged behind general Catholic 
opinion. The Church of France did try to participate 
in politics in the Spring of 1940. Its leader, the new 
Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Suhard, was a prudent 
negotiator. 
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Under Vichy, the great initiatives of the Church in 
school matters came from Cardinal Lienart, Bishop of Lille, 
who had initiated negotiations with the last governments of 
the Third Republic regarding State subsidies to Catholic 
education. The Cardinal maintained good relations with the 
Regime of Petain as did Monseigneur Chappoulie, who was the 
official Church of France representative to the government 
of Vichy; Monseigneur Beaussart, official representative to 
the Ministry of National Education in the Occupied Zone; and 
Monseigneur Aubry, who represented the National Committee of 
Free Education. 
In 1940, French Catholicism was marked by two other 
personalities: Cardinals Gerlier of Lyon and Baudrillard, 
Rector of l~Institut Catholique of Paris, who appear to have 
been more politicially active than other French prelates. 
I 
The former fervently supported Petain, "the saviour of the 
nation." Gerlier, who was opposed to Vichy~s anti-Semitism, 
tried to unite all Catholics. "He considers France a 
country of mission, a territory to be reconquered by 
'th " 4 f a1 · Baudrillard engaged in anti-communist state-
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rnents. In 1941 he had participated in creating the Legion 
of French Volunteers, and in anti-Bolshevist crusades which 
justified Hitler~s invasion of the Soviet Union. 
The France of 1940 was largely de-Christianized. Fur-
thermore, the Third Republic~s school system with its mili-
tant laicism, had played an active role in the process of 
Catholicism~s decline. In spite of rapprochement between 
the Church and the Republic, the two institutions were never 
completely reconciled. The school question in particular 
constituted the cornerstone of the divorce between the 
Catholic Church and the State. 
The military defeat of June, 1940 also resulted in an 
unexpected opportunity for the ecclesiastical aim of re-
Christianizing France. This occurred when Marshal P'tain 
unequivocally signed the death certificate of the Third 
Republic. Also, since the law of separation (December 9, 
1905), Petain was the first Chief of State to acknowledge 
the Church by kneeling during a religious ceremony. In 
addition, the Church was very distrustful of parliamentary 
democracy, freemasonry, nationalism and the L~Action 
Fran3aise. The clergy interpreted defeat as a sign of 
authentic "divine punishment" for 60 years of lay ideas 
4 Prost, L~Enseignment en France. p. 473. 
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and a few months of social agitation. In the clergy~s view, 
the defeat resulted from a proceee of moral degradation and 
national degeneration. More surprising, even the disaster 
of the Summer, 1940 was viewed by Heads of the Church as the 
means of a national redemption from errors of the past (both 
Le Front Populaire as well as the French Communist govern-
ment of 1936). The Church was not unhappy to follow the 
Army in assigning responsibilities for the defeat. Since 
lay people were indicted in the school milieu,5 it was 
easy to allege that the military and moral crumbling of the 
country was directly provoked by the school "without God" 
and the teachers. General Weygand said to whoever would 
listen, that the country deserved its defeat because it had 
exluded God from the schools for the past 50 years. His 
opinion was shared by Jacques Chevalier, the Minister 
of Education.s 
The Church wanted to take advantage of the situation 
because the New Regime offered the prospect of a triple 
revenge: political, social and cultural. The opportunity 
was not missed, and Cardinals Gerlier of Lyon and Suhard of 
Paris met in Paris to talk about financial aid for Catholic 
schools. 
5 Halls, p. 89. 
s Halls, p. 425. 
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p~tain in turn stated in the Catholic newspaper, La Croix, 
that the Church must play a pre-eminent role in a France 
liberated from materialism and rebuilt by spiritual forces. 
In this way, during the forties Catholics and Maurassians 
shared political power. 
The school question must be posed in all clarity and all 
justice. The public school must give scrupulous atten-
tion to the soul of the child. The Catholic school must 
be readily available for those Christian families who 
wish it, thanks to an equitable partition of subsidies 
from the State.7 
In this way Catholics did not use pressure or influence 
in school matters. In Vichy, the consensus on the school 
question was total, and Catholic claims were judged to be 
perfectly legitimate. They were: 
1. that the interdiction of teaching by religious con-
gregations be lifted; 
2. that access to public schools be given to parish 
priests; 
3. that Catholic teaching in the regular curriculum of 
public schools be re-established. 
4. that organizations hostile to religious education be 
suppressed. 
I 
Marshal Petain completely agreed to these requests, not 
so much to obtain political support, but because of his 
ideological agreement and personal views. On July 17, 1940, 
7 W. D. Halls, The Youth in Vichy France, p. 68. 
103 
paul Baudin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, deplored in his 
diary the activism of the clericals who worked to obtain 
abolition of the lay laws as follows:B 
1. Law of September 3, 1940, which repealed the law of 
July 7, 1904 which had suppressed teaching by members of 
congregations. 
2. Law of January 6, 1941 forbidding priests to teach 
religion in the schools. 
3. January 6, 1941: a second legislative act introduced 
in public schools making religious instruction optional. 
4. Article 8 of the law of October 15, 1940, which dis-
solved the National Union of Primary Teachers.e 
The religious politics of the Vichy Regime were the 
work of Jacques Chevalier, the godson of Petain. Chevalier 
was Dean of the School of Literature at the University of 
Grenoble and held the post of General Secretary of Public 
Instruction from September 6 to December 13, 1940. Dur~ng 
this short period, he had succeeded in re-introducing the 
notion of "duties toward God" in the curriculum of public 
education.10 
8 Baudin, Neuf Mois au Gouyernement, p. 253. 
9 Prost, L'Enseignment en France. Index of Legislative 
Texts, p. 510. 
10 Law of Oct. 23, 1940 and ministerial by-law dated 
Dec. 6, 1940. Cited by Baudin, p. 253. 
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In 1900, Chevalier, as well as Carcopino, entered into 
the Ecole Normale Supe'rieure. After having obtained a doc-
torate in philosophy, Chevalier went to Oxford and published 
a study on the religious sentiments of Wales. Attracted by 
Britain and Spain, two very religious countries, Chevalier 
was the doctrinary theoretician of the traditionalist con-
ception of Catholicism based on conservation of the social 
order. He had been; since 1926, President of the National 
Union of Members of Public Education. In 1939, Chevalier 
was contacted by Franco to establish the reorganization of 
teaching in Spain, which he refused. On the other hand, as 
a devout Catholic, Chevalier tried to revive the Catholic 
Church. 
In his educational views, Chevalier appeared to be more 
like a political minister than a secular educator. He was 
more interested in having French Catholicism regain the 
position it lost in 1905 with the passage of the separation 
of Church and State. Chevalier was conscious of the politi-
cal opportunity and learned how to benefit from the legal 
ambuiguity which established the school system and the 
Republic. He made a frontal attack against the lay estab-
lishment. In this way, he continued the policy of his pre-
decessor, Ripert, who had given subsidies to pupils of free 
private schools (law of October 15, 1940) in a circular 
105 
dated January 3, 1941, which stipulated "that communities are 
allowed to discreetly help private schools by acts permitted 
within the law." On January 6, 1941, Chevalier promulgated 
another law11 which authorized municipalities to directly 
subsidize private schools by giving financial aid specifi-
cally designated for poor pupils in private schools. 
ChevalierJs attack against the laity was followed by the 
law of November 23, 1940, which re-inserted the notion of 
"duties toward God" in public school programs. The primary 
teachers in public schools had to permit religious instruc-
tion given 90 minutes each week by the parish priest.12 
For W. D. Halls, this provocative measure was directed 
against "the assault on the lay primary teachers in partic-
ular,"13 and therefore to reignite the school war for the 
profit of the clerical camp. Chevalier had never tried to 
justify his intentions and his ideas on the "duties toward 
God," himself being a devout Catholic. He used a subterfuge 
to finish his work, and profited from the lapse of time 
between the retirement of Pierre-Etienne Flandin and the 
coming to power of Admiral Darlan. Chevalier passed the 
ministerial decree of February 22, 1941.14 This decree 
~ 11 R. Remand. Les Catholigues. Le Communisme et Les 
Crises <1929-39), (Paris: Kiosque), 1960. 
1 2 Baudin, Neuf Mais au Gouyernement, p. 253. 
13 Prost, LJEnseignment en France, Index of Legislative 
Texts, p. 510. 
14 Law of Oct. 23, 1940 and ministerial by-law dated 
Dec. 6, 1940. Cited by Baudin, p. 253. 
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stipulated in effect, that pupils of private schools could 
benefit from a grant given by the State. The law of March 
10, 1941 stipulated that religious instruction could be 
given outside of public schools, thereby avoiding the 
criticisms of anti-clericalism. 
The policy of religious fervor directed by Chevalier in 
the seventy-two days of his Ministry for the sole benefit of 
Catholic restoration reached great heights (in particular, 
the rebirth of Chaplainc·ies in secondary teaching). His 
successor, Carcopino, was much more moderate and respectful 
of university tradition and tried to restrain this move-
ment. On December 12, 1940, the newspaper, La Croix, wrote: 
"School has survived without God." It was certain that the 
Catholic world could celebrate teaching dogmas of the faith 
I 
thanks to the Petain Regime (the Church had been ignored 
politically since before the war). The responsibility for 
the defeat, attributed to the French army, allowed the Cath-
olic Church to develop a theology of expiation, contrition, 
and redemption of the French people. Education found itself 
in the first ranks of the accused, 
for having booted patriotism out of school, for having 
supported a weak literature, for the degr.ading promiscu-
ity of workshops, offices and factories, Lord, we ask 
your forgiveness. What use have we made of the victory 
of 1918? What would we have done with an easy victory 
in 1940?15 
1~ La Croix, June 28, 1940. 
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The church appeared less skillful in the promotion of 
an imminent national resurrection thanks to the intervention 
of Petain. This redemption was renounced by the French 
youth. Because of the corruption of the former regime, the 
catholic hierarchy invested all its ideological capital in 
the complete takeover and control of youth, their education 
and their formation. For the Church, this reconquest of the 
young had essentially passed by the reactivation of mass 
professional organization, which survived the defeat. Since 
September 7, L#Action Catholique des Jeunes Frangais asked 
its members to collaborate with the Vichy Regime. Though 
the influence of the clergy was principally directed toward 
the mobilization of adolescents, younger Catholics were not 
neglected. Catholicism had conquered secular France, and 
its culture hid eminently political desires. 
This was perfectly expressed by Antoine Prost: "When 
they feel the strongest, Catholics consolidate their own 
schools and infiltrate the public school."1B It is evi-
dent that the defeat of June, 1940 miraculously reversed the 
course of the school war to the advantage of Catholics after 
a half century of lay-hegemony. This was because the Vichy 
Regime gave active support to the enterprise of Catholic 
restoration. Strengthened by institutional support and 
is Prost, L#Ensei~nement en France, p. 475. 
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a.IIlbient crises which anesthetized traditional resistance, 
Catholics started a school crusade assured of success by 
re-conquest. All was changed from the social structure.half 
a century old and already traditional. Not only did Cathe-
lies take the initiative in the school fight, but the public 
school world was ostracized and retracted by virtue of its 
silence and paralysis, thus giving a free hand to a Catholic 
offensive. W. D. Halls noted this anti-laic segregation 
starting from September, 1940: 
to the pupils of the public school ... suspension ... they 
were encouraged by priests not to work too much (while 
in catechism) until their parents agreed to their 
transfer to the Catholic school. When the Germans took 
over the public schools, the Mayor did not make any 
effort to find another solution ... this way, the school 
was closed.17 
In addition, pressure groups such as the Association 
of Parents of Students from t~e Public School (APEL) and 
Secours National, supported by members of the clergy, had 
pressed for the establishment of a special statute for 
public schools and for school subsidies. In the Fall of 
1941, APEL was sufficiently influenced by the Vichy Regime 
to contest the effects of the laws of November 2 promulgated 
by Carcopino. The president of APEL rejected the laws of 
November, which constituted a definitive statute of private 
17 W. D. Halls, p. 80. 
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teaching. He also condemned Carcopino#s re-evaluation of 
the initial measures taken by Chevalier in January, 1941, 
(law of January 6, 1941) which had produced great enthusiasm 
among Catholics.18 
The lay primary teachers of national education showed 
their fear of becoming completely "confessionalized" in 
Spring, 1942. A teacher of the department of Oise wrote to 
, 
Marcel Deat, who was particularly aware of the danger, to 
obtain the release of her husband, a primary teacher and 
prisoner of war: 
In the city of 1,100 inhabitants in which (her husband) 
has' made public schools win the majority of students, 
private schools have already made a strong 
recovery.1s 
Thia judgment, pronounced in the midst of the event, is 
confirmed by W. D. Halls.20 In 1941, approximately 5,000 
children left the public school for confessional schools, 
which at the beginning of 1944 had increased its primary 
education students by close to 5 percent. It was, however, 
secondary education, (the traditional bastion of Catholic 
presence in education) which showed the most spectacular 
18 Halls, p. 89-90. 
19 Halls, p. 89 and A.N. F 17 13342. 
20 Halla, p. 89. 
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progress with a gain of 13 percent in 1942 when compared to 
1939. In 1942, private secondary schools had the majority 
of pupils (53%).21 
The French Catholic school system definitely grew 
during and in spite of the German Occupation. The Catholic 
world benefited not only from the French State, but also 
because of a movement of general opinion, favorable to its 
growth as a result of the disarray of the Summer of 1942. 
This diffused environment, filled with moralism and religi-
osity permeated the entire national territory (occupied or 
not), although the southern zone seemed more disposed to 
receive a "mystical renewal." In its November 30, 1941 
edition, La Croix noted a return of religious sentiment 
which would give the Church the unexpected result of a re-
Christianization of France. The Catholic world believed it 
had witnessed authentic reconciliation of altar and throne. 
Until the return of Laval to power in April, 1942, the 
Catholic world probably constituted the most advanced part 
of militant Petainism. Laval, by employing the ideas of the 
National Revolution, definitively dissipated the Petainist 
image and replaced it with total engagement to Nazi Germany. 
21 Halls, p. 425. 
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Both clerics and laity were incensed with a political 
regime, which for the first time since the fall of the moral 
order not only promoted the traditional values of political 
Catholicism, but also promoted social values, such as family 
and professional corporations. These values eliminated the 
republican political life and promoted veneration of the 
I 
charismatic Petain. 
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Reactions 
The reaction of the Catholic world, and moreover the 
Christian world remained undeniably mixed: Catholic col-
laborators, such as Monseigneur Mayol de Lupe, Philippe 
Henriot, and at the other extreme, progressionist Chris-
tians, such as Emmanuel Meunier and Georges Bidault, lived 
in an antagonistic political atmosphere in 1940. This was 
hidden for a while from the active Petainists. 
At the beginning of 1941, the school reform started by 
Chevalier was received with enthusiasm by the majority of 
the French people, especially in regions with Catholic 
majorities. Thus, Le Memorial, the conservative newspaper 
of Saint Etienne in the Non-Occupied Zone, faithfully 
engaged itself in the propagation of Vichy propaganda and 
expressed its support of the Regime . 
... that Jacques Chevalier be substituted for Jean Zay 
in functions of our superior education is more than a 
sign of the times ... it is proof that the National 
Revolution will not be an unknown idea in the school 
domain.22 
In its entirety, the clerical measures enacted in 1941 
satisfied the majority of the French, in spite of the fact 
that school reform played only a minor role in their lives; 
22 Le Memorial, Jan. 15, 1941. 
but VichyJs ideas were not imposed on all the French. A 
prudent reserve and even a virulent protestation emanated 
from some French people. In fact, the Protestants were 
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reserved regarding the first school measures enacted in the 
Vichy Regime. 
Pastor Marc Boegner, who held many leadership positions 
in the Reformed Church and the Protestant Federation, was 
the first Protestant clergyman to show an ambiguous atti-
tude. Between 1940 and 1942, French Protestantism exercised 
a major influence in Vichy with its numeric force of one 
million adherents. This was due in part to the fact that 
Protestantism was already implanted in the Free Zone 
(Cevennes, Midi, Toulouse). From the start of the first 
anti-Semitic deportations in 1942, Protestants separated 
themselves from Vichy and then broke almost completely with 
I 
the Regime of Petain. The courageous determination of the 
ce'venole, who harbored Jewish refugees is well known. 
It is also very probable that the Catholic influence 
on Vichy had notably accelerated the process of Protestant 
rejection because the liberal and republican Protestants at 
the end of the 19th Century had been the founding fathers of 
the lay school (Ferdinand Buisson, Pastor G. Casalis and 
Felix Pecaut). 
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Undeniably, the possibility of the destruction of the 
laY school had contributed to unify Protestants in their 
refusal to support the Vichy policy. A small group of 
catholics who constituted the Christian university unions 
opposed the Vichy clericalism. Even so, it was affiliated 
with the CFTC from its creation in 1937. The General Union 
of National Education (SGEN), under Paul Vignaux#s direct-
ion, expressed its attachment to the lay character of public 
teaching manifested by its principle opposition to the nego-
tiations directed by Cardinal Suhard with the Daladier gov-
ernment on the question of subsidies to private confessional 
education. 
In Paris and New York, (where Paul Vignaux was a refu-
gee in 1943) men fought the anti-lay propaganda of Vichy 
with audacity and maintained the theoretical position of 
unionist organization. The union and intellectual milieu 
cooperated in the fight against the anti-laic propaganda of 
Vichy. Its.true anti-clerical propaganda was organized 
around Emmanuel Meunier, a brilliant Doctor of Philosophy, 
and director of the newspaper, l#Esprjt. Meunier knew 
Chevalier, the General Secretary of Public Instruction. 
At the time of the Spanish Civil War, Meunier had been 
Chevalier#s disciple at the University of Grenoble and 
equally his political adversary. Chevalier for his part, 
had not forgotten the anti-Franco views of Meunier, and when 
Meunier announced to Chevalier his intention to republish 
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his newspaper after the interruption of the Summer of 1940, 
Chevalier reminded him of his past.23 Three days after 
the promulgation of the provocative laws, Mounier made 
public his rupture with his mentor and ended his friendship 
with the Christian philosopher. 
Emmanuel Mounier started a true intellectual offensive 
against the policies of Chevalier and courageously editor-
ialized against this exaggerated interest in religious 
matters. He demonstrated and re-established with exactitude 
the petty sectarism of the illusory Catholic restoration. 
As early as February, 1941, l~Esprit carried an inquiry on 
God at the school. This had repercussions among the 
intellectuals who were seduced by theories of Christianity 
or were not ready to completely break away from the Regime. 
They appreciated an account or criticism of its religious 
orientation. The courageous opposition of Mounier, however, 
had exercized influence over certain Vichy elites, as well 
as the directors of Uriage, who even supported Maurice 
Schumann, the Catholic Gaullist, against Chevalier~s 
decrees. In addition, the Mounierist remarks undeniably 
belonged under the flag of humanism and Christian progress-
ivism in the movement of lay reaction against the clerical 
provocations of Chevalier. 
23 Mounier was received by Chevalier Sept. 26, 1940. 
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The anti-clerical collaborationist, Michel Winock, 
succinctly deecribed hie era when he noted, "legions of 
catholics with staff in front, appear to savor the felici-
ties of a stupid revenge."24 
French opinion (both Christian and non-Christian) was 
not the unanimous Petainist enthusiasm of Catholic and con-
servative forces of the country. Once the shock of disaster 
was overcome, (especially after the meeting with Hitler at 
Montoire on October 24, 1940) the working class tightened 
its ranks. They were afraid of German reactions, especially 
in the north of France. Intellectuals and even some mili-
tary reacted and considered going underground. In the edu-
cational domain, the true religious push of the winter of 
1941 relied upon the reticence of certain factions of public 
opinion, in which the cultural schemes were derived expli-
citly from the republican tradition. First, it seemed that 
the policy of Chevalier had found very little sympathy among 
the superior executives of the high administration of 
national education who remained attached to the liberalism 
and neutralism of the university.2e The idea that priests 
could infiltrate inside a public school to give religious 
instructions (as one of two laws of January 6, 1941 allowed) 
particularly shocked the public primary teachers, who were 
still laic at heart. 
24 Winock, p. 229. 
2e Halls, p. 77. 
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For W. D. Halls,26 even with the lack of information 
in archival sources, it was the North of France which con-
stituted the heart of resistance to clerical progression in 
the school domain. It is certain that a great number of 
teachers resisted this clerical progression and the skepti-
cism of the North (including the Catholics) in regard to the 
/ 
accomplishments of Marshal Petain. 
Overall, it can be said that this reticence of many 
sectors of opinion, which were traditionally anti-clerical, 
were essentially implanted in the Free Zone, betraying the 
legend of a complete adhesion to the Regime of Vichy that 
propaganda tried to diffuse but that collective memory con-
tinued to spread. In fact, it is an authentic reminder of 
republican tradition (which had been blown apart by the 
storm of the Summer of 1940) that succeeded in expressing 
itself in the collective consciousness. 
Other indications contributed to confirm the historic 
belief according to which "40 million Petainists" inhabited 
the France of 1941. A movement of protest was initiated, 
and the high ecclesiastic hierarchy27 soon expressed the 
desire to stop the development of anti-clericalism. In 
March, 1942, Pierre Pucheu, Minister of the Interior of the 
26 Halls, p. 77. 
27 Halls, p. 73. 
118 
I ....._ . 
Darlan government, estimated that Jerome Carcopino "has 
already rectified the monstrous error of his predecessor ... 
which menaced the country with a terrible wave of anti-
clericalism."28 
It can finally be established that a series of con-
current events inspired by the partisans of the Catholic 
Restoration had largely contributed at least to the exacer-
bation of the anti-clerical reaction starting from what has 
been called "the affair of the crucifix." In the Catholic 
west, the crucifix continued to be present in town halls and 
public schools well after the separation of church and 
state. This practice, (common during the defeat of Summer, 
1940) was the expression of a desire to find refuge in 
religious mysticism. In March, 1942, the prefect of the 
Pas-de-Calais requested precise instructions from the Vichy 
government because crucifixes in schools of the department 
had been re-introduced in large quantities "in an ostenta-
tious manner against public primary teachers."29 This 
problem of "the crucifix in public schools" was amplified 
because of the vengeful attitude of Catholics. It succeeded 
because Petain decided it was not useful or desirable to 
listen to teacher opinion.so 
28 A.N. A.G. II 650. Halls, p. 73. 
29 A.N. F 17 13376. Halls, p. 69. 
I 
30 A.N. A.G. II 459. Letter to Petain, cited by Halls, 
p. 426. 
A note was sent to Minister Bennard in Spring, 1943 
indicating that in some schools the crucifix was still in 
place.31 This affair, quite minor in itself, showed the 
political vengeance animating the Catholic elites. The 
response of Vichy to activism coming from the National 
Revolution, confirmed the force of the lay opposition to 
the Catholic conquest. 
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In July, 1941 Admiral Darlan, Vice President of Coun-
cil, ended the matter by giving municipalities a free choice 
on crucifixes in the schools. This measure apparently 
corresponded to the majority sentiments of the local popula-
tion. For W. D. Halls, this poorly-hidden reversal of a 
Catholic restoration in public schools had definitely failed 
as early as 1941.32 This was the result of neglect of lay 
tradition and the resolute resistance of the majority of the 
French population. It would not, however, have taken the 
dimension of a historical disavowal without the ferocious 
help of Parisian collaborationism, which under a Deatist 
banner, fought the clerical options of Jacques Chevalier 
with violence. Different political parties had their own 
reactions. For example, the newspaper, Le Cri du Peuple, 
(in articles on January 7 and 9, 1941) expressed a protest 
on principle as a result of the law of January 6, 1941. 
31 A.N. F 17 13364, note of May 2, 1943. 
s2 Halls, p. 79. 
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Another newspaper, L~Anticjpatjon Natjonale, allowed 
cardinal Baudrillart to express his appeal to the people and 
his especially pro-Fascist views. Jacques Doriot, who was 
easily influenced, was not a virulent anti-clerical. The 
fascist wing of collaborationism, however, including Marcel 
Bucard and Pierre Pucheu, with its "unique youth" was more 
interested in the process of the militarization of youth in 
the national-socialist sense than the school problem. Only 
Lucien Rebatet, in the newspaper, Je Sujs Partout, appeared 
to integrate himself into the clerical movement. In 
revenge, Jean Luchair, in Les Nouveaux. Temps threw himself 
into a violent diatribe against Chevalier, accused of being 
the man of the Jesuits: 
Chevalier is out of his role; the confidence of the 
French, a great number who are non-believers, have not 
asked the Marshal and his team to modify what was just 
and indisputable in the lay laws.33 
But it was Marcel D~at and "Deatism" which represented 
the greatest menace for Vichy clericalism. D~at himself was 
a teacher, a doctor in philosophy, an ex-student from 
l~Ecole Normale Sup~rieure, a socialist (as teachers usually 
were), originally from the Left, and a lay intellectual 
(with whom he shared through nee-socialism, the Briandist 
and Munichist label of union and pacifist teacher). I De at 
always expressed (even after his support to the New Order) a 
33 Les Nouveaux Temps, Feb. 14, 1941. 
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passionate attachment to republican values, of which laicity 
/ 
was the cornerstone. After the defeat, Deat, strengthened 
bY the support of Otto Abetz, took control of the radical 
newspaper, L~Oeuvre, in September, 1940. After having 
written the famous phrase, "Should we die for Danzig?" in 
May, 1939, Deat failed in his project for a single party at 
the end of Summer, 1940. He fought against his principal 
political enemy and rival, Jacques Doriot. 
P~tain had D~at arrested in Paris on December 13, 1940 
at the same time as Laval in Vichy. With the blessing of 
Abetz, (who reproached Chevalier for his clerical and anglo-
philic sentiments)34 D~at started an offensive of a rare 
political violence as early as January 9, 1941 in L~Oeuvre. 
This supported the lay position as well as prepared the 
creation of a new party--the RNP (Rassemblement National 
Populaire)--which recruited an important part of its 
militant base among unionist teachers and pacifists. 
Contrary to other collaborationist groups, the Deatist 
movement expressed throughout the Occupation by its recruit-
ment and its publications, a constant interest in the school 
question. The pragmatism of Abel Bonnard was interesting. 
Before he became Minister of Education in April, 1942, 
34 Chevalier corresponded with an old Oxford schoolmate, 
Lord Halifax. H. Michel, Petain, _Laval, Darlan: Trois 
Politigues?, pp. 151-156. 
Bonnard sympathized with the Maurasians,35 then with the 
Doriotists. He never stopped trying to develop anti-
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clerical arguments, which were often tempered when he came 
to the Cercle Fustel-de-Coulange (a club). But in news-
papers such as Le Petit Parisien and Je Suis Partout, 
Bonnard prudently preferred to exalt the virtues of the 
Franco-German collaboration. He was, however, sufficiently 
opposed to the clerical advantages given by Chevalier. 
Bennard even believed at the end of February, 1941 that he 
should have succeeded Chevalier in spite of his personal 
hostility toward P~tain and the Carcopino politics of finan-
cial aid to private teaching which produced distrust of the 
Catholic hierarchy. In June, 1942, after CarcopinoJs 
arrival at the Ministry of Education, the Cabinet of Petain 
wondered about the repercussions of BonnardJs anti-clerical 
statements.as 
, 
To appease Petain and his government, 
Bennard reassured them in June, 1943 by helping public 
education and giving financial aid (10,000 francs).37 He 
destroyed the control measures instituted by Carcopino to 
monitor redistribution and use of public funds for subsidies 
given by the French State to private teaching. Carcopino 
35 Followers of Maurras philosophy, see Chapter IV. 
36 A.N. A.G. II 570. Report cited by Halls, p. 431. 
37 A.N. F 17 13341 (Piece 340). 
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stated, however, that procedures established by the 
subsidies to help private institutions had ended since his 
departure, and in addition, the requests for subsidies were 
not processed after Bennard took over the Ministry.38 
Beginning in 1941 there was a climate of tension among 
the Catholics desprte the euphoria of the preceding months. 
This was the undeniable result of a "resistance" of the lay 
population which had been largely underestimated by the 
clerical offensive. The Catholic world was ready to fight 
again by Fall, 1941 and Spring, 1942. For the first time, 
however, large financial subsidies were obtained for its 
system of education. Even so, it did not achieve the power 
to control public schools morally. As head of the education 
system during that time, Bennard expected the appeasement 
between clericals and anti-clericals which were again fight-
ing for education and youth. 
Confronted with the real risk of an anti-clerical 
approach following the Chevalier decrees of January 6, 1941, 
as soon as he became the Secretary of State at the end of 
February, Carcopino opted for immediate appeasement of the 
law of March 10, 1941. This law modified Article 2 of the 
law of January 6 and sent priests back to their rectories. 
38 Halls, p. 97. 
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Later, Article 2 of this law was cancelled and replaced 
by the following disposition: 
Religious education given outside of the school build-
ing is considered only as voluntary education within 
the school schedule, according to the conditions which 
will be established by the Academy Inspectors after 
discussion with religious authorities in their areas. 
(Signed by Petain and Carcopino).39 
On April 7, 1941 Adolphe Terracher, General Secretary 
of Public Instruction, published a circular which suggested 
the complete introduction of religious teaching in the 
school schedule. On March 10 of the same year, Jerome 
Carcopino substituted "the spiritual values of the country, 
Christian civilization and the notion of duties toward God" 
in the school program.4o 
Times were periodically unstable because at first the 
public school partially financed Catholic private schools, 
but later the ideas of God were rejected in public schools. 
And this despite the law of 1882, when the Senate defeated a 
legislative amendment which proscribed that professors had 
to teach children "duties toward God." It was Jules Simon, 
who had succeeded in introducing this concept in the lay 
laws of 1881-1886 by a parliamentary movement.41 
39 Journal Officjel, Mar. 12, 1941. 
40 A.N. F 17 13319. Circular, Apr. 9, 1941. 
41 Halls, p. 426, citing L. Plante, L~Ensejgnement de la 
Morale a l~Ecole Prjmajre, (Paris: Ecrits de Paris, 1957), 
p. 46. 
125 
All current conservative and clerical political forces 
could use the Ferry laws to have this concept applied in 
public schools. In Vichy, the old controversy resurfaced on 
the issue of whether the public primary teachers devoted to 
laicism and positivist scientism were able to dispense with 
objective teaching. Carcopino, who wanted to banish 
theology from the primary school, succeeded at the Council 
of Ministers.42 This explained the violent reaction of 
the clerical party as early as March, 1941. Numerous 
letters of complaint arrived in Vichy condemning the Minis-
ter of National Education. Some of them were significant: 
"Carcopino gives me the impression of being something like 
Pontius Pilate." And, "What is this fashion to invite God 
into school in the Fall, only to throw Him out of the door 
in Winter?"43 
In spite of the unseasonable declaration of LyonJs 
Cardinal Gerlier, who disapproved of the new attitude of 
Carcopino, W. D. Halls distinguished three types of reac-
tions among the Catholics. The first few (such as Meunier) 
felt relief at the announcement of the StateJs return to 
neutrality; but the second group, (the integrists or extreme 
conservatives) were furious over the re-examination of the 
42 A.N. A.G. 11 609, Dossier CM 25A, and Carcopino, 
p. 306. 
4 s A.N. A.G. 11 607, Dossier CM 21E. 
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clerical advances given by his precedeasor, Chevalier. 
The third or moderate group, which was the most numerous, 
accepted this tacit re-establishment of the status quo with 
bad graces. 
Carcopino#s politics had bothered Catholics at least at 
the level of school legislation. Not only had Carcopino 
annulled the favorable measures of his predecessor, but 
again he tried to defer the national desire for a definitive 
status of free education (another great Catholic claim). 
During this period in 1941, the Regime itself was being 
put into question. It appeared to be shaken by the anti-
clerical awakening of the largest group of the population, 
which had reverberated in the northern zone due to the 
occurrence of Paris collaborationism. The Carcopino measure 
had succeeded in defusing the rebirth of anti-clericalism. 
In spite of the fact that his Ministry had known difficult 
circumstances, Carcopino succeeded with honor. He appeased 
their spirits, even among Catholics. His work was positive 
because he was the first to re-open the treasury of the 
State for subsidies to public teaching. 
If Chevalier was unable to do more to increase benefits 
to schools and students of private teaching, it was due to a 
lack of time. 
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However, Adolphe Terracher, General Secretary of Public 
Instruction (appointed by Carcopino) issued an eloquent cir-
cular on May 24, 1941: 
Beginning this year, the law will not make any distinc-
tion between children, no matter which institution they 
will be destined to ... so as not to establish differ-
ences among the number of grants which will be allowed 
to them in private institutions as well as in public 
institutions.44 
With official and definitive recognition of private 
education, the question of financial subsidies was the basis 
for all the debate around the Catholic school sector. Cath-
olics fought to obtain a proportional repartition in the 
schools as early as the Winter of 1941. 
In ·reference to the attitude of Petain, Carcopino said 
in private that he wanted to "re-Christianize France" by 
creating new Catholics.46 He favored subsidies to private 
teaching by the French State. He had already received 
Cardinal Lienart~s emissary, Mr. Toulemond, who was an 
engineer from Roubaix and a "spokesman of the great 
bourgeoisie."413 
The problem of private education was complex and far 
from being resolved. It was also far from satisfying the 
French people as a group. Obtaining proportional funding 
(funding per student equal to what the public school 
44 A.N. F 17 13319. 
46 Carcopino, p. 38. 
46 Halls, p. 85. 
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received) in the schools had always represented (in the eyes 
of Catholics) the universal panacea for the evils of private 
teaching. Financial compensation was also present, but more 
moderately due to the prudence of Cardinal Lienart after the 
anti-clerical "fire" of the Spring of 1941. Mr. Toulemond 
would have liked to resurrect the old 1872 idea of school 
vouchers which would give 50 francs per month to each Catho-
lic pupil. P~tain was not against this, but he collided 
with Carcopino, the Minister who had other ideas about 
finance. His idea was that a subsidy would be given if the 
private institution provided education for at least 20 per-
cent of the local school population. Each Catholic pupil 
would receive up to 700 francs per year. The Ministry con-
sidered a right of control over funds given by the State. 
I 
In July, 1941 Petain asked Carcopino to find an equit-
able way to subsidize Catholic teaching.47 The Minister 
opted for special aid to private institutions which had 
difficulties. He considered that the circumstances of the 
Occupation did not provide the best conditions to continue 
the school war. 
Pierre Pucheu, Minister of the Interior, who favored 
fusion of the two systems of education, accepted this pro-
visional arrangement and left the final resolution of the 
school problem until after the war. With the help of 
Carcopino, Pucheu started new negotiations with the 
47 A.N. A.G. II 459. 
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Archbishop of Paris, Cardinal Suhard. They could not nego-
tiate directly with Cardinal Lienart as even Ministers of 
the Vichy government were not authorized by the Germans to 
enter the forbidden zone at Lille where Cardinal Lienart was 
the Bishop. 
Carcopino agreed with Suhard on providing a subsidy of 
400 million francs to be divided according to the needs of 
each Diocese. For a long time, Suhard had been a partici-
pant of compromise. The Diocesan boundaries corresponded 
exactly to the administrative ones, and as a result bishops 
had to negotiate given credits with the prefects. This was 
divided on a proportional basis according to the density of 
Catholic population in each department. Consequently, two 
laws dated November 2, 1941 were promulgated. The first one 
legalized "exceptional aid adapted to circumstances" and was 
dispensed by the Minister of the Interior--not the Minister 
of National Education. The second law instituted severe 
control of funds allotted by the State and inaugurated a 
process of didactic integration to Catholic teaching assimi-
lating it to the public school sector. Private schools 
could still work out their own programs and schedules, .but 
all pupils of subsidized private institutions had to pass 
the certificate of primary studies. Young teachers had to 
have a baccalaureate to teach just as the teachers of 
l~Ecole Normale had been doing since September 18, 1940. 
This sudden eruption of the State in the management and 
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philosophy of the private schools provoked a strong 
unhappiness in certain intransigent Catholics. This occur-
red especially in the west of France where the private 
schools of each community counted on the active good will 
of the municipality. In addition, delays of the subsidy 
' payments were long, which produced some grumbling. This 
situation continued until April, 1943. 
In general, Catholics appeared satisfied with Carcopino 
and lauded him on December 6, 1941 in their Parisian news-
paper, La Semaine Religieuse. Not only had a large subsidy 
been given to Catholic teaching, but special dispositions 
had been made in order that. re.ligious instructions could be 
given "exceptionally" in public schools in the hamlets.4s 
It appears that the agreement between Carcopino and Suhard 
in 1941 which underlined annual assistance of 700 francs per 
Catholic pupil varied from one department to the other by as 
much as double the amount.49 
The rhythm of the progression of subsidies between 1941 
and 1944 which were given to private educationoo facili-
tates understanding the pronounced attachment of the Church 
48 A.N. F 17 13390 and F 17 13380. 
49 Halls, ibid., p. 93-94 and A.N. F 17 13365. 
50 A.N. F 17 13390. 
1941-42: 400.436,594F 
1942-43: 
1943-44: 
471.093,321F 
380.739,493F 
(Carcopino gave other figures: 
386.248,968F) 
(increase of 18%) 
(includes only 55 departments). 
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I 
and the Catholic world to Petain 1 s Regime. The 18 percent 
augmentation from one year to the other shocked people at 
the liberation. If these subventions had been continued and 
not cancelled by the consultative assembly of March 28, 
1945, they would have constituted an expense of 716 million 
francs for the provisional government. 
It is justifiable to assert that the Vichy Regime had 
not only opened the doors of the El Dorado to Catholic Edu-
cation, (the principal beneficiary of Vichy~s subsidies) but 
it had literally inaugurated a policy of generosity by the 
Regime in support of Catholic education. This policy had 
not been denied by the Fourth Republic, which was the result 
, 
of the Resistance (Laws of Marie and Barange, 1951); nor by 
the Fifth Republic of DeGaulle (Laws of Debre, 1959 and 
Guermeur, 1977). 
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The Symbolic Purge 
The three Ministers of Education under the government 
of Pierre Laval until December 13, 1940 succeeded one 
another rapidly. Albert Rivaud remained for one month dur-
ing the armistice and vote of full power (June 17 - July 12, 
1940). Emile Mireaux, director of Le Temps, was Minister 
during seven weeks (July 12 - September 6, 1940); then it 
was the turn of Georges Ripert, Dean of the Law School of 
Paris (September 6 - December 13, 1940). Ripert was forced 
to leave because of the dismissal of Laval. 
If these Ministers did not have the time to establish 
the base of a national school, they had, in another domain, 
the responsibility of an intention or a decision (the last 
including Chevalier, Carcopinio, and Bennard) for the purge 
of the teaching corps. 
Rivaud51 thought to punish primary teachers because 
of their responsibility for the defeat of France. He was 
Minister of the last Cabinet legally constituted by the 
; 
Third Republic under the presidency of Philippe Petain. 
51 Louis Plante', a functionary of the Academy of Grenelle, 
described his meeting with Rivaud in his memoirs, Souvenirs, 
Scenes et l'Aspect du Ministre de l'Instruction Publigue -
Education Nationale (1920-44), Part III, p. 203-352. 
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E~ile Mireaux, Senator, was the First State Secretary 
of Public Instruction in the French State. On June 8, and 
then on August 16, 1940, he published two circulars which 
were geared to the sanction of abandonment of work. But 
when p~tain took the power (July 17, 1940) he had author-
ized, purely and simply, the dismissal of undesirable func-
tionaries. 
,. 
Mireaux was dismissed when Petain dismissed his 
Parli~entary Ministers. 
With the arrival of Georges Ripert at the head of the 
Secretary of State for Public Instruction, Fine Arts and 
Youth in September, 1940, the decisive step was taken for 
the passage and establishment of a repression in education. 
The Minister wanted explicitly to "clean" primary education 
by punishing without mercy, those primary teachers who had 
been politically engaged in the Left. This was done under 
the pretext of protecting the other teachers against subver-
sive propaganda.52 He wished to hit school opinion in a 
decisive and spectacular manner. According to W. D. Halls, 
he "projected a persuasive and exemplary action more than 
simple retribution."53 This explained the severity of 
Ripert's speeches and his coercive measures on the basis of 
the la~ of July 17, 1940, in which a certain aggressivity 
appeared. 64 
52 ~ Temps, Dec. 1, 1940. 
53 Halls, p. 106. 
64 Circular of Nov. 15, 1940, A.N. F 17 13318. 
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These innovations differed, however, from French university 
traditions, and were the expression of a desire to authen-
tically purge the teaching corps in its entirety. For 
example, in higher education, Ren~ Cassin, a Jewish pro-
fessor of the law faculty at the University of Paris, was 
exiled in London near De Gaulle. Secondary education was 
equally purged, but it was especially the primary teachers 
who were affected by this massive purge at the beginning of 
the school year in September, 1940; and this, in spite of 
administrative disorganization due to the defeat. 
Faced with the reality of a will of purgation from the 
New Regime installed in Vichy, the historian is surprised to 
find few or no statistics on the subject--even if the admin-
istrative structure of the time explained in part this 
I 
lacuna. Andre Delmas affirmed, in relation to the infiltra-
tion of militant primary teachers, that "it was always the 
result of local vengeance undertaken by dubious reactionary 
elements happy to be able to exploit in their respective 
fiefdoms"l5l5 the divine surprise "of a return of the Right 
to power."l5a These teachers were victims of members of 
Parliament which they had fought in the past, and who now 
took advantage of the situation to settle personal quarrels. 
55 A. Delmas, Memoire d~un Instituteur Syndicaliste, 
(Paris: Albatros, 1979), p. 451. 
ee A. Delmae, ibid., p. 453. 
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These repressive movements can be articulated along two 
principal goals between 1940 and 1942: 1) to repress the 
political and union activity which started between the two 
wars attacking specifically the Popular Front. It was a 
form of political revenge. The victims were not very numer-
ous, but expurgation was firm in order to hurt the image of 
teachers in the eyes of the public; and 2) the policies of 
P~tain attacked those who were favorable to the Allies. 
These sanctions were less severe because a great number of 
persons were only demoted or transferred. Two specific cat-
egories of the primary teaching corps had completely escaped 
from this selective political prophylaxis: Jewish and free-
mason Masters were excluded a priori from schools. The for-
mer were never particularly numerous in primary teaching, 
although they constituted a strong traditional presence in 
secondary teaching as well as in higher education. Vichy 
applied these laws without mercy to the few Jewish teachers 
in primary education.57 Petain was engaged the most in 
relation to this purge because he wanted the Jews to leave 
their position within a two-month period following the 
promulgation in the Journal Officiel of the first statute 
of the Jews in the French State from December 18, 1940. 
57 Law on the statute of the Jews, Oct. 3, 1940 and 
June 26, 1941. These mentioned access to and exercise of 
public functions by members of the teaching corps which were 
forbidden to the Jews. 
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Pierre Ory skillfully described this process of 
anti-Semitic persecution in public teaching: 
As of October 21, the collaboration of the school and 
university system discrimination is started: ... the 
Minister of Justice, Raphael' Alibert, at this date the 
hierarchical superior State Secretary for Public 
Instruction had asked that attention be given to 
consonants or sounds of first and last names ... 58 
In the Autumn of 1940, Georges Ripert chose an apparent 
liberal method to track down Jewish and freemasonic teachers 
because National Education had opted for a procedure of 
individual declarations or oaths of non-membership. Abel 
Bonnard demonstrated the anti-Semitic achievement of Vichy 
in education, which was confirmed by historians, Paxton and 
Marrus: 
I have the honor to transmit the enclosed decision 
commissioned by the General Commissariat to the Jewish 
Question on the situation in relation to the law of 
June 2, 1941 for the functionaries having a first name 
of hebraic consonants or having ascendants presumed 
Israelite.59 
It is difficult to quantify the social purification 
that occurred because sources appeared to hide behind the 
pressure of a collective inhibition. Only Algeria, a non-
occupied zone far from Vichy, (where General Maxime Weygand, 
/ 58 P. Ory, "L~Universite Fran~aise face a la Persecution 
Anti-Semite (1940-44)," in La France et la Question Juiye 
(1940-44}. (Paris: Actes du Colloque, Messinger, ed., 
1981), p. 79-80. 
59 R. 0. Paxton and M. Marrus, Vichy et lea Juifs, (Coll. 
Diaspora, Calmann-Levy, 1981), 434 pp. Document from A.N. 
F 17 13320. 
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the General Delegate of Marshal government for French 
Africa, presented himself as a fervent apostle of a "de-
Judaization" of education in Algeria) took an unmerciful 
approach to superior education because the quota had not 
surpassed the "maximum 2.5 percent" in the university. 
Anti-Semitic filtration of Jewish teachers in Algeria 
had been probably the most massive in all French regions, 
(Occupied or not) with the exception of Alsace, which had 
been annexed to the Third Reich. 
In addition, it was the Jewish children who were the 
greatest victims, starting from the beginning of the school 
year in Autumn, 1942: "Over 18,500 Jewish children were 
expelled from primary education out of a total of around 
25,000."60 After the Allied landings in November, 1942, 
this purge became somewhat lighter.61 
All the barbaric measures of this ostracism which 
affected teachers and children can be understood when we 
know that the free choice of the Vichy Regime was not the 
result of any particular German exigence. Algeria had con-
stituted a special territory of Vichy anti-Semitism. But in 
metropolitan France, it must be taken into account with the 
acquiescence of a large part of the teaching corps, (tradi-
tionally attached to a certain liberalism) which succeeded 
60 Paxton and Marrus, Chap. IV, p. 120 and No. 4, p. 354: 
Letter of Weygand to Petain, May 15, 1941 (A.N. A.J. 38 4). 
e 1 Ory, p. 81. 
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in expressing itself until November 11, 1940. The most 
spectacular symbol of what appears to be a passive resist-
ance to the anti-Semitic measures of Vichy were expressed 
in the report of Gustave Monod, Inspector of the Academy of 
Paris. In this report, he transmitted to Dean Roussy a dir-
ective for application of the first statute of the Jews in 
teaching.62 The conclusion being: ; .... What is put into 
question today is the whole university liberalism ... "63-
Following this report, Minister Ripert asked Monad if 
he was a Jew himself. After his dismissal, Monod was put 
into retirement; and at the Liberation became the Director 
of Secondary Teaching. The anti-Semitic persecution was 
probably exhaustive, with the exception of cases where the 
university administration was very often compassionate and 
the solidarity of colleagues succeeded in avoiding the peril 
of exclusion. 
Another category of teachers also suffered under the 
Vichy persecution. Unlike their Jewish colleagues, which 
always constituted "an event" in primary teaching, the free-
mason teachers were numerous enough to form an active minor-
ity. They were part of the pillar of social homogeneity of 
the primary teaching group between the two wars. Paradoxi-
cally, few were dismissed.64 As early as July, 1942, 
62 IHTP 72, A.J. 251, cited by P. Ory. 
63 Ory, p. 87. 
64 Halls, p. 115. 
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masonic masters who were dismissed were re-integrated into 
their positions by Bennard. He emphasized their good work, 
devotion and patriotic valorso (as many were decorated 
with the "croix de guerre"). 
The anti-masonic persecution was more resolute than the 
anti-Semitic one, but proportionately less effective. Too 
many teachers were touched by the application of the law of 
August 13, 1940 on the secret society, and the ministry 
could not be deprived of these teachers in primary education 
without a dramatic decrease in the number of teachers. 
Almost 13,000 teachers (10%) were war prisoners in Germany, 
and the ministry had to engage in a massive hiring of auxil-
iary teaching personnel on the advice of prefects and aca-
demic inspectors during the 1940-41 school year. Thia group 
was essentially composed of women who did not have diplomas 
from the Ecole Normale. 
If the ihformation gathered on the subject of the purge 
among teachers is limited, however, should there be doubt as 
to its effect? The British historian W. D. Halls proposed 
to approach this subject chronologically: From August, 1940 
to February, 1941 the first purge occurred under the Minis-
try of Mireaux, Ripert and Chevalier whose motivation was 
anti-Semitic and anti-unionist. It was followed by a period 
so A.N. F 17 13364. 
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of relaxation due to a certain stability from March, 1941 to 
April, 1942 under the Ministry of Carcopino. Finally, from 
May, 1942 to August, 1944, France saw a second purge against 
communists and the resistance under the Ministry of Bonnard. 
Carcopino had offered an enormous respite to the pri-
\ 
mary teachers after the harsh method of his predecessors. 
Ripert had (especially in primary teaching) put together a 
system of purgation in agreement with the Christian phil-
osopher, Jacques Chevalier, who had in turn not hesitated 
to accelerate the pace of the dismissals. When Carcopino 
arrived in power, he noticed the trauma of the teaching 
corps and decided to finish the university purgation 
first.66 Undeniably Petainist but profoundly supportive 
of university liberties, Carcopino seemed to have sincerely 
wanted to stop the mass "persecutions," "reprisals" and 
"letters of detention."67 In fact, Carcopino wished to 
de-politicize the school institution, which had primarily 
veered toward the Left before the war and since the defeat 
had become the site of revenge which profited only reaction-
aries led by Ripert and Chevalier with the blessing of 
Marshal Petain. 
66 Carcopino, Chap. IV, Part III, p. 342. 
67 Carcopino, p. 345. 
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With the eviction of Laval in 1941, political and 
diplomatic situations were modified. While attempting to 
re-establish contact with Germany in hope of obtaining 
honorable peace from the victor, Admiral Darlan needed to 
increase the guarantee of internal political stabilization 
in defeated France. To insure success of this policy with 
the Germans, it was necessary to increase internal order by 
emphasis on the National Revolution. Vichy multiplied the 
signs of internal appeasement and attempted to seduce public 
opinion with prospects of a rapid peace treaty with Germany. 
In the teaching corps, the desire to stop the purge by 
Carcopino corresponded to the national will of political 
neutralization of the country. This occurred only after the 
approval of Petain, who under the pressure of Darlan had 
significantly softened his initial orientation. Carcopino 
was sincere when he wrote in his memoirs: "The total number 
of my sanctions in secondary teaching, which were the 
hardest hit, came to 46."sa 
The personality of the Minister-historian was not on 
trial because he was acquitted at the Liberation and con-
tinued his classes at the Sorbonne. It can be said that he 
had decreased purgation and stopped political dismissals and 
persecution. In general, however, Jewish and masonic 
sa Carcopino, p. 116. 
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teachers did not benefit very much from Carcopino~s actions 
because their exclusion was the consequence of a policy 
which was not limited to national education. 
Thanks to the contemporaneous section of the National 
Archives, some statistics appear. It can be said that in 
all French Departments (non-annexed such as Alsace and 
Moselle) had changed Academy Inspectors on an average of 
once per year during this period (with the exception of 
Paris). In fact, 326 academic inspectors had circulated 
between the different zones of defeated France to manage 
successfully "the departmental service of education." Of 
this nµmber, almost half of them (150 or 46%) had been 
sanctioned by the Vichy Regime. Of those, one quarter 
were transferred. This demonstrated the instability and 
confirmed the lack of confidence placed by Vichy in its 
functionaries in education. It was the expeditive method 
of Ripert which was contrary to all the traditions of 
republican liberalism. 
As early as Autumn, 1940 conflicts started between the 
Ministry and its subordinates in the name of the school pol-
itics of "the National Revolution." Numerous teachers and 
Academic Inspectors were dismissed or replaced because of 
"communism" or "professional insufficiency."69 It seemed 
that prefects had greater responsibility than the academic 
se A.N. F 17 13364. 
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authorities concerning the purge of militant teachers. This 
was because they were granted administrative power in their 
departments and executed the orders of the Vichy government 
with zeal at least until 1942. It was the responsibility of 
government men who made political decisions. Their respon-
sibility was high-lighted by Inspector General Chattelun: 
There were few dismissals of primary teachers because 
of the prefectoral authority which decided these 
matters and the government of Vichy, in view of poli-
tical evictions, had immediately instituted the "dis-
missal of functionaries", reserved for ministerial 
authority. This was done without any procedure. 7 0 
In fact, the dismissal of functionaries was not even 
considered· ·by the law of December 21, 1940 signed by Pe'tain, 
Chevalier and Alibert, the Minister of Justice. At that 
time, Alibert exercised his interim in National Education, 
and determined disciplinary measures applicable in primary 
teaching.71 
It is difficult to reach conclusions on the subject of 
disciplinary measures among primary teachers due to the lack 
of documentation on this subject at the National Archives. 
What appears to be certain, was that the first purge 
7 0 A.J. 72 251. Testimony of Maurice Chattelun, History 
Committee of the Second World War, Mar. 18, 1963. 
7 1 Journal Officiel, Jan. 17, 1941. See Appendix F. 
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W.D. Halls wrote, "It is improbable that the number 
(900 victims) was complete or definitive."73 It is, 
therefore, reasonable to think that approximately 1,000 
teachers were purged by the Vichy Regime for motives 
strictly political and anterior to the National Revolution 
until the middle of 1942. To this extension, another 1,000 
victims were added as a consequence of the interdiction of 
secret societies and Judaism. These victims received the 
abject denial of the protective tradition of Republican 
France from the Regime of Vichy. Approximately 2,500 other 
functionaries had-to leave their jobs for other reasons. 
This purge involved 2 percent of the 130,000 functionaries. 
These evictions did not reach the proportions of teachers 
punished by Edouard Daladier as a result of the strike of 
November 30, 1938. 
Paxton demonstrated in The France of Vichy that the 
entire failure of the National Revolution was a result of 
the poor diagnosis made in 1940 by Vichy leaders on the 
future evolution of France, due in part to the blind hope of 
an honorable peace offered by Hitler to a wiser France. Un-
predictable British stubborness and extension of work 
hostilities obliged Vichy to a revision of its initial 
options as well as the interior diplomatic level. This was 
the reason why the Regime could not sever all the primary 
73 A.N. A.G. 11 459, and Halls, p. 437. 
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teachers involved in a union or political struggle--they 
were too numerous (10% of 26,000). In addition, of those 
who were prisoners of war in Germany (13,139 out of 26,000), 
few were freed (only 2,245 as of January 7, 1943). There 
were still 4 million pupils who needed teaching during this 
war, and the German Occupation had gravely deteriorated the 
quality of school life. 
If Vichy ever did trust the teaching world, which was 
the subject of particular surveillance, it was after the 
martyrdom of 1940 and 1941. The political incidents which 
continued the repressive action rendered Vichy only too 
happy to symbolically eliminate only the most active of the 
leaders and local militants and to put pressure on the mass 
of their colleagues. But all the cases of police methods 
were abused extensively by the military dictatorship of 
Vichy. The teaching corps, which had occupied the first 
ranks of the political and social scene between the two 
wars, was provisionally condemned to silence. During 
several months, primary teachers concentrated on themselves 
with distrust, anxiety and anguish--and this when in the 
past they had been so completely open to the world for a 
quarter of a century. 
CHAPTER IV 
EDUCATION AND POLITICS 
The primary public school was "a departmental public 
service which functioned in municipal locales with function-
aries of the State,"1 and constituted a republican symbol 
par excellence around which crystallized all the questions 
of the school under the Third Republic. The Regime of Vichy 
had re-examined this symbol of the public elementary school 
and had benefited from having a relative autonomy of 
decision-making in school matters. Vichy had used its 
autonomy to undertake an enterprise of political revenge 
which used the republican school as a touchstone. These 
decisions will be analyzed in three phases: 
First, the degree of Vichy autonomy will be determined 
in relation to the Germana and the first decisions of the 
Regime in the school domain will be measured. 
Second, the importance of the primary achievement in 
the public sector with the new political personnel and the 
privileged rapport with public education will be noted. 
1 A. Prost. Histoire de l~Enaeianement en France, 
1800-1967, (Collection U. Colin, 1979), p. 274. 
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Finally, the objective conditions (the school during 
the War), and the subjective conditions (the schools· 
behavior), which determined the impact of school politics on 
the French Society of the forties will also be considered. 
It is indispensable to specify some of the methodologi-
cal obstacles that each historian of the Twentieth Century 
finds along the path of his research and which limits that 
research. ·rt is also difficult to grasp the purging of the 
Jews as some militant primary teachers were victimized in 
the course of the Vichy school years.2 In addition, the 
movement is perceived only by indirect means.s As a 
whole, the information is scarce and difficult to gather. 
Departmental archives and those from the academic inspectors 
are meager.4 Also, some documents were destroyed at the 
time of the Allied landings, as well as during the bombings. 
2 In the Collection of Ministerial Circulars of the era, 
preserved at the A.N., Series F 17 (13318 to 13324). Inter-
esting dossiers (ex. "Communistes dans l·enseignement,") 
hold the manuscript note: "Trouve' vide en 1956." 
3 A.N. F 17 13364. Because Bonnard at his arrival to the 
Ministry in April, 1942 revised some sanctions to appease 
people, and by declarations of some functionaries, such as 
Rene Capitant, Commissioner of l·Ecole Normale, F 17 13335. 
4 Until the Liberation, primary teachers were under the 
control of the Prefect. W.D. Halls: The Youth in Vichy 
France, (Oxford, 1981), p. 414. (Quantitive poll of some 
French Departments.) 
149 
To those administrative obstacles, was added the reti-
cence of the witnesses, which is a phenomenon very well 
known to the practitioner of oral history. When one evokes 
the troubled period of the Occupation, this often becomes 
the surprising picture of a retraction. The study of this 
work approaches several tendencies of the new history: the 
political and cultural history dear to Pascal Ory.e It is 
necessary to be concerned with social history through the 
study of the 15,000 primary teachers and 4 million pupils. 
The study of the mentalities, dear to Vovelle,s is 
necessary in order to grasp the evolution of public opinion 
and at the same time remain objective. 
5 Pascal Ory, La France Allemande, (Paris: Gallimard, 
Coll. Archives, 1977), p. 67. 
I 
s Michel Vovelle, Ideologies and Mentalities, (Chicago: 
Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990). 
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Political Meddling 
Historians will never insist enough on the violence 
with which the French felt the shock of the military defeat 
of June, 1940. All the genesis of contemporary France comes 
from this historical tragedy. Apparently no one could pre-
diet this national catastrophe, starting with the behavior 
of the French themselves, blindly confident in "the first 
army of the world" (since the pompous victory parade of July 
14, 1919) and the occupation of the Ruhr. The New York 
Times of May 7, 1938 reported that Ludwig Beck, Chief of the 
General Staff of the Reich, recommended prudence to Hitler 
when he stated that the French Army still remained the 
"strongest in Europe."7 The scientific historiography of 
Vichy being French (H. Michel), American (R. 0. Paxton), or 
German (E. Jackel) demonstrated brilliantly "the mechanisms 
of defeat",a and demonstrated equally the forerunning 
signs. From the "cowardly relief"e shared the day after 
Munich by a very large section of the French public opinion, 
to the "cowardly relief"10 felt by the quasi-totality of 
7 R. 0. Paxton, p. 15. 
a Y. Durand. Vichy. 1940-1944. Bordas. 
, 
e Expression of Leon Blum before the signing of the Munich 
agreements, Le Populaire, Sept. 20, 1938. 
10 R. 0. Paxton writes, "the joy and relief which 
unfurled" in The France of Vichy, p. 20. 
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the French after the military armistice of June 22, 1940, 
numerous premises announced the mental unpreparedness of 
the French people and its elite to confront a modern war. 
From the reverse tradition of the radical faction of 
the parliamentary majority to the initiative of Edouard 
Daladier, two years after the euphoric Spring of 1936, the 
support of a mixed public opinion finally continued rein-
forcement favorable to peace. Thia included the triumphant 
reception of Edouard Daladier at the Bourget when he came 
back from Munich, and the joyous deactivation of some 
reservists of 1938--all this in spite of the second 
Czechoslovakian crisis. I The famous article of Marcel Deat: 
"Should we die for Danzig?"11 marked the height of the 
"Munich spirit" among the other "champions."12 
In July, 1940, in spite of the brutality of the 
warning, the French as a whole believed that the war was 
over. The war rapidly became known in the official milieu 
of Vichy, as well as in the population, as the "War of 
1939-40." Contrary to the War of 1914-18, it had lasted 
only ten months with two or three military campaigns, of 
which the last one was dramatic for France. It was thought 
11 May 4, 1939 .... "the French peasants have no desire to 
die for the Polish." 
12 Jean Giono wrote, "I prefer to be a live German than a 
dead French." 
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that only a few weeks of reprieve were given before England 
would also suffer defeat. In this atmosphere, the time was 
considered as one of reconstruction after the war.13 
Although necessarily considered by the new French leaders 
from the economic and social point of view, they did not 
neglect the moral and ideological aspect: the hope of a 
purified French nation. The French youth embodied the hope 
for redemption of a defeated nation. Thia initial invest-
ment in the youth of France, a youth that would produce a 
new France in 15 to 20 years explains, in part, the great 
interest of the Vichy Regime in education. 
In relation to Hitler, little of what happened in the 
French schools was important as long as the schools did not 
become foyers of nationalistic agitation. During a meeting 
held in Berlin chaired by Hermann Goering on November 9, 
1940 with those responsible for the war economy of the 
Reich, Pierre Laval thanked the French-German cooperation, 
which he pleaded "would be offered to the French youth--a 
different idea than the idea of revenge."14 
I 
13 Henri Michel. Petain et le Reaime de Vichy. (Paris: 
Presse Universitaire de France, 1980), p. 26. 
14 Documents on German Foreign Policy (1918-45), Series 
D. "The War Years," Vol. XI, Sept., 1940 - Jan., 1941, 
London, 1961. Document No. 306, p. 502. The meeting of 
Sept. 12, 1940 dealt with economic problems and Africans. 
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The only goal of all these German policies in regard to 
French education was to prevent by all means the resurgence 
and the division of a spirit of revanche; that is, revenge 
favored by a national revolution. It can be considered, 
therefore, that the university authority of the Vichy Regime 
was defined by French management under German control but, 
that the French regime retained the primacy of adminiatra-
tive decision.15 Germany seems to have been uninterested 
by the education question in unoccu~ied France. This was 
contrary to the very strict ideological control weighing 
heavily on all aspects of education in national socialist 
Germany. Education was, therefore, one of the rare domains 
in which one can speak of Vichy politics, largely autonomous 
in relation to the Germans, at least until Laval#s return to 
power in 1942. 
A margin of maneuvers relatively more important in the 
educational domain was left to the French government, which 
in the hope of an early peace committed itself to maintain 
internal order. This does not exclude for the moment the 
existence of German political pressure very often exerted 
behind- the scenes at the national level and more direct 
locally. 
15 Article in Le Petit Parisien, Aug. 28, 1940 (a triple 
decision taken by the Minister of Education). "The return 
to classes will be September 2 in primary schools, 
September 15 in lycees and colleges, and October 1 in the 
universities ... " --but some parents say "the return to 
school was earlier than usual." It was precise. 
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Otto Abetz 
In Paris, Otto Abetz, German Ambassador to France, 
controlled every aspect of education during the Vichy Regime 
despite the intentions of Ernest Achenbach, his political 
counsel. According to the declaration, "the German govern-
ment did not want to get involved in the ~university~ ques-
tion."ie Paradoxically, Otto Abetz, appointed at the time 
of the armistice, was not a new figure in French politics. 
He headed an office of Nazi education in France called the 
France-Germany Committee until his expulsion by Daladier in 
July, 1939. The official goal of the committee was to pro-
mote cultural cooperation between France and Germany thanks 
to a concourse of "great leaders" such as Jean Luchaire, 
Fernand de Brinon, and Abel Bennard. They are found in the 
best collaborationist society later. This man of propa-
ganda, Abetz, had good reason to interest himself in popular 
education because this branch constituted one of the points 
of fixation of the Hitlerian mystique in National Socialist 
Germany. In addition, Abetz was an avant-garde teacher. He 
would always keep a pedagogical view of propaganda. In 
ie Jerome Carcopino, State Secretary of National Educa-
tion, interview June 5, 1941, I.H.T.P. 72, A.J. 251, p. 8-9. 
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fact, he organized "in August, 1937, conferences of Pichot 
(a professor) in German, in front of the public meeting of 
Veterans estimated at 200,000 persons.17 
Abetz also organized "discourses in 1938" of "German 
youth and happiness." Any method which could maintain the 
political rivalries of defeated France was considered good. 
Abetz quipped on August 8, 1940: "Our goal is to seed the 
division in France."16 
In 1942 Marcel D~at created a union of education, to 
which Jean Giono brought his participation; a pale copy of 
the national socialist league of professors and teaching 
branch of the Rassemblement National Populaire (RNP) created 
by D~at two years before. Deat could, therefore, count on 
the active support of Abetz, German Ambassador, who was a 
fervent participant in one single group of primary teachers. 
Abetz would facilitate the groups~ control and allow the 
diffusion of propaganda on Franco-German collaboration. 
Abetz, who can be considered suspicious of a certain 
' 
"leftism" within National Socialism, shared with Marcel Deat 
and Abel Bonnard, options clearly anti-clerical which 
weighed heavily on the devout Jacques ChevalierJs escape 
(February, 1941). Even more directly than in his politics, 
17 P. Ory, Lea Collaborateure. (1940-45>, (Paris: Seuil), 
p. 12. 
16 ibid. p. 19-20. 
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the goal of AbetzJs action was to control the men who 
participated in politics. The Ambassador of Germany multi-
plied the political pressures on the Cabinet of Petain to 
keep away or to impose men whom he liked, that is, Laval and 
Bonnard,19 who were loyal to him. For one, the return to 
power; for the other, the arrival to power. 
Georges Ripert and Jacques Chevalier, third and fourth 
, 
secretaries of National Education of Petain owed their dis-
missal to him. Ripert suffered German displeasure for 
having been unable to prevent or repress the Gaullist demon-
stration of Parisian students on November 11, 1940. (The 
Germans also obtained at this time dismissal and replacement 
of the Dean of the Academy of Paris, G. Roussy, who was, in 
addition, married to a Jew. He was replaced by the Director 
of lJEcole Normale Superieure of rue dJUlm, Carcopino.) 
Ripert joined Laval in disgrace to the great satisfaction of 
the collaborationist press, which was not very happy about 
the dismissal of Laval, but which considered Ripert much too 
reactionary. 
Abetz intervened even more strongly against Chevalier, 
professor of philosophy at the School of Literature at the 
University of Grenoble, who had Henri Bergson for a Master 
10 Besides "Gestapette" ("Gestapo homosexual"), "Abetz-
Bonnard" was one of the scoffing surnames of the academic, 
which showed that Bennard was close to the doctrines of 
Abetz and Petain. 
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and Emmanual Meunier as a student. This godson of Marshal 
Petain exasperated Abetz by his militant clericalism; and in 
addition, by the telegram of condolence which he sent to the 
widow of Bergson. (In 72 ministerial days, Chevalier estab-
lished "duties toward God" in the program of public schools 
and introduced the teaching of Catechism.) On February 25, 
1941, Admiral Darlan, successor of Laval and Flandin at the 
I 
head of government, designated dauphin (successor) of Petain 
was summoned by Abetz, who reproached the pro-Semitism of 
his State Secretary.20 
In spite of the political weight of Otto Abetz, a trace 
of the university autonomy in the Vichy government is found. 
The Ambassador of the Reich, very annoyed by the dismissal 
of Laval, wanted to impose Bonnard on National Education in 
the Government of Darlan, formed at the end of February, 
1941. But it was a compromise choice of a ministerial 
candidate who received the nomination of the Director of 
the Ecole Normale Superieure (equally, Dean of the Academy 
/ ... 
of Paris), Jerome Carcopino. This was another sign of the 
intense resistance of the Petainist lobby of Vichy: the 
result of which was "the disappointment of Abetz."21 In 
addition, the German military authority in France (Militar-
befehlshaber Frankreich) did not resist the temptation to 
20 W. D. Halla: Tbe Youth in Vichy France, p. 21. 
21 J. Carcopino. Souyenirs de Sept Ans. 1937-44, p. 283. 
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overstep the reserved domain (propaganda) of the bright and 
subtle Otto Abetz. Therefore, in the course of a meet~ng 
with Carcopino, General Von Stulpnagel did not hesitate to 
caution the Secretary of National Education against the 
spirit of the school community, too influenced and favorable 
to the Gaullist dissidents: 
The General repeated the language which he used with 
the Minister Carcopino in relation to the· youth and 
which can be summaried in this way: Gaullism cannot be 
for young French wary of the future of the expression 
of patriotism because Gaullism tends to discard the 
French Colonial Empire and reduce the role of France 
in Europe. He must realize, however, that Gaullism 
continues to gain adepts in the schools and in the 
institutions of education, principally because its 
propaganda is neither seriously fought nor seriously 
punished.22 
If this direct intervention of the Germane illustrated 
the bureaucratic competition, it also clearly marked that 
the education domain was not perceived by the Germana as a 
threat to themselves. In reality, the school institution was 
transcended by a permanent political preoccupation. This 
consisted of the docility of the French public opinion 
guaranteed by Vichy Regime. It was, more than anything, 
this constant concern to maintain order which incited the 
22 Letter of Fernand de Brinon to Admiral Darlan, 
Sept. 18, 1941, reproduced in H. Nogueres~ Histoire de 
la Resistance en France, t. 2, p. 694. 
Germans to watch, with other sectors, the school world in 
particular. In the school domain, the commission "Kultur 
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und Schule" (Culture and School), directed by Drs. Rilke, 
Reiprich and Dahnke from the Majestic Hotel, maintained a 
narrow control in National Education by scrutinizing each 
university law published in the Journal Officiel of the 
French state and by examining the schoolbooks, university 
reviews, and education journals. But the constant attention 
of the Occupier was geared essentially to the members of the 
community school who were incapable of organizing any type 
of political agitation. Thia was especially the case after 
the student manifestation of November 11, 1940. Communist 
education, as well as lyc,es and students, were the object 
of police surveillance. In revenge, Jews and free masons 
were publicly denounced as such, irrespective of their 
abilities as educators. 
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German Interest 
Paradoxically, the Germans did not hide a certain 
sympathy for the ex-leaders of the union of National Primary 
Teachers,2a which was dissolved by Vichy in August, 1940 
along with all its professional and union organizations. 
Men such as Ludovic Zoretti (ex-General Secretary of the 
/ General Federation of Education tied to the GGT), and Andre 
Delmas (ex-General Secretary of the Syndicat National des 
Instituteurs), unionists of the Left, were credited by the 
Germans for their anti-communist, anti-clerical, and 
pacifist positions before the war. Thia was taken into 
account when the unionists tried to create a prof esaional 
association of primary teachers in 1941.24 
It is interesting to see that German opinions were the 
opposite of Petainist Vichy, which in the Fall of 1940 had 
employed sanctions against the leaders of the National Union 
of Primary Teachers based on their past political positions. 
The promotion of those unionists under Bennard seemed to 
2a A.N. A.J. 40556; note of Dr. Dahnke to the German 
military authority (Militarbefehlshaber) of Nov. 7, 1941. 
24 ibid. and A.N. F 17 13364. Lavenir, Blain and Emery, 
who activated the rhodianienne section of the SNI in the 
thirties. As for Ludovic Zoretti and Andre Delmas, Bonnard, 
on becoming Minister, facilitated their promotion in July, 
1942. 
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appear as an intent to obstruct school politics judged too 
"reactionary and clerical," especially under the short 
ministry of Chevalier. 
The MBH-F had better relations with Fernand de Brinon, 
the direct interlocutor in Paris, who also was the general 
delegation of the French government in the Occupied Zone. 
de Brinon was an old friend of Otto Abetz, whose ideas were 
nearer to Laval than the Vichy government, which he was 
supposed to represent in the Occupied Zone. In charge of 
school and university affairs at the DGGF, was J. Verrier, 
(General Inspector of Historical Monuments, Maurice Roy, and 
Grandclaude, (professor at the Law School of Paris). They 
successfully represented Carcopino from 1941-1942. 
I Rene Georgin and P. Couissin, (ex-member of the Fustel 
de Coulanges circle) became the representatives of Bennard 
in the Spring of 1942. They were "more German than the 
Germans" according to Laval. In fact, it was especially at 
the local level25 in the Occupied Zone that German 
pressure was exercised efficiently on the schools. In 
Rennes, the propaganda Abteilung demanded that the Dean 
of the Academy of Paris furnish a list of all movements of 
personnel up to January 1, 1941. On occasion, soldiers came 
25 A.N. F 17 13379. 
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to control and inspect school institutions. This was much 
more disagreeable than it was effective. Sometimes they 
patrolled the school libraries to see if books forbidden by 
the German censorship were present. 
Until November, 1942, the line2s between Occupied and 
Non-Occupied France was divided into two different worlds. 
The latter did not see German uniforms, Abteilung propaganda 
or the German system of organization. Its pressure on 
French political opinion was minimal. 
The Vichy Regime appeared to have a certain freedom of 
action. For example, the schoolchildren were allowed to 
carry the insignia of the francisque.27 Meetings of the 
boy scouts were authorized as well as the singing of the 
Marseillaise, the weekly ceremony of the "Salute to the 
Colors," and the daily singing of "Marshal, Nous Voila." 
All this was present in all primary and secondary schools 
of the Free Zone as early as the 1940-41 schoolyear. 
2a The Loire River. 
27 A.N. F 17 13319. Note dated May, 1941. 
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Ideological Interest of the Germans 
The child did not constitute a protected category for 
the Germans. Progeny of an enemy people, youths and child-
ren were "themselves submitted to the same constraints as 
the adulta."2S This explained the severe repression of 
the demonstration of the students on November 11, 1940, as 
well as the strikes of the miners of the North in 1941. 
The Germans wished to promote their ideology in the 
schools as well as in the culture. Demonstrations of German 
influence became very frequent. "Pedagogic projects" flour-
, I 
ished from Spring, 1940, and a French-German lycee was 
created. A aeries of monthly conferences were given,2e 
with titles such as, "France and Germany Throughout the 
Centuries: Are They Really Hereditary Enemies?"So 
In the schools, the Germans seemed to prefer the exer-
cise of ideological coercion to the practice of intellectual 
seduction. Primary teachers in the large cities of the 
Occupied Zone were firmly initiated and directed to guide 
their pupils in the expositions of propaganda. In Paris, 
as early as the beginning of the achoolyear of 1940, the 
teachers went to the Berlitz Palace to attend an exposition 
on the rituals of free masonry. 
26 A.N. F 17 13319. Circulars of June 9 and 16, 1941. 
2e A.N. F 17 13341. Paper No. 188. 
ao A.N. F 17 13342. 
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In September, 1941, there was an exposition on "The Jew 
in France," and the following year the subject was "Bolshev-
ism Against Europe."31 The Germans concentrated their 
effort in the educational system on trying to introduce 
propaganda Abteitung posters in the classrooms. Invariably, 
their preoccupation remained within a strategic as well 
as a political order. Their vigorous reaction to the pro-
clerical measures of Chevalier at the beginning of 1941 was 
as much against Nazi philosophy as it was against the 
belligerence of any type of public agitation, which would 
on this occasion be clearly anti-clerical. In the same 
fashion, the "Otto Abetz List" of September, 1940 did not 
produce a "Nazif ication" of programs and French school-
books. It was geared more definitely to censor all or parts 
of the history books of the Third Republic, which presented 
an aggressive image of Germany in their explanations of the 
Wars of 1870 and 1914-18. They also wished to banish books 
and literature of Jewish and Judeo-German writers, such as 
Heinrich Heine and also British and Polish writers in 
genera1.a2 Entire schoolbooks or certain chapters were 
banned from publication or eliminated from the field of 
study. Professionals enforced these actions with the goal 
of influencing school opinion. 
31 A.N. A.J. 40557. Letter of the Propaganda Abteitung 
of August 22, 1941 to Headquarters. 
32 The two editions of the Otto Abetz List are classified 
in the papers of A.N. F 17 13369 and F 17 13378. See also 
Appendix I. 
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Some professors were forbidden to teach by the German 
authorities because they had given books to students from 
the school library "containing attacks against Germany." 
The Germans especially distrusted English professors, 
because they allowed their students to sing "God Save 
the King." 33 
From the ideologic point of view, it appeared to be 
more effective to eradicate the nationalist remnants which 
may have been present in the school domain. W. D. Halla, 
the British historian, affirms "the Germans discourage or 
sabotage the efforts for the sake of the National Revolu-
tion," for fear that they would encourage a spirit of 
revenge.34 
It is difficult to say that the Germans had totally 
neglected the French school system, especially in the Occu-
pied Zone. Even with the relative ideological disinterest, 
it seems legitimate to wonder if the Germans had not tried 
to impose on the defeated nation their own cultural model 
and on the children the perspective of "the new European 
order." I Men such as Marcel Deat or Jacques Doriot control-
led the conversion of French youth to German national 
socialism or to a "national socialism in the French way." 
In this hypothesis, the Vichy Regime would be reduced to 
applying a school politic strongly influenced by Germana. 
33 A.N. F 17 13377. Note dated Apr., 1941 from the Field 
Commander regarding a professor in the primary school of 
Fougere. 
34 Halla, p. 52-54. 
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One cannot overlook remarking on some analogies between 
some of the school options of the Vichy Regime and the 
educational system in Germany and Italy. In Germany, the 
Minister of Education, Rust, purged the teaching corp of 
Jewish and Marxist professors thanks to the constitution 
of a sole teaching organization, the National Socialist 
Lehrerbund. In addition, education for young female stu-
dents had to satisfy the motto of "Kinder, Kuche, Kirche" 
(Children, Kitchen, Church). 
As for Fascist Italy, it benefited from a school 
charter of 1939 established by the Minister of National 
Education, Ballillo, which continued the gentile reform of 
1923. 
. I 
This charter unified l'Ecole Secondaire Inferieure 
and introduced manual work among education activities. From 
1928, the production of state books was controlled by a 
specialized commission. Education systems adopted by the 
dictatorship35 favored essentially gymnastic or manual 
work which accentuated virile behavior in contradiction to 
intellectual knowledge and book erudition which favored 
critical sense. Thia fundamental option was reinforced by 
control of the teachers and the enlistment of youth in 
paramilitary formations (the German Hitlerjugend and the 
Italian Balilla). 
ss Louis H. Parias, ed. L'Hiatoire Generale de l'Enseigne-
ment et de l'Education en France, (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie 
de France, 1980-83), Vol. III, p. 194. 
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From this point of view, the Vichy Regime authorized 
uncontestable conceptions and pedogogical practices close to 
the educational orientations of dictatorships, but more from 
Italy than Germany (development of youth movements, censor-
ship of school programs, surveillance of teachers, promotion 
of a "general and sports education," disdain for teaching 
women ... ). 
This apparent representation was more due to general 
tendencies of totalitarian regimes, which searched for 
greater control of the state on the individual, than due to 
a deliberate will to follow the victors. Totalitarian edu-
cation was, in fact, geared toward the politization and mil-
itarization of youth. This was globally forbidden to the 
Vichy Regime by the reality of the German Occupation. In 
this way, the promotion of a dynamic French youth by the 
National Revolution was particularly feared by the Germans, 
who saw in it, at least until 1942, a prospective will of 
revenge. Some weak indices seemed to confirm that the Vichy 
Regime had not been obliged to follow a foreign educational 
model. This was underlined: "It is not a question of 
making a servile copy of what has been done abroad."Se 
In addition, the organizational initiatives of educa-
tion were equally antagonistic on each side of the Rhine. 
At the time when Carcopino tried to integrate lea Eccles 
ss A.N. F.N. 13364. 
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Primaires Sup~rieures to the modern college of secondary 
teaching in 1941, Minister Rust started "primary schools 
with a terminal level reinforced, "--the Hauptschulen 
(highschool).37 
It is to go too far to state that the school policies 
of Vichy would have been the site of an attempt at the 
"Nazification" of French teaching. It appeared that Vichy 
was really responsible for its policy--ao much so that 
I 
Petain wished he was the Minister of Education to be able 
to impose his ideas of "Family, Work, Country." 
The ideological pressure exerted by the Germana on the 
educative system weighed very little in comparison with the 
dictate of material orders which were imposed on schools. 
Requisitioning primary teachers and professors or using 
school buildings for their own needs was not uncommon. In 
March, 1944, 2,806 primary teachers had been the victims of 
"the service of obligatory work" (STO) in Germany with 
16,200 other French functionaries. To .this number, we 
must add 1,800 master students sent to Germany who came 
out of the ex-l#Ecole Normale dissolved by Vichy.38 The 
Germana also requested a contribution more adapted to its 
function from the teaching corps. In order to remove some 
of their military activities, the Occupation Authorities 
37 Henri Michel, Paris Allemand, (Paris: Albin Michel, 
1981)' p. 167. 
38 A.N. F 17 13348. Letter from the Secretary General 
of STO to Bonnard, Mar. 20, 1944, and Halls, p. 120. 
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decided to organize French language courses. Transgressing 
the administrative hierarchies, they pressured the French 
academic authorities to comply. 
The following was noted by an Academy Inspector in his 
report to the Minister of National Education: 
The Germans had asked the Deans, and very often 
directly to the Chief of the Institution or professors, 
to put locales and professors at their disposition. 
The locales were to be utilized only after the class 
day of the regular pupils, from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m., 
generally. The remuneration offered to the professors 
was 100 francs per hour in Paris.39 
Therefore, French classes by German professors were 
given to German officers and non-commissioned officers. 
The Director of Superior Education, while warning Minister 
Carcopino of the intention of the Germans added that "this 
measure" was to be "generalized by the German authority, and 
in case of refusal would requisition professors after their 
hours of regular service."40 
It was public institutions which especially interested 
the Germans (schools, armories, and hospitals). But the 
educational institutions in the Occupied Zone were particu-
larly appreciated by the Germans because of the large school 
yards where groups could be reunited. The yard gave space 
39 A.N. F 17 13377. Report of Apr., 1941. Note that the 
retribution of 100 francs per hour is raised for an average 
salary of 30.000F (old francs). 
40 A.N. F 17 13377. 
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to their vehicles, and classrooms served as lodging for 
soldiers; also one should not forget their refrigerators and 
kitchens. In November, 1942, the Germans occupied "30" per-
cent of the university locales, 40 percent of the secondary 
schools, and 6 percent of the primary schools."41 
In his Souyenira de Sept Ans, Jerome Carcopino spoke of 
the occupation of lJEcole Normale Superieure of rue dJUlm, 
to which he was appointed by Emile Mireaux, the Secretary of 
State on September, 1940: 
... on September 18, officers of the Luftwaffe came from 
the Palace of Luxembourg to look at the locales from 
underground to the attic with the pleasantly expressed 
intention to move in and rapidly establish 300 of their 
aviators in an encampment which would encompass a cen-
tral building in its entirety, and even without excep-
tion, our library.42 
This entry into the Ecole Normale in rue d~Ulm in 1940 
would occur only with a compromise from each party. In a 
general fashion, the occupation of school locales in the 
Occupied Zone was very often the expression of a difficult 
negotiation between the German military authorities and the 
French academic ones. If the German troops left one place, 
it was to go to another one. For the Germans, schools were 
an excellent point of reunion, and therefore passages .. 
41 A.N. F 17 13379. Halls, p. 49. 
42 Carcopino. Souvenirs de Sept Ans, pp. 191-92. 
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On occasion, only one part of the building was occupied 
bY the soldiers, meanwhile the teachers continued to teach 
in another part. In some cases, it was a very precarious 
arrangement, especially in the rural areas. When a school 
was requisitioned, it was taken over completely, and 
teachers were obliged to teach in the barns or outbuild-
ings. 43 On occasion, the German occupiers of the locales 
caused property damages, especially when the soldiers 
trained with grenades.44 
The schools of the northeast had first suffered consid-
erable damage during the battles of May and June, 1940, when 
many schools were destroyed. According to W. D. Halls, "one 
of the favorite games of the German troops was to evacuate a 
school, await its renovation by the French for school use, 
then return."45 In addition, subsidies were given for the 
repairs.46 It was, therefore, understood that "a wall of 
hostility had been rapidly raised between masters and their 
pupils on one side and the Germans on the other."47 
4a· A.N. A.G. II 654. 
44 A.N. F 17 13376. 
45 Halls, p. 49. 
46 A.N. F 17 13319. 
47 Halls, p. 52. 
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The university and its environment had always been more 
recognized for its ideas against the governments in power, 
and this goes back to the early 19th Century. It was, 
therefore, this same French class who asked questions about 
the German Occupation and the servility of the Vichy Regime. 
In this way, Parisian students full of temerity manifested 
·their patriotism on November 11, 1940 and July 14, 1941. 
This irritated the Germans. The educators indubitably 
constituted the objects of German repression. Many primary 
teachers and professors were arrested. Thia was mentioned 
in the academic notes and reports of the prefecta.4a It 
was especially after the occupation of the entire country 
(November 11, 1942) that German repression became stronger, 
reaching its apogee in 1944. The Ministry of Education made 
a file listing the arrest of educators who were the first 
victims of obligatory work (ST0).4S Children and students 
did not escape German repression because they were consid-
ered responsible persons. For the Germana, the school world 
was directly responsible for the state of the spirit of the 
French, decidely Anglophile and favorable to Gaulliam. On 
48 A.N. F 17 13377. 
49 A.N. F 17 13386. Arrests and Reports (1940-44). 
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the whole, the territories of the school communities had 
suffered in an uncontestable manner from the German Oooupa-
tion because it reassembled a category of French particu-
larly dangerous and susceptible to lead public opinion. 
During the Summer of 1943, numerous arrests were made, 
including 23 pupils, 4 students, 20 primary teachers, 
7 secondary professors, 5 university professors, and 2 
others. 150 
The entire French youth was hurt by Nazism during this 
very painful period of history, particularly the Jewish 
children. On June 10, 1944 a horrible holocaust took place 
at Oradour-sur-Glane,51 whose entire population (of which 
180 were children) was exterminated by the SS. This 
massacre showed well that children did not benefit from a 
privileged status under the German Occupation. On the con-
trary, they have been, with their masters, the object of a 
very special surveillance because the Germans feared the 
influence of teachers on children and on French public 
opinion. It is, therefore, evident that the Germans dir-
ectly imposed political pressure to create a new ideology 
of the time: "the new order" of the Petain Regime. 
50 A.N. F 17 13346, and Halla, p. 53. 
5 1 See article on this incident: "Silence," Prairie 
Schooner, 63:42-44, Summer, 1989. 
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Intellectual Influence: The Maurrasians 
A new but heterogeneous political staff was created 
with the arrival of the Cercle Fustel-de-Coulanges to power. 
The Carela Fuatel was founded in 1926 by two secondary 
teachers, G. Cantecor and H. Boegner, in order to promote 
integral nationalist ideas in the university, using the 
name of Charles Maurras, a nineteenth Century positivist 
historian, who wrote "History of the Political Institutions 
of the Old Regime in France."152 
Instead of winning the enthusiasm of teachers for the 
National Revolution, the Vichy Regime undertook to win over 
the educators of the Third Republic through bribery in order 
to infuse them with a more "national" spirit. This ideo-
logical maneuvering was made possible by a new political 
staff, which had not participated in the decision making 
during the Third Republic. This new staff was no less 
diverse than under the Third Republic and merits study. 
The politics of Maurrasian inspiration were close to Paris-
ian collaborators and technicians who preached political 
neutrality. They thwarted one another, succeeded one 
another, and even conducted a battle for influence behind 
the scenes. 
5 2 Charles Maurras, La Seule France - Cbronigye des Joyrs 
d#Epreyves, (Lyon: 1941). 
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The study of the educational politics of the National 
Revolution also corroborates the general historiography of 
Vichy illustrated in the widely accepted thesis of Stanley 
Hoffman, according to which, "Vichy is as diverse at any 
moment of its existence as formerly."!53 Since these 
frictions disturbed the functioning of leaders of other 
groups, new functions were created, new positions given out 
(such as Secretary General for Youth and Commissioner for 
General Education and Athletics) in the central and regional 
administration of the Ministry of Education. To Marshal 
I 
Petain, who immediately after his investiture on July 10, 
1940 undertook to lighten the administrative burden of the 
Republican Regime, the circumstances and reality of an 
increased bureaucracy was an anomaly. 
Briefly, the French educational system contained two 
antagonistic groups in the school debates until mid-1930: 
the partisans of a traditional laic school system and those 
who exposed a unified school system. These divisions caused 
tensions and disagreements in the educational politics of 
the Front Populaire. These partisans found militant ideo-
logical support among Leftists, and this exasperated the 
Front Populaire. In essence, the Left chose the primary 
school over the secondary school. Thia meant that because 
153 Stanley Hoffman, "L .. Aapect du Regime de Vichy," Revue 
Fran9aiae de Science Politigye, No. 1, Mar., 1956, p. 46. 
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of the Cartel, teachers went to elementary classes in the 
high schools and colleges.54 The Cartel des Gauches 
favored a democratization in education55 allowing the 
I I Societe Nationale des Instituteurs (SN!), to designate 
inspectors in elementary education. 
As mentioned in Chapter III (Vichy), it was during the 
Bloc National in 1923 that Leon Berard succeeded in rein-
stating the notion of "duty toward God" in academic programs 
despite the conflict with Paul Lapie, his Director of Pri-
mary Education. Thanks to the Cartel des Gauches, primary 
I teachers could teach in elementary classes of lycees and 
colleges according to the Decree of December 9, 1925. 
This decree later gave birth to a new program for primary 
schools. The reforms of 1932,56 which extended the 
authority of the primary school inspectors, required a 
I Brevet Superieure {special diploma) to teach. This marked 
the Leftists return to power--a detail whose importance 
would be understood at a later date. 
Radical Jean Zay, supported by his Director of Second-
ary Teaching Chatelet, attempted to unify a pluralistic 
primary educational system, but he quickly dedicated himself 
54 Journal Officiel. Sept. 12, 1925. 
55 "Veterans of the university" was a concept of l~Ecole 
Unique since 1918. Cited by A. Prost, L~Enseignement en 
France, (Paris: P.U.F., 1970), p. 406. 
56 Journal Qfficiel, Dec. 30, 1932. 
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to the dismanteling of the Front Populaire. Although he 
failed to impose the baccalaureate on future primary school 
teachers, his most significant success was, nevertheless, 
impressive--French students had to remain in school until 
14 years of age.67 
Neither the Right nor the Left in Parliament tried to 
alter the status quo in education. They were, however, 
interested in the selection of the elites; and it was the 
Republican Right which wanted to reform secondary educa-
tion. Moderates assured the beginning of free instruction 
at the secondary level,58 which satisfied the demands of 
demographic pressure and facilitated education for the 
common classes (reserved for the secondary cycle of primary 
teaching). An entrance examination at the sixth level,59 
however, did try to contain the number of young students. 
This development in academic life was compromised by the 
victory of the Front Populaire and the general strike move-
ment in the Spring of 1936, which fundamentally changed the 
French political landscape by exacerbating social conflicts. 
After the sacred union~s triumph in World War I and the 
relative calm of the twenties, the school was again in the 
foreground of the political scene as a catalyst of a wider 
57 Journal Qfficiel, Aug. 9, 1936. 
58 Journal Officiel, Dec. 30, 1928 and Apr. 16, 1930. 
59 Journal Officiel, Sept. 1, 1933 and Feb. 13, 1934. 
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ideological debate--the political administration. The male 
teachers who, between 1940 and 1942, encouraged a "new and 
National" school came from conservative circles that were 
concerned with education and teaching organizations that 
wanted to confront the SNI. The UNMEP (Union Nationale des 
Membres de l~Enseignement Public) was strongly anti-
communist and insisted on protecting teachers against all 
harassment of their religious and expressive freedoms. The 
fundamental ideological base of the French primary teacher 
was morality, patriotism and civics. It was necessary to 
have these characteristics in the schools and eliminate 
political unionism and masonic influence. In Vichy, the 
school policy of the National Revolution was not decided by 
the primary teacher but by men who found their inspiration 
in the ideas of Maurras. 
The Cercle Fustel-de-Coulanges published bi-monthly 
bulletins taken over from provincial university groups. It 
was poorly distributed apart from availability around Paris 
and in a few of the larger cities. The Cercle also organ-
ized a primary branch under the direction of a Maurrasian 
teacher, Serge Jeanneret, but it failed owing to the dis-
interest of its readers. 
Another more favorable area was then selected where an 
important ideological offensive was initiated where the aca-
demic policy of the future National Revolution planted its 
roots. Vichy, in fact, applied the credo and educational 
programs that the Cercle adopted in 1933.6° All the 
ingredients of a "national" academic policy were in place 
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--elitism, patriotism and the strengthening of education--
to stop the influence of the Leftists in education. These 
ideas tried to overthrow the Third Republic and to move away 
from the authority of the French institutions to the benefit 
of the conservative forces of the country. 
The Cercle Fuatel channeled the nationalist and reac-
tionary tendencies of a few hundred educators toward a 
Maurrasian point of view with General Maxime Weygand (who 
was the "compagnon de route" of the Cercle) and the German-
ist Albert Rivaud.e1 Rivaud, philosopher, Head of the 
Cercle and first Minister of Education under Vichy from 
June 17 to July 12, 1940, remained in the Vichy government 
through 1944. In 1936 he participated in editing a work on 
education and the idea of patriotism. 
Because the ideas of the Cercle Fustel triumphed at 
Vichy, this group became the principal contributor of the 
"Cahier du Cercle," which had largely influenced the moat 
major appointments in the Vichy government. 
60 H. Boegner, "Esquisse d #un programme," 
of June 1, 1933 under the presidency of Abel 
Cahiera du Cercle Eustel-de-Coulanges, Oct., 
p. 23-24. 
61 A.N. F 17 13364. 
Occasionally, 
(conference 
Bennard) from 
1933, No. 1, 
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contributors, sympathizers or members sought the support of 
high-ranking army officers for the activities of the Cercle 
Fustel: Marshal Lyautey (the social role of the conaerva-
tive officer concept); General Weygand (how to raise sons, 
1937); Colonel de Gaulle (who fashioned the educative model 
I -' 
of the National Revolution); Leon Berard and Serge Jeanneret 
former clerical minister of the Bloc National (and a primary 
school teacher) who had a position at the Ministry of 
Education in 1942. 
Maurraa, who inspired the entire National Revolution 
until 1942, had to rival other Petainist constituents. The 
reality of ~uc~ a competition furthered its true impact on 
France~s academic policy. The arrival of Rivaud (July, 1940 
to April, 1942) symbolized this ascent to power, which was 
not formally solidified, however, until about 20 months 
later with the appearance of Abel Bennard, another member 
of the Cercle, but passionately Germanophile. 
Many Maurrasians slowly disappeared showing the rapid 
advancement of yet another category of men long since 
excluded from the decision-making power in the Republican 
Regime: certain university professors and high-ranking 
functionaries of National education arrived by order of the 
Minister of Education. New students from l~Ecole Normale 
Superieure and other ministry officials officially inherited 
an intellectual commonality. 
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Emile Mireaux, a political conservative, went to the 
famous Ecole Normale in Paris and became a "normalien."62 
He became co-director of Le Temps with Jacques Chaetenet, 
who began a parliamentary career because of this appoint-
ment. Mireaux was the first Minister of Education in 
France and set the machine of purification in motion. He 
questioned the loyalty of the teaching personnel, began the 
discreet recruitment of inspectors and granted concessions 
to the clergy, who had been forbidden to teach since 1904. 
P~tain dismissed his parliamentary minister on 
September 6, 1940. This date truly inaugurated the era 
of the technician: the dean of the law school in Paris, 
Georges Ripert, brought the support of his reactionary ideas 
to the measures of purification--l'Ecole Normale was closed, 
the teachers' union organization was dying and Catholic 
schools were favored. Ripert himself was brought down with 
Laval on December 13, 1940. He had time, however, to put 
the academic policy of the National Revolution in motion. 
Jacques Chevalier, Ripert's Secretary General of Public 
Instruction, succeeded him in another purely nationalistic 
government directed by Flandin. A traditional Christian 
philosopher, Chevalier made religious changes without 
considering the cultural realities of contemporary France. 
s2 The term applies to Ministers of Education who 
inherited common intellectual ideas from the Ecole Normale 
Superieure, Rue d'Ulm (Mireaux, Chevalier, Carcopino). Men 
who had similar positions in the Ministry included, Jolly, 
Terracher, and Chenevrier. Other famous names from the 
same school include Deat, Brasillach, Pucheu and Zoretti. 
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Jerome Carcopino, ChevalierJs successor in DarlanJs 
Cabinet, did not share his predecessorJs sectarianism.as 
He was deeply rooted to the traditional liberalism of the 
arts and resisted force from the administration of lJEcole 
Fran9aise de Rome. His governmental style was less rigid 
than that of his predecessors, and he was also more open to 
using direct contact such as short-wave radio broadcast 
speeches. He moderated the political purging in 1940 and 
eased requirements of religious teaching in public schools. 
He was a symbol of calm and respite in educational policy 
during the Vichy era. 
Symbolically, the Vichy Regime fought the academic 
institutions that were representative of the Republic--
the symbol being primary education. After September, 1940, 
the instructors of lea Eccles Normales (those "lay anti-
Semites"64) were dismissed. The National Revolution had 
hoped to be like the intellectual and moral reforms extolled 
by Ernest Renan after the defeat of 1870. Vichy wished to 
bring down the intellectual leaders of the Third Republic in 
order to assure control as well as to achieve the goal of 
as A. Prost, LJEnseianement en France, (Paris: Armand 
Colin, Coll. U., 1968), p. 475. 
84 Carcopino, p. 308. 
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conversion. The Rightists had reproached the primary 
schools for being centers of anti-clerical ideas. Teachers 
were oriented toward secondary schools and had to prepare 
the baccalaureate the following year because lea Ecoles 
Normales were transformed into Institute de Formation Pro-
fessionnellea (IFP) where student teachers went for ten 
months of training. The Regime also vehemently challenged 
professional organizations accused of putting the hierarchal 
authority of the university in jeopardy. Equally, it wished 
to root out academic textbooks of republican ideology. In 
1940, a reviewing committee met at the Plaza Hotel in the 
town of Vichy to examine textbooks in which the editor, 
Sudel,65 was the principal victim of this "refinement and 
purification."66 
Contrary to the Republican victory of 1875-80, Vichy 
(in 1940) envisioned its evolution on a political national-
istic basis and no longer a democratic one; it was the foun-
dation of a New Regime (authoritarian, corporatist, and 
Christian) and the "de-Republicanization" of primary school 
teaching. The government had to rebuild new programs for 
the educators and the concern was morality. Students were 
6 5 Editor for the SNI, "Epuration Livresque,", Feb. 3, 
1941, Journal Officiel, Aug. 13, 1940 and Feb. 21, 1941. 
se A.N. F 17 13369, 13377, 13378. The list of textbooks 
banned in public primary schools in 1940 is in Appendix I. 
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e~pected to honor the motto of "work, family, country." 
This idea of nationalism in the world of education was 
possible by the new political power--a thesis of the Cercle 
Fustel: "the restoration of France is possible only by the 
child."67 Along the same line of thought as Ernest Renan 
in 1870, young people were to be the means of securing the 
reconstruction of the country. Renan wrote that since the 
older generation had lost the war to the Prussians in 1870 
blaming education, it was time to train the younger genera-
tion for the reconstruction of France as a Republic (1875-
80). Vichy, in 1940 envisoned the reconstruction of France 
by the younger generation, but on a political and national-
istic foundation and not a democratic regime. The Vichy 
Regime was to be built on authority, cooperation and 
Christian principles. 
67 A.N. F 17 13364. "L~Ecole et la Famille." 
CHAPTER V 
THE SCHOLASTIC MILIEU 
Realities of Daily School Life 
Even though "chestnuts are not eaten in the streets of 
Paris" as Paul Eluard wrote with bitterness, it is surpris-
ing to observe that the school institution continued to 
function during these hard years of war. But it functioned 
poorly as a result of a series of factors (the rigeurs of 
the German military occupation for the teachers and pupils, 
and hunger). This explained in part the failure of the 
Vichy Regime to develop mass education for the benefit of 
the National Revolution. The complete administrative dis-
organization of the Summer of 1940 and the development of a 
totalitarian and police bureaucracy had contributed to the 
dysfunction of the school system. Two circulars of the Min-
istry of Education underlined the repartition of administra-
tive tasks between the zones: academic authorities must be 
directed to Paris for questions of general administration 
and to Vichy for problems of politics or discipline.1 
Thia confusion was recognized at the beginning of 1943 by 
Abel Bennard who stated during a meeting of Ministers, 
"there is too much confusion between Paris and Vichy."2 
1 A.N. F 17 13322. C No. 1401 (July 6, 1942) and 
C No. 1989 (Nov. 11, 1942). 
2 A.N. F 17 13364. Meeting of Jan. 25, 1943. 
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The exodus from Paris in June, 1940 also added disorder 
to the administration of the French educational system. The 
transfer of thousands of children from one place to another 
had resulted in massive confusion. In August 1940, the Red 
Cross and families were searching for 90,000 children lost 
on the roads during the defeat.a 
In some ways, the children of refugees actually 
increased the effectiveness of the schools. For example, 
the lyc~e of Renries, which had 225 pupils on the June 26 had 
doubled the number of pupils three weeks later.4 Until 
November, 1942, it was schools in the Free Zone which 
received most of the refugee children. In general, from 
1943 until the Liberation, the schools of the rural areas 
were those which absorbed the flood of children evacuated 
from the urban centers because of the bombings. 
To understand correctly the reality of the daily school 
life from 1940 to 1944, it is important to note the number 
of schools destroyed or occupied by the Germans. In spite 
of the lack of accurate statistics, we know that the number 
is massive. Material damage, especially near the battle-
grounds (the north and the east in 1940 and Normandy in 
1944) was enormous. 
3 Halls, p. 3. Newspapers such as L~Effort, published 
lists of lost children. See also the film entitled, "Jeux 
Interdits." 
4 A.N. F 17 13379. L~Information Universitaire, 
No. 973-4, p. 2. 
Since the Summer of 1940 in the Occupied Zone, the 
German troops increasingly occupied school buildings.5 
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The occupation of schools and their destruction had con-
stituted an effect on school life almost daily during this 
period in FranceJs history. 
In some rural regions, there was a return to the Guizot 
Law of 1833, because it happened that the municipality or a 
rich inhabitantJs land, house or barn had received exiled 
children from the communal school occupied by Germans. In 
the Paris suburb of Argenteuil, the Jules Ferry school was 
occupied by the Germans, who had installed their radar and 
tactical base of operations. Teachers and pupils had to es-
tablish themselves in the hangar of a small factory nearby. 
In addition to these material inconveniences, one must 
also evoke the bombings endured--especially in the cities. 
Even if the children transformed the alerts which so often 
interrupted the continuity of the classes into a game, the 
teachers were not fooled. Most of them exercised their 
pedagogic apostolate with dedication and continued their 
classes as if in the trenches. 
Even though numerous pupils of the forties s~ared these 
souvenirs, all schoolchildren were not protected from the 
bombing. In Argenteuil, there was no air raid shelter. In 
5 A.N. F 17 13349. 
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case of an alert, everyone was required to take refuge in 
the basements of the schools. This tragic situation amused 
the Academic Inspector of Seine-et-Oise, a philo-Petainist 
who developed a morbid pedagogy which alluded to the fact 
that he loved his personnel being in danger. 
In addition, the daily school life existed in a world 
of rationing. In the Fall of 1942, Minister Bennard sent a 
circular which reaffirmed that the financial support of 
schools was the responsibility of the municipalities.a 
Between 1940 and 1944, the schools of France lacked every-
thing. Amid the conditions of hunger, other aspects of 
school life (heat, lighting, furniture, utensils, and equip-
ment) became more scarce everyday, and from 1943 were quite 
severe. In 1944, the administration recognized that schools 
were allocated only one-third of their needs.7 
The lack of fuel and furniture suffice to illustrate 
the difficulties endured by the schools during the years of 
war and Occupation. The lack of paper was the moat serious 
shortage. In class, primary teachers used slates and tried 
to preserve their supplies of chalk. In September, a minis-
terial circular confirmed this shortage and declared that 
6 A.N. F 17 13322. Circular, Sept. 5, 1942. 
7 A.N. F 17 13364. A weak augmentation from 100 to 250 
francs per month. 
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administrative instructions were not followed and that there 
was a considerable reduction in paper production, which in 
1942 was only one-third that of 1939.e 
On September 2, 1942, the Commission of Repartition of 
Paper and Cardboard established levels of points necessary 
for the acquisition of school materials.a The Minister 
judged the opportune moment to publish a National Bulletin 
of Primary Teaching, which was intended to replace depart-
mental bulletins. These literary pieces of pure propaganda 
were the benefit of a special derogation of the Commission 
of Repartition of Paper and Cardboard, which issued tens of 
tons of paper. Despite the scarcity of paper, at the begin-
ning of the school year in 1942, Adolf Terracher, General 
Secretary of Public Instruction, ordered a contest for 
decorating the classes by drawings of pupils on the theme, 
"France Which We Love."10 
For the school year 1942-43, the Director of Primary 
Education also considered the instoration of a monthly 
exercise of free drawing on the following themea:11 
a A.N. F 17 13322. Circular No. 352, 353. Sept. 16, 1942. 
e A.N. F 17 13322. C No. 373. Oct. 29, 1942 and 
C No. 403. Nov. 14, 1942. For example, one booklet of 24 
pages was equal to 3 points; rough copy notebooks of 96 
pages were equal to 5 points; and drawing notebooks of 16 
pages were equal to 1 point. 
10 ibid. 
11 ibid., Circular No. 164, Sept. 23, 1942. 
(1) Marshal of France, Chief of the State; (2) the French 
Colonial Empire; (3) Sport activities of French Youth; 
(4) Field work and the return to the soil; (5) Artisan 
and local activities. 
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It did not matter that paper was lacking if the Regime 
of Vichy was the beneficiary.' Fuel was another type of rare 
material which was indispensable. Henri Michel had appro-
priately titled it "the anguishing lack of coal in Paris." 
Before the war, this coal was sent from the north of France 
and the Pas de Calais. However, this region was now situ-
ated in the forbidden zone, and coal was sent for the eco-
nomic profit of the Third Reich. Authorities in Paris were 
.. 
ordered to reduce the needs of coal in schools by 25 percent 
and in administration by 15 percent.12 The problems of 
heat which were already critical everywhere got worse day 
by day. To this alarming shortage, of which famine was the 
most anguishing of menaces, Vichy responded by an economic 
mobilization of schoolchildren far and above the scholastic 
needs of the school. 
France~s labor force was crippled due to the fact that 
two million workers were prisoners of war. ~orking con-
ditions had deteriorated since 1939, erasing many social 
12 Henri Michel, p. 43. 
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advantages acquired during the Popular Front. Vichy, 
especially after the return of Laval, had favored the 
deportation of workers to Germany under the mandatory work 
program (STO). The school population of four million stu-
dents constituted an appreciable work force in the economy 
of the country. It was not Vichy, however, which had 
negotiated the process of school children contributing 
to the war economy. The "National Defense" government of 
Daladier and Reynaud had previously opened the way before 
the defeat. In a circular in 1940, Maximilien Serre, the 
Director of Primary Teaching under Jean Zay, requested 
primary teachers to ask students "to aid the National 
defense. "13 
On June 1, Albert Sarraut, Minister of National Educa-
tion in the government of Paul Reynaud wrote "an appeal to 
the youth of France" outlining their "vacation for the 
Fatherland." What Vichy had invented was the systematic 
economic requisition of children and youth based on the 
moral authority of Marshal Petain: " ... pupils ... (you will 
give) your Sundays ... "14 
Two circulars dated June 28 and August 25, 1941 had 
instituted the "participation of primary school children" 
to National Aid, the French Red Cross, and the Committees of 
Assistance to War Prisoners. The exploitation of a juvenile 
1s A.N. F 17 13318. Circular, May 4, 1940. 
14 A.N. F 17 13320. 
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workforce was prevented, however, by a relatively moderate 
program. It was effective, and Carcopino congratulate~ the 
academy inspectors. 1 6 Apart from students, teachers were 
also mobilized in the economic requisition. In addition, 
the extracurricular activities which were traditionally 
allowed to them were multiplied tenfold by circumstances of 
war and the Occupation: daycare and vacation colonies were 
increased by necessity, and children were menaced by home-
leasness and the risk of abandonment. Thia omnipresence 
and the devotion of teachers went unrewarded by the Vichy 
government. In fact, until Spring, 1942, a teacher~s salary 
after the senior level was between 10.500 and 23·.500 francs 
per year (approximately 1.375 francs per month). During the 
same period, a typist earned 2.000 francs per month and bank 
employees 3.500 francs per month when one kilogram of butter 
coat 350 francs and coffee 2.000 Francs (January, 1943).16 
The situation was worse than in the nineteenth century. 
An investigation performed at the request of the Minis-
try at the end of 1942 revealed the true social despair of 
primary teachers in the villages, some of whom were living 
in near poverty.17 At the end of April, 1942, the 
16 A.N. F 13319. Vichy, Apr. 28, 1941. 
16 G. Willard and R. Bourderon, eds., Histoire de la 
France Contemporaine - (1940-47), Vol. 6, 1980, p. 130. 
In 1940, one dollar was equal to approximately 2 francs. 
17 A.N. F 17 13364. Inquiry on the monetary situation of 
the teachers. 
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Petainist and collaborationist press (for once united under 
the unavoidable aegis of the task) were moved by this tragic 
and alarming regression of the standard of living of primary 
teachers. They requested a significant improvement of the 
situation at a time when Pierre Laval had returned to the 
power and tried to restart (in a more germanophile sense) 
a National Revolution, which was "distinctly moribund in 
1942. " 16 
On March 26, 1942, Carcopino, Secretary of State, 
promulgated a decree which authorized a salary revaluation 
in the teaching corps.1e The brutal deterioration of 
school life had produced a reaction of combativeness among 
the teachers. Previously there had been (at least between 
the two wars) a certain solidarity and homogene.ity. The 
National Revolution became ridiculous when "the primary 
teachers who were dismissed by the application of the law 
on secret societies had immediately found more lucrative 
employment." This was a consequence of the devaluation of 
the teaching profession. 
At last, and for the first time since the years of 
public school foundation, the departure of numerous primary 
teachers was affected by a severe decrease in the number of 
student teachers. The escape of the primary teachers in 
1a Halla, p. 130. 
1e A.N. F 17 13364. A weak augmentation from 100 to 250 
francs per month. 
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1942 to more lucrative professions and the difficulty of 
requesting new professors proved a true crisis in the didac-
tic and pedagogic conditions of the schoolchildren. In the 
Occupied Zone the academic authorities were even· obliged to 
close a number of classes. They had to resort to auxiliary 
teachers and enlist 12,000 primary substitute teachers (of 
which 9,000 were from the Occupied Zone). This corresponded 
partly to the proportion of primary teachers who· were 
prisoners of war in Germany. Despite the initial intensity 
of the determination of Vichy, the purge of the militant 
teachers in 1940-41 could not have been carried to success 
solely by the pressure of circumstances, because the exodus 
of the primary teachers started very early. As early as the 
end of 1941, the Vichy Regime was crippled by this lack of 
effective educators in the school world. Stephane Jolly, 
the Director of Primary Teaching, had to decide not only 
to recall primary teachers who had retired in 1940,20 but 
also to call for the reemployment of female primary teachers 
in their fifties as substitutes. These were Jewish func-
tionaries dismissed by the law of October 11, 1940.21 
20 A.N. F 13320. 
21 ibid. Circular, Dec. 11, 1941. 
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In 1942, when Abel Bennard became Minister, it was 
considered necessary to re-evaluate the closing of the Ecole 
Normale for primary teachers. "The Eccles Normales have 
proved seminaries are necessary for the formation of future 
educators ... they were truly schools for executives ... 22 
This need for the Ecole Normale was felt more and more due 
to the feminization of primary teaching, which was a conse-
quence of the circumstances. After having voted against 
teachers following the defeat of 1940, the men of Vichy 
wished to become their allies in 1942. However, they had 
contributed to the ruin of the vocation for clerical bene-
fit. Therefore, primary teachers owed the devalorization 
of their profession to the government of Vichy. 
It was not only teachers who were persecuted by Vichy--
children were also hurt (both mentally and physically) by 
those events. During the entire German Occupation, alimen-
tation was the daily and most important preoccupation of the 
French population. Neither adults or children escaped the 
torments of hunger. The rationing and ticket system existed 
until 1947. Children from urban areas suffered the moat. 
The irony is that the children learned how to conjugate the 
verb "to eat" in all tenses, learned how to count, and 
learned the value of food coupons as well. 
22 A.N. F 17 13364. 
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These tragic events marked the children~s consciousness 
forever as they learned how to survive. Each school tried 
to subsidize the food availability and had its own cafeteria 
as early as 1940 when food procurement was difficult. 
Organizations tried to alleviate the nutritional deficien-
cies of children either by private means or by aid and 
solidarity between parents who had contacts in the country-
side. There was also some assistance from the government 
or National Aid foundations such as the Red Cross until 
January, 1941. 
Petain then played the American card and negotiated 
with the Quakers of the American Friends Service Committee. 
This American association procured alimentary aid for 30,000 
children living in the Free Zone.23 However, food short-
ages continued to exist and the bureaucratic paperwork 
between the Academy, municipalities and school directors 
did not help in obtaining food. 
The rural areas were more fortunate than the urban 
areas and the government tried in vain to equalize this 
problem until 1941. Stephane Jolly, Director of Primary 
Teaching, mandated the organization of snacks in which the 
goal was "to fight against effects of malnutrition."24 
23 Henri Michel, p. 167-168. 
24 A.N. F 17 13320. 
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However, teachers and students still did not have 
enough food. As Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie writes: "The 
food ... seems to be atrocious in relation to my tastes, which 
were futilely refined."25 Between 1940 and 1944 there was 
an average deficiency of 800 calories a day in children 6 to 
14 years old. In January, 1943 a report was submitted to 
Bennard stating that 85 percent of the children in school 
had dental cavitiea.2s 
In addition to physical problems, psychological 
problems surfaced. The games children played in school 
reflected this as the boys played war and the girls played 
store. The time in which they lived was represented very 
well by both sexea.27 Most of the children, however, 
appeared to adapt to the circumstances of this terrible 
time, perhaps because the school tried to assure their 
protection and comfort. As early as the exodus until the 
Liberation, schools fought against absenteeism, especially 
in Paris. Absenteeism (voluntary or involuntary) was a con-
sequence of the lack of teachers since 1941. Later, in 1942 
and 1943 some of the teachers left their jobs to join the 
Maquis in order to escape the mandatory work order (STO). 
25 Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, PC-PSU (1945-63), (Paris: 
Gallimard, Temoins, 1982), p. 15. 
2a A.N. F 17 13341, No. 235. Report of Jan 26, 1943. 
The Service of Dental Hygiene was created in Sept., 1941 
by Carcopino following a medical inspection of the school 
in June, 1941. 
27 A.N. F 17 13364. 
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Another reason for school absenteeism was tied to the 
lack of shoes. In spite of a declaration of the government, 
which tried to stop absenteeism and improve school life,2a 
no direct mesures were taken. Political priorities had 
pushed school problems to another agenda. 
The failure of Vichy to revitalize education was tied 
to the poor start of the Regime, which diagnosed a short and 
redemptory war with the installation of a New Order. Until 
1941, Vichy had projected an athletic program as part of 
education. I Since 1941, Jerome Carcopino issued many 
instructions to lengthen programs of general and sport 
education. Thia idea had to be abandoned because many 
children were underfed. 
How could Vichy believe that it could win over the 
youth while continually attacking the teachers? Laval 
and Bennard had understood this and promoted appeasement 
in April, 1942, but it was already too late. 
2 s Law of Aug. 26, 1942, entrusting to Laval "the protec-
tion of childhood" mentioned in Marrus~ Vichy and the Jewish 
Children, p. 22. 
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Internal Problems of the Education System 
The Diplome d~Education Primaire Preparatoire (DEPP) 
/ 
unified the conditions of recruitment in the lyceea and 
colleges and enlarged the clientele by including rural 
children. It greatly favored private free teaching in which 
one entered without conditions--even if it was necessary to 
withdraw in the fifth grade public school. The DEPP consti-
tuted before all else a strict selection process aimed at 
freeing the elite. In the Alpes-Maritimes, the average 
success rate for entry into the sixth level in 1937 was 
82 percent. In 1943, however, the success rate at the DEPP 
fell to 19.6 percent.2e This scholastic revision ended in 
failure. The Vichy dictatorship required the French State 
to reform the primary level of education immediately. 
The effects of CarcopinoJs reforms in teaching were 
hardly profitable for the National Revolution. They were 
a product of the ideological preoccupation that burst forth 
due to the pressures of the time. The reforms surpassed the 
usual limits of institutional reform and imposed a plan 
which was an unmitigated dichotomy between upbringing and 
formal education.30 The National Revolution delivered 
2e A.N. F 17 13364. 
ao P. Laborie, pp. 224-225. 
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the stereotype of an ideal nationalized education. State 
education and scholarly life were brought to the point of 
near military habits and short ceremonies in schools. This 
school mobilization shows its most accomplished expressions 
~ 
in the speeches of Petain, which bestowed the honors of a 
great educator upon him: 
In these sad momenta when the heart of the Marshal, 
Head of State, is so deeply hurt by acts of treason or 
by the hypocrisy of a handful of unfaithful Frenchmen, 
he very sincerely feels fatherly concern for youth and 
searches for a teaching method that will be shielded 
from error and will be sensitive to preserving it from 
doctrines that lead soc"iety to anarchy and cause it to 
revert to paganiam.31 
Here, again, the declaration of intentions hide the 
manifestation·of "marshaliat" folklore which was geared 
toward children. Moat of the educators followed the guide-
lines, but with a certain skepticism. For Guehenno, for 
I 
example, the portrait of Petain was printed in horrendous 
colors (" ... this man with seven stars ... ").32 It seems 
that the Occupied Zone had been preserved from such an 
excessive picturalism. Schools in the northern zone like-
wise carried out their obligation by singing "Marshal, we 
are here,"33 while in the Free Zone, children were not 
obliged to sing the song. Mostly the Regime engaged in 
31 A.N. A.J. 1176, "Aimer et Servir," booklet dated 
May, 1941, p. 6. 
a2 Halls, p. 14. 
33 A.N. F 17 13319. 
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the ideological mobilization of children, catering to the 
National Revolution#s objectives (whose motives should have 
been the rebirth of the country after its military defeat. 
Family propaganda and promotion of the birth rate by the 
National Revolution was advocated throughout the school 
system.34 
Chevalier, Carcopino and Bennard jointly insisted on 
the pernicious and subversive character of encyclopedic 
instruction to which they opposed the merits of knowledge of 
practical or useful matters in education. Between 1941 and 
1944, ministerial instructions glorified the merits of man-
ual work. Drawing was promoted to the head of salvationist 
activities. From 1940 to 1942, school children were system-
atically solicited to produce drawings or small artfully-
crafted objects and to compose promises of allegiance and 
testimony of gratefulness. According to Chevalier, more 
than 2 million drawings were sent to Vichy for Christmas, 
1940.36 The 10,000 best drawings were on display, and 
the newspapers of the time supported this publicity opera-
tion which touched many children (at least in the Free 
Zone).36 Halls described it as the cult of the national 
34 A.N. F 17 13314 Circular for Mother#s Day. 
36 A.N. F 17 13319. 
se La Croix, Feb 2 and 5, 1941; Le Temps, Feb 25, 1941. 
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hero given to the children in the form of a history tale: 
"It was a nice old man, solid and straight; just like the 
tree of the druids."37 
Thus, all those stories about the Marshal were not 
entirely untrue. He did possess a natural penchant for 
children and demonstrated a fatherly image while visiting 
schools. He liked to be around the children of his secre-
I , I 
tary, Dr. Menetrel. Petain even used to give short radio 
broadcast speeches to the young people.3B His messages 
were usually edited and posted as a plaque or a brochure and 
were destined to replace civil and moral teaching manuals. 
Furthermore, many school supplies were issued bearing the 
likeness of the Marshal; and even a portrait of him decor-
ated classroom walls. In November, 1941, sales of the 
Marshal~s portraits, postcards and calendars amounted to 
17 million French francs.39 
As a reward for good behavior, certain schoolchildren 
were received by P~tain in Vichy on New Year~s Day, 
1941.40 These festivities featured both honors and 
food. In great pomp, students were given copious lunches. 
37 Halls, p. 13. Passage from !be Life Qf 
, 
Max: ab al Ee:tain 
!old :tc the Cbild;c:en Qf F;c:ance, R. Descours, (Nice, 1941). 
38 A.N. F 17 13319. 
39 Halls, p. 14. 
'40 Halls, p. 418. 
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This generosity was imprinted on the memories of underfed 
children and also impressed parents with undeniable feelings 
of gratefulness. 
On January 13, 1941, the Marshal·s tea party for needy 
children took place in the presence of important 
officials: the prefect, an academic inspector and a 
representative of the special delegation. They praised 
the Marshal·s concern for the unfortunates, but the 
headmaster outdid them by proclaiming lyrically: "let 
the little children come to me," words of the Master of 
the world (God) and received for his part by the Master 
of France, grandfather of all little children.41 
The power of the organizational means used showed the 
ideological importance of the game on public opinion. In 
April, 1942, Fernand de Brinon, a delegate of the Vichy gov-
.. . 
ernment in the Occupied territories, sponsored a publicity 
campaign in Paris at the Galeries Lafayette.42 Even the 
adults succumbed to this seduction. These political spec-
tacles also facilitated the remolding of the republican edu-
cational system into a more nationalistic one. 
The ideological conditioning of school children had 
another dimension which came from P'tain·a demand for the 
nationalism of education. As early as the Ripert·s Minis-
try in 19~0, two new offices were integrated into the heavy 
bureaucratic machine of National Education: one, under the 
control of an engineer, Georges Lamirand, who took direction 
41 Histoire de France Contemporaine, Vol. VI, p. 31. 
42 Halls, p. 14. 
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of the Secretary General for Youth; and the second, under 
the tennis player, Jean Borotra, who in 1940 became Super-
intendent for General and Athletic Education. At the end 
of 1940, Borotra proclaimed: 
Educating youth holds a considerable place in the 
concerns of government. The creation of the post of 
Superintendent for General and Athletic Education marks 
this intent by making a tremendous effort toward the 
training of healthy youth with the goal of giving them 
a harmonious and strong body and character.43 
General and athletic education was essentially founded 
on the principle of outdoor activities. Five hours per week 
of such instruction for boys and four hours for girls were 
required at the start of the 1941 school year. Carcopino 
considerably shortened the General Superintendent~s program, 
and the children subsequently had no more than one hour of 
physical education.weekly. Lesa strenuous "pedagogical 
walks" replaced physical education. 
In fact, national and sport education did not succeed 
in the school world. First, because the primary teachers 
saw the intrusion in certain schools by "professors of gen-
eral education" in a bad light. The Ministry of Education 
had young civil servants, whose duties were poorly defined. 
I • Adherents of the Petain ideology, they interfered at times 
in traditional educational matters of the primary teachers. 
43 A.N. F 17 13318. 
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The competition increased and the friction multiplied--
especially when primary teachers were obliged to spend a 
training period in the regional installation of the Commis-
sioner General of Education. Primary teachers and profes-
sors of general education were divided by their mentalities 
and their training. 
The following schedule shows the appointment and train-
ing procedure for teachers in the Occupied Zone in 1942:44 
1. Teachers are appointed for each training period by 
the Academy~s Inspectors. 
2. In principle, a regional inspector would attend the 
last week of teacher training. Appointment to what 
is then made by Inspectors of the Academy; 
3. The faculty of private schools can participate in 
the training of the teachers in public schools. A 
special training period is reserved for them during 
September. 
The majority of teachers developed a kind of passive 
resistance emerging from the atmosphere and the cultural 
traditions present in their world: republicanism, secular-
ism, and the social and ideological progress. 
During the Summer of 1940, French public opinion was 
concerned with questions regarding school among other wor-
ries--the Occupying German troops, food shortages, the men 
away in German priaons--in short--daily survival during the 
44 A.N. F 13322. Program contained in Appendix H. 
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war. While propelling teachers to the forefront, however, 
the Army, the Church, the new Vichy Regime, and the press 
furnished a perfect scapegoat to the wounded, bewildered 
and confused population. 
The tremendous defeat of June, 1940 furthered the erup-
tion of a formidable collective resentment. This resentment 
was fostered, kept alive, and then exploited by vengeful 
associates in Petain·s ascent to power. Locally, one 
breathed here and there, "an odor of dregs, an odor of 
aludge."-4~ 
Of course, teachers were far from being the only 
victims of sickening prose (letters of denunciation), more-
over, " ... they were high among the themes of a prolific lit-
erature that borrowed from xenophobes and anti-Semites in 
the name of moral purification of a nation."46 
If the denouncers all over France had little impact, 
they did, however, contribute to the poisoning of the 
atmosphere of the classroom. Teachers were denounced for 
"communist political activities" or for "comments of a 
doubtful loyalism."-47 In order to force the teachers 
into conformity with Vichy·s policies, the police could 
45 P. Laborie, p. 197. 
46 ibid., p. 100. 
47 A.N. F 17 13376. 
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count on a small number of informers. Still, some informers 
were professional in their denunciations such as the 
Fascist, Rebatet. While on vacation, he tracked down 
Gaullists and·communists. He also addressed a letter 
to Bonnard·s Cabinet Chief, Pierre Couissin, in which he 
betrayed a conversation he had with the youth center·s 
director as "a faithful and complete echo of an English 
radio broadcast."48 
The corps of informants had trusted men who accused 
_, 
many people--like Marcel Deat·s friends who wrote to the 
Minister accusing a teacher·s association of not sending 
their teachers to the STQ.49 This atmosphere, however, 
was repugnant to most French people. In rural communities, 
teachers had increased stature since 1880, even if they had 
occupied a place in local society other than that of the 
village intellectual. As secretary to the Mayor, a teacher 
also became part of the local governing fabric. This privi-
leged position, in the village or even the urban community, 
did not seem to have been so available after the def eat and 
during the second half of 1940. On the contrary, it even 
appeared to be limited to the time when the teacher became 
48 IHTP, 72 A.J. 251. 
49 Halls, p. 125. 
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a discreet member of the Resistance or the Underground. In 
general, one made it publicly known if oneJs educators were 
not well appreciated or vice versa (unlike the denunciations 
in the anonymous letters).60 
The school needed its propaganda specialists because 
propaganda for internal use in the schools endeavored to 
uphold the RegimeJs major educational aims and to reinforce 
its influence over infants and youth. This propaganda 
borrowed important thematic ideas from the previous gov-
ernment. The five sections devoted to propaganda were: 
1) patrimonial, 2) elitist; 3) nationalist; 4) economic; and 
5) anti-Semitic. The patrimonial section enabled Chevalier 
(in February, 1941) to engage in general and popular ideas 
in pedagogy in order "to return to the people an order of 
forgotten virtues."61 The history of France, including 
knights, saints, workers, provincials and traditional songs 
constituted the basis for the iconography. The propaganda 
services department of the Ministry of Information carefully 
worked out a photographic strategy that constantly presented 
/ 
children surrounding Petain. 
50 A.N. F 17 13364. 
51 A.N. F 17 13319. 
The elitist section sought to teach children the 
principle of academic inequality, because all children 
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were not going to serve the country in the same way: "Dear 
children, you will not be called to serve the Fatherland in 
the same way. Heroism will only be for a few of you."f52 
The nationalist section was directly linked to the 
preceeding section in that completion of homework was an 
element of the existence of the Fatherland. 
The economic section constantly reminded children of 
the necessity of their mobilization. Classroom walls were 
covered with posters showing aid to prisoners and refugees. 
The anti-Semitic section remained a project and was never 
implemented. The extension of P~tain~s ideology in the 
academic world was the way in which the ministry wished to 
reach parents as students would transmit opinions to their 
parents. 
52 A.N. F 17 13322. 
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The Catalyst 
Thus, Vichy attempted to transform primary educational 
institutions into objects for propaganda. In 1940, the gov-
ernment required instructors to participate in this politi-
cization. Vichy, however, miscalculated the depth of the 
teaching corps~ involvement with these aims, as well as 
their unwillingness to be manipulated by a totalitarian 
state whose educational programs they opposed. 
Consequently, the Vichy propaganda had difficulty in 
establishing and maintaining itself in the primary teaching 
setting because its philosophy of Family, Work, Country were 
not fundamentally in line with the republican traditions and 
aspirations of the academic world. 
Teachers were so anti-Vichy during wartime, that 
between 1942 and 1943 they persuaded people to change their 
minds in favor of the Allies, de Gaulle and the Resistance. 
Those changes differed from region to region. Their conduct 
can be easily explained because of the key position of the 
teacher in French society, but this forceful attitude came 
indubitably from a culture often called the spirit of the 
primary educator. 
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In 1940, the primary school teacher upheld cultural 
values that Vichy seemed unable to weaken or even to shake. 
Neither the idea of dedication to peace, the unshakable 
faith in science and progress, nor the devotion to universal 
man could reconcile itself with the Vichy anti-Semitism. 
These methods only provoked teachers~ disgust, as witnessed 
in this excerpt from a letter to P~tain from a teacher: 
... "La Bete Noire" of the liberal Republic, radical and 
masonic ... a teacher cannot preach such a radical pol-
icy. He does not want to bend academic principles any 
more for an authoritarian and reactionary regime that 
crushes the republican democracy that (it) has brought 
to students, citizens and voters.53 
Another teacher wrote to Rene Capitant, Commissioner of 
National Education: 
We have a primary vocation to a noble cause that com-
bines love for France and for the Republic. Above all, 
teachers cannot accept this "mobilization of the laity" 
in its broadest sense into the government~s teaching 
system. The instructor is deeply shocked by the 
efforts to restore the "clerical schools" during a 
national tragedy, and his conscience forbids him to 
allow and to serve this deneutralization of the repub-
lican academic system.54 
63 A.N. F 13335. Letter of Aug. 30, 1942, CDJC, CXV-69. 
64 A.N. F 17 13336. 
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From the instructors' point of view, Vichy sinned by 
violating the traditional neutrality of the academic commun-
I 
ity by introducing PetainJs Regime in the classroom. This 
cultural violation explained the primary teaching corps' 
opposition and its universal acceptance of the Resistance. 
In June, 1941, Pierre Maucherat published the magazine, 
"The Lay School" in the Paris region. In the same year, 
Joseph Rollo and George LaPierre (in total opposition to the 
Minister of Works, Ren~ Belin), attempted to reconstruct the 
SNI in an effort to reestablish contact with the clandestine 
Confederation G~n~ral du Travail (CGT). Furthermore, in 
1942, Rollo edited "A Call to France's Primary Teachers," 
which was exceedingly helpful to the spirit of the Resis-
tance. Even though the enlisting of teachers into the 
National Liberation occurred rather late, they worked with 
perseverance, discretion, and great effect in undermining 
and discrediting the National Revolution in the eyes of the 
French. The collective memory maintained between 1940 and 
1944 was an image largely stereotypical, but revealing 
nevertheless. In Louis Malle's film, Lacombe. Lucien, a 
young vil-lage poacher and future gestapo agent impatient to 
act, asks his teacher about joining the Resistance. This 
filmmaker's work undoubtedly showed the tribute the French 
people paid to their school masters. 
CONCLUSION 
The priorities of the Vichy Dictatorship, obliged the 
French State to control the school children in order to 
control society. This annexation did more than reform 
institutions, it was direct contact between the State and 
French society. The National Revolution first created the 
stereotype of an ideal national education by imposing a 
dichotomy between education and instruction and tried to 
make the former more important than the latter. 
This study has discussed the diverse ministers between 
1940 and 1941. Also discussed was the involvement of the 
community in education. For the forces that composed Vichy, 
the defeat of France confirmed the urgent necessity of a 
reorientation of teaching to inculcate nationalist ideas and 
which expressed a new form of citizenship. The content of 
academic programs included the teaching of morality to 
conform to France~s new motto: "Work, Family, Country." 
History was revised and interpreted in a new patriotic 
manner, which was centered not only on the great figures of 
the past, but also removed republican ideology from school 
curricula and textbooks. 
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"Failure often serves as a scapegoat in a country that 
(endures) failures," wrote R. O. Paxton.i Soon after 
FranceJs military was crushed in 1940, the schools of the 
Third Republic, which symbolized excellence, had to suffer 
onslaughts of rampant nationalism because the men who 
created Vichy believed in changing the foundations of the 
new society, that is, a "national" society. This plan to 
ruin the Third RepublicJs educational system by calling 
its schools into question was made even easier by the dis-
interest of the German Occupation Army to reform French 
education. 
Until Pierre LavalJs return to power in April, 1942, 
(during the time when the National Revolution developed a 
largely autonomous set of values) Vichy had free reign in 
educational matters. The dramatic circumstances of the 
defeat allowed the National RevolutionJs political and-
ideological forces to take spectacular revenge on the 
primary teaching personnel by accusing them of the major 
responsibility for the defeat in 1940. 
The initial wish to purify and change was rapidly 
thwarted by the priorities imposed by the war, the Occupa-
tion, and the liberal tradition of universities. As far as 
l.R. 0. Paxton, La France de Vichy. 1940-44, (Paris: Seuil, 
1974, 375 pp. 
215 
private schools and ideology were concerned, any attempts 
toward clerical support and elitization of teaching encoun-
I 
tered the aame obstacles. In particular, PetainJs plan, 
which was based on recollections of the war of 1870 and its 
consequences, did not sufficiently count on the traditional 
resistance to change by the French teachers. Although the 
war of 1939-1940 was brief and followed by an armistice, 
its consequences proved a difficult confinement from the 
new French State. 
, 
Petain#s deeds of capturing students# attention and 
exploiting a confused public opinion led the Regime to 
decide in favor of an economic and ideological mobilization 
of children. Vichy had also undereatimated the schoolJs 
role as mediator. In the 1940#s, it was through education 
that a child#s social nature was formed and information 
networks were born. 
Even if Vichy, all in all, had failed to take sides 
with the school and its driving forces (and thus, public 
opinion) the National Revolution#s academic accomplishments 
still influenced considerably the educational policies of 
the post-war era. In this case, the Vichy episode did not 
constitute a digression since Vichy teachers continued to 
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prepare the baccalaureate under the Fourth Republic. In 
addition, Vichy inaugurated a systematic policy of state 
subsidies for denominational free education that continued 
during the Fourth Republic, born of the Resistance (Marie 
and Barange law of 1951) and the Fifth Republic, a child of 
Gaullism (Debre and Buermeur law 1959-1977). In conclusion, 
Vichy~s educational contributions were significant. 
What is also interesting is the surprising historical 
interest in the Vichy Regime~s educational policy. Since 
1980, this interest has increased and marks the centennial 
of the Ferry laws. In the Spring of 1982, the national 
union of l~Association des Parents des Eccles Libres (APEL), 
as well as the National Committee for Lay Action gathered 
its supporters together in massive demonstrations. 
Lastly, Vichy remains present in contemporary France~s 
daily cultural life: the political debate during the Summer 
and Autumn of 1982 is a constant reminder.2 This study 
presented the Vichy Regime as an expression of the revenge-
ful politics of a minority in opposition to advocates of 
banality. It further attempts to honor the educators who 
invested their energy in protecting children from Nazism and 
the horrors of war. 
2 Le Mende, Sept., 1982 
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Abreviations Used 
AD 
AG 
AJ 
AN 
APEL 
BDIC 
CDJC 
CFTC 
CGQJ 
CHSGM 
CNMAD 
DEPP 
ENS 
IEQJ 
IFP 
IHTP 
APPENDIX A 
Abreviations Used 
Departmental Archives 
General Archives 
Archives on Youth 
National Archives of France 
Association des Parents des Ecoles 
Libre 
International and Contemporary 
Library of Documentation, 
Center for Contemporary Jewish 
Documentation 
Confederation Francaise des 
Travailleurs Chretiena 
Commissar General of the Jewish 
Question 
History Committee of the Second 
World War 
Conaervatoire Nationale de Musique 
et des Arts Dramatique 
Diplome d~Education Primaire 
Preparatoire 
, 
Ecole Normale Superieure 
Institute for the Study of the Jewish 
Question 
Institute de Formation 
Profesaionnelles 
Institute d~Histoire du 
Temps Present 
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MBF-H 
MNE 
PUF 
RHDGM 
RNP 
SEC 
SNI 
STO 
UFDR 
UGIF 
UNMEP 
Militarbefehlshaber Frankreich - the 
German military authority in France 
National Museum of Education 
Presse Universitaire Frangaise 
History Review of the Second 
World War 
Popular National Assembly 
Section of Problems and Controls 
Societe Nationale des Instructeurs 
Service du Travaille Obligatoire 
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French Union for the Defense of the Race 
General Union of the Israelites 
of France 
Union Nationale des Membres de 
l~Enseignement Publique 
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Ministers of Education 
1940-1944 
June 17. 1940 -
July 12. 1940 
July 12. 1940 -
September 6. 1940 
September 6. 1940 -
December 13. 1940 
December 13. 1940 -
February 23. 1941 
February 23. 1941 -
April 18. 1942 
April 18. 1942 -
August 24. 1944 
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Ministers 1940-44 
A. Rivaud; Minister of National 
Education; last government of 
the Third Republic presided over 
by Petain 
E. Mireaux; State Secretary of 
Public Instruction and Fine 
Arts 
G. Ripert; State Secretary of 
Public Instruction, Fine Arts 
and Youth 
J. Chevalier; General Secretary 
of Public Instruction and Youth 
J. Carcopino; General Secretary 
of National Education and Youth 
A. Bennard; Minister of National 
Education 
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Ministers and Cabinets 
(1939-40) 
DELBQS 
Minister of National Education 
September 14, 1939 - March 21, 1940 
Director: 
Bureau Chief: 
Adjunct Chief: 
Composition of Cabinet 
H. Laugier (Chief of the Central 
Service of Scientific Research) 
E. Bouvier (School of Literature, 
Montpelier) 
Drouart (Tax Collector), R. Paty 
(Director of the Paris Academy) 
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Private 
Secretary Chief: Lanoix (Bureau Chief, Dordogne Hqtrs.) 
Charges Mission: 
Cabinet Attache: 
C. Laval (Director, Credit Agricole) 
A. Bontemps (Inspector General of 
Sport and Leisure) 
H. Capitaine 
G. Monod (Inspector General T.P.) 
Mme. Templier (Director of the 
Academy of Paris) 
Lamblin (Parliamentary Services) 
Di:c:::crector: 
Chief: 
Adjunct Chief: 
Ministers and Cabinets 
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A, SERRAQT 
Minister of National Education 
March 21, 1940 - June 17, 1940 
Composition of Cabinet 
P. Crouzet 
C. Peloni 
H. Legrand, R. Paty 
Pz::n-ivate 
Secretar~ Chief: Mlle. Breaut 
Attttaches: J. Fraysae, Mme. Templier, Lenoix 
(Parliament and Presa) 
Dir-rector: 
Bureau Chief: 
Cabinet At:1ttache: 
A, RIYAUD 
Minister of National Education 
June 17, 1940 - July 12, 1940 
Composition of Cabinet 
L. Lavelle (Professor, Henri IV) 
Lieutenant Commander Vasseau Marcha 
Mlle. de Couvertin 
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E. MIREAUX 
State Secretary Minister of Public 
Instruction and Fine Arts 
July 12, 1940 - September 6, 1940 
Composition of Cabinet 
Secretary General: 
Secretary General: 
Director: 
Bureau Chief: 
Private 
Secretary Chief: 
Charge Mission: 
R. Gillouin (Public Instruction) 
L. Hautecoeur (Fine Arts) 
L. Lavelle 
J. Hourticque 
Ballet 
Duverney (Honorary Prefect) 
G, RIPERT 
State Secretary of Public Instruction, 
Fine Arts and Youth 
September 6, 1940 - December 13, 1940 
Composition of Cabinet 
Secretary General: 
(Public Instruction) 
Secretary General: 
(for Youth) 
Secretary General: 
(Fine Arts) 
Director: 
Bureau Chief: 
Private 
Secretary Chief: 
Charge Mission: 
J. Chevalier (Dean, School of 
Literature, Grenoble) 
G. Lamirand (Engineer) 
L. Hautecoeur 
J. Hamel (Professor, Paris 
Law School) 
A. Lefas (Youth and Sport) 
J. Hourticq (Public Instruction) 
J. Boulanger (Professor, Lille 
Law School) 
Duverney 
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J. CHEVALIER 
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State Secretary of Public Instruction (Justice) 
December 13, 1940 - February 23, 1941 
Renamed State Secretary for Public Instruction and Youth 
' January 8, 1941 
Director: 
Bureau Chief: 
Section Chiefs 
of the Cabinet: 
Private 
Secretary Chief: 
Composition of Cabinet 
Fugier (Professor, Lyon Law Faculty) 
Grandclaude (Professor, Paris Law 
School); then Vizioz (Jan. 1, 1941) 
Charmoillaux (Professor of 
Literature at Versailles); Husson 
Professor of Literature, Montpelier) 
Blanc (First Inspector) 
J. CARCQPINO 
State Secretary of National Education and Youth 
February 23, 1941 - April 18, 1942 
Director: 
Charges Mission: 
Composition of Cabinet 
J. Verrier (Inspector General of 
Historic Monuments) 
Grandclaude (Professor, Paris Law 
School) representative of the 
State Secretary at the level of 
General Delegate of the French 
Government in Occupied Territories 
Roy (General Inspector of Public 
Instruction - Secondary) 
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A. BONNARP 
State Secretary Minister of National Education 
April 18, 1942 - August 24, 1944 
General 
Commissioner of 
Sports: 
Composition of Cabinet 
Colonel Pascot (in charge of General 
Education and Sports) 
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Jacques Bousquet who was director of the Bonnard Cabinet, 
followed Rene Georgin, specialist in grammar. Couissin, 
member of the Superior Counsel of the Public Instruction was 
Adjunct Director until his replacement by Gait, the latter 
ceding his place as Cabinet Chief to Mouraille. 
Chief Private Secretariat of Bonnard was Jean Georges, 
Master in Law and then Lavenir, his attache. The Secretary 
General of Public Instruction was Terracher, a position he 
retained until 1944. The Private Secretary was the Primary 
Instruction Inspector, Lafille. Gallitier remained Director 
of Superior Education until his replacement by Prechac, the 
Inspector General; Lecouturier was Adjunct Director. 
APPENDIX E 
Educational Functionaries & Legislation 
November, 1940 
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Gidel and Hardy were known for their anti-Semitism; 
however, Boussagol was very moderate. Gidel was Dean of the 
School of Law. He replaced Dean Maurain (who was arrested on 
September 10, 1941) to the deanship of the University of 
Paris. Gidel was extremely conscientious in whatever 
concerned the aryanization of education. He wrote to the 
CGQJ on March 28, 1942 to call attention to what appeared to 
be a loophole in the legislation: The Jews could still be 
directors, administrators or professors in private education 
"in complete freedom and without limitation of numbers." 
Gidel proposed to exclude the Jews from private education. 
His proposition of November 12, 1942 was vetoed by the 
Minister of Education. 
Hardy, Dean in Algiers, easily forgot his responsibili-
ties as Dean to promulgate the anti-Jewish propaganda in 
Algeria. The paternity of the quota is, at least in part, 
attributed to him. He proposed it to Weygand in June, 1941 
as something very necessary. With the assent of Weygand, he 
had it applied immediately--well before the application of 
the law of October 19, 1942. His circulars of September 25 
and October 17, 1941 prescribed a quota of 7 percent in 
primary and secondary education. 
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PROGRAM FOR TRAINING OF TEACHERS OF GENERAL EDUCATION 
March 30 - April 4, 1942 
Monday 
March 30 
Tuesday 
March 31 
Wednesday 
April 1 
Thursday 
April 2 
8:30 
9:00 
10:00 
10:45 
12:00 - 5:30 
8:30 - 9: 15 
9:30 - 10:15 
10:30 - ·12:00 
2:00 - 5:30 
8:30 - 9:15 
9:30 - 10:15 
10:30 - 12:00 
12:00 - 5:30 
8:30 - 9:15 
9:30 - 10:15 
10:30 - 12:00 
2:00 - 5:30 
Closing by the General 
Superintendent 
Paris 
Welcome for trainees and 
introduction of training 
Demonstration with Commentary; 
Seasonal Lesson 
Practice Session 
Candidate Registration 
Outdoor Afternoon 
Demonstration with Commentary: 
Lesson in the School Courtyard 
Practice Session 
Use of the Natural Method in 
the National Doctrine 
Outdoor Afternoon, Stadium 
Demonstration with Commentary 
Lesson on Developed Ground 
Practice Session 
Reports of General Education 
Schoolmaster with Director, 
Monitors of Physical/Athletic 
Education, Colleagues, Families 
Medical Check 
Corrective Exercise 
Swimming 
Demonstration with Commentary: 
Athletic Initiation 
Practice Session 
Payment of Jews for Training 
Outdoor Afternoon: Park/School 
"Role & Mission of the Director 
General Education 
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APPENDIX H 
Table of Training Periods in Regional Centers 
1942 
lducational Supervision 
-General A Sport-
Occupied Zone 
TlBLI Of TIAIIIIG PDIODS II THI RIGIOIAL CllTDS 
JOI THI YUi 19421 
m1m JAi JIB IUI APR MAY JUD JULY AUG SIPT OCT IOY DIC 
llale/feule 
Instructors 
(1) 5-31 5-28 5-28 
PriluJ 
Inapectora 
13--9 15--12 
(2) 28-31 23-28 23-28 • 4-9 1-6 •• 
llale/f eule 
Student 
Teachers 
llelbera of 
Printe 
Teachi11 
(3) 3-26 
(1) - Teachers are appointed for each trainin1 period bJ the Acade11·s Inspectors. 
22--19 25--23 
• •• 
(2) - In principle, a re1ional inspector would attend the last week of traininl. Appointaent is 
then 11de bJ AcadelJ Inspectors. 
(3) - JacultJ of priYate schools 111 participate in the training of teachers in public 
schools. A special training period is reserYed for the1 during Septelber. 
•laster Vacation 
••Vacation - Personnel 
***Vacation - Personnel 
1 A.I. 1 17 13322. 
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OTTO Lista: Banned Textbooks 
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Paris 
September, 1940 
Preamble 
Wishing to contribute to the creation of a more healthy 
atmosphere and a desire to establish the necessary conditions 
for a more objective appreciation of European problems, the 
French editors have decided to withdraw from bookstores the 
sale of books which are on the following lists, and similar 
lists which could be published later. These are books which 
in their untruthful spirit and tendencies have systematically 
poisoned the French public opinion. The publications of 
political refugees and Jewish writers are particularly aimed 
at because they have betrayed the hospitality that France had 
granted them. They have, without any scruples, pushed France 
to a war from which they try to profit from their selfish 
goals. 
I Comite 
Albin Michel 
Al can 
Armand Colin 
Asy-Verlag 
Attinoer 
Baudiniere 
Beresniak 
Berour-Levrault 
Bibliotheque D#Anvers 
Bibliotheque du Musee Social 
Bloud et Gay 
Bureau d#Editions 
Cahiers de Cyrano 
Calmann-Levy 
Castermann 
Alsacien d#Etudes et d#Information 
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List of Books Removed from Sale by Hachette 
October 11-25, 1940 
Hachette 
By the orders of German Authority, the following books 
must be immediately withdrawn from sale. The final decision 
taken on the matter will be communicated to bookstores. 
Meanwhile, the bookstore owners are notified that it is in 
their best interest to return copies which they hold in stock 
to the publisher before Novemper 10, 1940. If they do not 
follow such orders, they may be liable or requisitioned by 
the German Authorities. 
B~jean: Resume aide memoire d~histoire Brevet ~lementaire 
Bertaux et Lepointe: L~Allemagne par les textes 
Bertaux: Versions et themes de lJAllemand au bac 
. / Bouillot: Le Fran~ais par lea textes cours superieur 
Cohen: La grande guerre 1914-1918, encyclopedie par 
lJimage 
Daljat: Gloire, hiatoire illustre de la guerre 1914-1918 
Dumas: Livre unique de Francais cours moyen et superieur 
Gallouedec, Maurette et Martin: L~Europe et lJAmerique 
Les Principales Puissances 
Gauthier-Deschamps: Legona completes dJhistoirea 
Gauthier-Deschamps et Aymard: Histoire de France en images 
Helot: DeUX. cents questions dJhistoire et de geographie 
Isaac: Petite histoire de France 1789-1912 
Isaac et Alba: Histoire, Fourth Grade 
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Lemonnier-Sohrader et Dubois-: I Geographie, cours superieur et 
complementaire 
I 
Malet: Histoire 
Malet et Isaac: 
de France De~uis la Revolution, Tome III 
Cours abrege d 1 histoire 
Les Temps Modernes 
Histoire Contemporaire 
Le Moyen Age Jusqu 1 a la Guerre de Cent Ans 
Paces: Histoire sommaire de la France 
Scheme: Cent compositions d 1 histoire et de geographie 
Cent questions d 1 histoire et de geographie 
Additional Textbooks Banned from Usage 
in the Public Primary Schools 
Male: Au Jardin des Images ( Sudel, Editor) 
Vildrac: Classe de Fin d 1 Etudes 
Truillet & Berger: Le Cof fre aux Joujou 
Dubua: La Ronde des I Metiers et des Jours 
Rollard & Mallaurie: Series Jean Christophe 
Adenis: La Lecture Vivante 
Ballereau-Brangier: Les Textes Vivants 
Weber & Gailly: Arithmetic 
Bonne: France and Civilization 
DuVillage: History of France Explained to Children 
Clemendot: History 
Brossolette: History of France 
Bougle-LeFranc: History of Work and Civilization 
Additional Textbooks Banned from Usage 
in the Public Primary Schools 
continued 
Gachon-Seneze: Geography 
Emery: Before Life 
Primaire: Moral, Civic and Social Education Manual 
Mercier: History of France and Algeria 
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Letter of Inspector Monod to Minister Ripert 
November, 1940 
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Rapport de M. Monod, Inspecteur de l·Academie de Paris sur 
la r~union des Proviseurs et Directrices des Lyc~es 
pariaiens, tenue a la Sorbonne le 4 Novembre, 1940. 
5 Novembre 1940 
Monsieur le Recteur, 
J·ai l·honneur de voua rendre compte que, d·accord avec mes 
collegues et avec M. Guyot, Secretaire General de l·Univer-
site, nous avons reuni hier soir 4 Novembre a 17 heures dans 
la Salle des Commissions lea Proviaeurs et Directrices des 
lycees parisiens. 
L·objet de cette reunion etait d·attirer l·attention des 
Chefs d•Etablissements sur lea mesures a prendre pour eviter 
dans nos lycees tout incident d·ordre politique. Cea 
mesures ne pouvaient pas faire l·objet de circulaires ou de 
messages telephones: nous avons cru necessaire de les pre-
scrire de vive voix. J·ai pris la parole en votre nom et au 
nom de mes collegues. L·echange de vues qui a suivi a 
revele que la situation, sans etre grave, meritait d•etre 
con~ideree tant dans lea lyceea de gar9ons que dana lea 
lycees de jeunes filles avec beaucoup de vigilance. 
Certains quartiers de Paris manifestent plus d 1 emotion que 
d·autres. Les Chefs d•Etablissements passeront eux memes 
dans lea classes et donneront aux eleves des conseils de 
prudence, en soulignant lea consequences tres graves qu·un 
acte isole peut avoir sur l·activite tout entiere de nos 
lycees. 
Bien que la question ne fut pas a l·ordre du jour, les Chefs 
d•Etablissements ont profite de cette reunion pour signaler 
a l.Administration superieure lea difficultes qu'ils 
eprouvent a appliquer le statut des Juifs. Leurs obser-
vations ont porte sur lea points auivanta: 
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1/ La designation des fonctionnaires juifs "de notoriete 
publique" OU a la connaissance des Chefs dJEtablissements" 
parait devoir entrainer arbitraire et injustice. Il est 
inutile de rappeler que jamais lJAdministration universi-
taire fran9aise ne sJest inquietee jusquJa present de la 
race OU de la religion de son personne. Les liates a 
etablir vent done reposer sur des t6moignages indirects, 
necesaairement incertaina. Tel fonctionnaire au nom aryen 
(je mJexcuae dJavoir a employer dans ce rapport un vocabu-
laire a ce point ~tranger a une plume dJadministrateur 
fran9ais) peut avoir le nombre d#ascendanta juifs qui 
devrait lJexclure de nos range. Inversement un profeaseur 
au nom juif peut echapper a la proscription du fait de ses 
ascendants maternela. Faudra-t-il demander des pieces 
d#etat civil a ceux que designe "la notoriete publique?" 
Mais lea administrateurs que nous sommes sont bien peu 
competents pour juger de la valeur de cea pieces, qui, en 
France, jusqu#a notre recente defaite, ne comportaient 
aucune mention de race ou de religion. 
Au critere de la n~toriete publique, il y aurait done lieu 
de substituer la declaration individuelle faite sur ques-
tionnaire par chaque membre de personnel enaeignant: lea 
Chefs ~#Etabliaaementa nous ont demande aJila pouvaient 
proceder ainai. Je n#ai pas voulu leur donner de reponae 
sans vous en referer, eatimant que l#Adminiatration super-
ieure avait sans doute eu sea raiaona en ne preacrivant pas 
cette maniere de faire. 
/ I , --.. " 2/ La question a ete poaee savoir si devaient etre portes 
sur les listes les fonctionnaires juifs "de notoriete 
publique" qui, soldats de la derniere guerre sont 
actuellement absents parce que portes disparus - ou 
prisonniers en Allemagne - ou hospitalises pour blessures. 
J#ai du r~pondre que ni la loi ni la circulaire d#applica-
tion ne creaient d#exception, dans le corps enseignant, en 
faveur des anciens combattants de cette guerre ou de la 
guerre de 1914. Cette reponse a soulev~ lea reserves et les 
regrets que voua devinez. 
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Je dois dJailleurs vous rendre compte, Monsieur le Recteur, 
de lJatmosphere dJemotion grave et douloureuse dans laquelle 
sJest deroule cet entretien. Manifeatement les mesures que 
la loi recente impose a nos Chefs dJEtablissement, non 
seulement sont contraires a leurs habitudea, maia elles 
blesaent leura consciences dJadminiatrateura aussi 
soucieuses de lJinteret de leura eleves que de celui des 
professeura quJila ont a diriger. Le nombre des fonction-
naires juifa "de notoriete publique" doit etre dans les 
lycees parisiena dJenviron 80 sur pres de 3.000, soit moins 
de 3%. Dans lJhypotheae ou il y aurait un enseignement juif 
particulierement dangereux, comment admettre que sJexercant 
dana de pareillea proportions son influence ne soit pas 
largement neutralisee? 
Mais il eat evident quJil ne sJagit pas ici de nombre. 
LJemotion que jJai sentie - et dont certains mJont dit 
quJelle traduiaait celle du corps enseignant tout entier -
venait de plus loin. Ce qui est aujourdJhui mis en ques-
tion, cJest le liberalisme univeraitaire, cJest toute une 
conception d lJhonneur intellectuel qui a ete puisee par 
nous taus au plus profond des traditions fran9aises human-
iste et chretienne, - et quJil parait impossible a un 
universitaire de renier. 
Je dois a la verit~ de dire, Monsieur le Recteur, que je 
nJai pas ete un bon avocat de la cause administrative, et 
que bien loin de pouvoir la defendre, jJai ete oblige de 
mJaasocier sinon en paroles, du moins dans le secret de ma 
pensee a toutes lea reserves formulees.· Mon loyalisme de 
fonctionnaire mJoblige a vous apporter ce temoignage que je 
vous serais reconnaiasant de transmettre a M. le Ministre. 
Dear Dean: 
English Translation 
Monod Report 
November 5, 1940 
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I have the honor to report that in agreement with my 
colleagues and Mr. Guyot, General Secretary of the 
University, we had a meeting yesterday, November 4 at 5 p.m. 
in the Commission Room with the principals of the parisian 
high schools. 
The object of this meeting was to attract the attention 
of the directors of the teaching institutions on measures to 
take to avoid any political incident in our schools. These 
instructions could not be written or telephoned. We thought 
it necessary to express them directly. I spoke in your name 
and the name of your colleagues. The following points of 
view have revealed that the situation without being serious, 
should be watched as much in the girls# schools as in the 
boys# schools. Certain areas of Paris express more emotion 
than others. The directors of schools will personally go 
into the classrooms and will give prudent advice to students 
underlining the very serious consequences that an isolated 
act may have over the activity of all our schools. 
Even so, the question was not on the agenda, the direc-
tors of schools have expressed· in the meeting the difficulty 
they have in applying the statute of the Jews. Their obser-
vations were as follows: 
1. The designation of Jewish functionaries as "public 
notoriety" or joined to the director of the school seem to 
produce injustices and arbitrary decisions. It is not 
necessary to recall that French University administration 
never discriminated on the basis of race or religion. 
Lists which will be established will therefore· be based on 
indirect testimony. This testimony is unreliable. Those 
functionaires with an aryan name (forgive me to have to use 
vocabulary in this report so foreign to the pen of a French 
administrator) leave a certain number of Jewish ascendants 
which might exclude him from our ranks. Inversely, a pro-
fessor with a Jewish name may escape the interdiction due to 
his maternal ascendants. Should we ask for a document from 
those who are designated "public notoriety? We administra-
tors are poorly competent to judge the value of these docu-
ments which in France until our recent def eat did not 
mention race or religion. 
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To the criterion of "publi• c notoriety", we should therefore 
substitute individual decl-arations written by each member of 
teaching ~rsonnel. The d irectors of schools have asked if 
they could proceed in such a way. I did want to give my re-
sponse without referring t:-his question to you because I 
estimate that the secondar:y school administration has with-
out doubt had its reasons -to circumscribe this procedure. 
2. The question has been - asked if we should include on the 
list Jewish "public notori .. ety" functionaries those who are 
soldiers and are at preaen-t absent because they have diaap-
peared--becauae they are p:risoner in Germany or in hospital 
because of wounds. 
I had to respond that nei t:her the law nor the application 
circular credited exceptio=n in the teaching corps in favor 
of veterans in this war or in the war of 1914. This 
response has produced the : reserve and regrets which you 
suspect. I mention also t•o you, Dean, that the atmosphere 
was full of serious, painf.....-ul emotion. Obviously, the 
measures that the recent 1. aw imposes on our school directors 
are not only contrary to tiheir habits, but wound their con-
sciences as administrators because they are worried about 
the safety of their atuden-ts and their professors. The num-
ber of Jewish functionairi• es of "public notoriety" in the 
secondary schools in Paris must be appromximately 80 or a 
total of 3,000 pupil a, the= re·fore, less than 3 percent. In 
the hypothesis where there would be a Jewish teacher partic-
ularly dangerous, how can =you admit that exercising his in-
fluence in similar proport_ ions he would not be neutralized? 
But it is clear that here _it is not a question of number. 
The emotions which I felt, and of which some have told me 
from the whole teaching co=rps, came from further back. What 
is today put into question is university liberalism as a 
whole--a conception of inteellectual honor which has been 
founded by us in the moat rProfound French tradition of 
humanism and Christianity. And this is impossible for a 
university memory to forge-t. 
I must say in truth, J:Dean, that I have not been a good 
lawyer of the administrati~e cause and that far from being 
able to defend i ta poai tio:cn, I have been obliged to asso-
ciate myself, if not in worrds, at least in the secrecy of my 
thoughts, to all the reser...-vations which were expressed. My 
loyalism asa functionary mnandates that I report this testi-
mony to you, and I would bse grateful if you transmitted it 
to the Minister. 
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